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My Hiphop Philosophy—“A Strange Affinity” 
 
 
 This project works backwards: a contemporary concern—my deep engagement with 
hiphop music—is used as a heuristic device through which to resound the historical 
trajectory of American modernism.  The intention is ot so much to explicate an airtight 
genealogy as to dwell upon the juxtaposition of twobodies of work separated by a 
temporal gap but nevertheless possessing significant and unexplored similarities.  Such a 
comparison can provide a novel understanding of both terms.  Pragmatism—especially as 
enunciated in the work of William James—is chosen as a starting point due both to its 
prominence in the history of American modernism andbecause I believe it holds a 
strange, but compelling, affinity with hiphop.  As soon as I began reading James’s work, 
I intuited a connection between it and hiphop and as I grew more familiar with it my 
sense that he and the contemporary musicians I had been studying were concerned with 
the same issues and had developed remarkably similar approaches to their engagement 
became stronger.  To a large extent, the current project comes down to giving voice to 
this intuition, despite the difficulty involved in articulating it.  I am given assistance, 
however, by the wide-ranging literature tracing the rich interaction of pragmatism and the 
African American vernacular, particularly the work of Carrie Bramen, Michael Magee, 
Ross Posnock, and, of course, Cornel West.1
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 James’s pragmatism—especially as elaborated by his students Gertrude Stein and 
W.E.B. Du Bois—touches deeply upon two related concer s that have arisen through my 
study and enjoyment of hiphop music: improvisational lyricism, on the one hand, and the 
interaction between personal development and artistic achievement, on the other.  The 
philosophy of affect and expression issuing out of James’s work and the variations his 
successors performed upon it must be considered acts of art as well as of thought.  
Pragmatism, as I use it, is a means for enacting thi king as improvisational lyricism and 
thereby eliciting affective resonance from one’s audience.  It is also, at the same time, a 
method of achieving and reflecting upon self-realization—and thereby reshaping 
reality—through aesthetic practice and theory.  Pragm tism as improvisational lyricism 
infuses language with music, working with found materials to achieve the unforeseen.  In 
this capacity, it serves as a means for working through and struggling to communicate 
one’s most unique and deeply felt—and by the same tok n most difficult to articulate—
experiences.  That is, it is a program for engaging what I call the existential problematic 
of singularity in order to trigger an ongoing process of attunement that gives rise to an 
ever-expanding ensemble of practitioners dedicated to fully sounding singularity’s plural 
potentials, dwelling upon the differences that we all share.  As such, it serves as a 
touchstone from which to begin explicating the independently invented but deeply similar 
philosophy that lies behind and motivates the music of hiphop.  At the same time, hiphop 
can be heard as the fulfillment of the promise implcit in the work of James, Stein, and 
Du Bois.  In order to begin unpacking this argument, I will now tell the story of how I got 
from hiphop to pragmatism in the first place. 
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Once Upon a Time Not Long Ago 
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 KRS-One, “Poetry”2 
 
 One of the first hiphop records I bought, a few years after a friend sent me a dubbed 
copy of Run-DMC’s Raising Hell, was Boogie Down Productions’ By All Means 
Necessary.  The reference to Malcolm X meant something to me, and it was a major 
reason why I picked up the album in the first place.  As it turned out, more than the cover 
photo of KRS-One holding an Uzi in one hand and lifting back the curtains to peek out 
his front window with the other, it was the record’s first track that mixed up the future of 
hiphop with my own.  The DJ drops the question “So you’re a philosopher” and cuts the 
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response “Yes, I think very deeply” with the emphasis on the first syllable so the listener 
is crystal clear about the positive response.  My head starts to bob as the scratched 
rhythm blends into one of hiphop’s perfect beats—a loop of “Sister Sanctified,” 
composed by Weldon Irvine and performed by Stanley Turrentine.  KRS starts spitting 
lyrics, and I am hooked for good.  More than what he is saying, it is his style that gets me 
open.  It is cool that KRS plays the role of the teacher against wannabe kings and sucka 
MCs, letting me know “it’s not about a salary, it’s all about reality.”  But what makes it 
real are not these words by themselves, but the way they are transformed by the sound of 
KRS’s voice and mixed with the beat. 
 The whole style of the song teaches me what it means to be fresh, dope, wild, chill.  
These are the main qualities that make hiphop what it is.  Fresh: smooth, swift, brilliant.  
Dope: solid, steady, deep.  Wild: explosive, exceptional, eccentric.  Chill: cool, 
composed, concentrated.  Listening to “My Philosophy” is the first time I remember 
hearing hiphop in full effect, the optimal balance of fresh, dope, wild, chill.  I wanted to 
follow in KRS’s footsteps.  He presented a powerful example of how these four 
potentially conflicting qualities could be mixed into coherent fusions of language and 
music, creating improvisational sounds of edutainmet.  It would take a few years for this 
lesson to really sink in.  Although I knew how to appreciate these sounds, I had yet to 
learn how to make them my own.  I needed to find my own style, make my own voice out 
of the gifts I had been given.  I was in search of a new element, my own original 
contribution to the world of hiphop. 
 The summer after my junior year in college, I was living in New York City 
researching my honors thesis, checking out graduate schools, and in general planning my 
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future.  Given my limited budget, one of my favorite pastimes—other than free movie 
screenings and the concerts I absolutely could not miss—was browsing in bookstores.  I 
especially enjoyed the large chains, because the volume of customers could easily 
camouflage the fact that my casual shopping would often take many hours.  I would skim 
books that I could not afford to buy, taking notes.  It was roughly equivalent to the access 
I had to the university libraries in the area, but the ambiance was better.  One day, when I 
found myself in the Barnes and Noble in Astor Place, I decided to take a break from my 
studies and check out the magazines.  Of course, I w nt straight to the music section and 
was struck once again by the sad state of American hiphop journalism.3  My mood 
improved when I came across a British magazine calld Trace.  The latest issue caught 
my eye because Goldie was on the cover, one of the musicians broadcasting the hiphop-
spawned genre of “drum and bass” from London to the rest of the world. 
 I had started to get into this kind of music a few months before, digging the way it 
flipped the hiphop script by smashing breakbeat land speed records.  I turned 
immediately to the cover story.  After a few lines, I went to the bookstore café, splurged 
on a cup of coffee, and transcribed pretty much the entire article in the same notebook 
where I had been bouncing back and forth between pla ning my honors thesis on 
American literature and drawing up outlines for my dissertation on hiphop.  The 
combination was somewhat of a mess, but my current find would help me clear things up 
a bit.  What struck me most about the interview washow Goldie presents the way he 
moved from being a hiphop head to becoming a drum and b ss musician by drawing on 
his experience as a graffiti writer.  Hiphop sampling, he suggests, grows into drum and 
bass the same way plain old block letters grow into wildstyle.  Will Ashon, Goldie’s 
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interviewer, explains that “in wildstyle, the writer ‘processes’ letters again and again, 
twisting them into ever more abstract shapes until they are unrecognizable as the original 
letters.”  Hiphop sampling does the same thing, with sounds rather than letters, forming 
the foundation for drum and bass’s further advances.  “It’s all about processing sound and 
taking sound forward,” Goldie tells Ashon, “as opposed to just using the sample.” 
 Goldie’s view of making music meshes with his broader understanding of style.  Just 
as in sampling you have to use what you find to make something new rather than just 
repeating the old, to be a hiphop head “you can’t jus take it up and think that’s it—go 
and buy a baseball cap, get some sneakers and you’re down.  It’s about progressing your 
own space.”  Ashon noted that “Goldie’s approach to life/music/art” vibed with “KRS-
One’s notion that the root of hiphop is self-creation.”  In fact, a shorter interview he did 
with KRS is published as a sidebar along with the Goldie article, in which Ashon 
continued exploring the comparison.  “The zenith of iphop, the movement, the forward 
movement of hiphop is exactly what you’re talking about,” KRS agreed, “create new 
things, create self.  Now we’re in a position where we can create new laws and new 
philosophies where before we could only re-create the turntable and dance and art and 
singing.”4   Reading this brought me back to the experience of h aring “My Philosophy” 
for the first time.  The notion of hiphop philosophy was resounding with both old 
meanings and new possibilities.  Thinking through this mix I started to hear my own 
voice, the first sounds of my own style.  I would give back what hiphop artists had given 
me by working to transform what I had learned from their examples into something of 
my own, contributing to the development of a new element of our common culture.  
Before I could present my version of hiphop philosophy, though, I would have to find a 
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way to render in words what these art forms mean to me, how they make this meaning, 
and why they are so important.  The notion of processing that Goldie put together from 
his experiences with sampling, graffiti, and hiphop style in general was a clue.  But I 
would have work to do on my own in order to realize this glimmering prospect by mixing 
it up with what I was learning in school. 
 In college I majored in English, but my interest in he world beyond literature placed 
me as part of a trend within that discipline migrating towards an evasive destination 
called cultural studies.  Even within this broader fi ld I felt a bit hampered, though.  
Much of the work in cultural studies, especially when it is informed by the study of 
literature, takes literature as a model for culture in general.  At its extreme this approach 
reduces the world to one big “text,” nipping my extracurricular ambitions in the bud.  
Assuming that everything works like literature makes it hard to understand why anyone 
would study anything else.  In particular, I found this overemphasis on the “literary” 
discouraging because it resulted in a picture of hiphop music in which lyrics and beats are 
treated just like words on a page.  The sounds at the heart of hiphop culture were nowhere 
to be heard.  In short, there was little that was fre h, dope, wild, or chill about the current 
state of hiphop scholarship.  In my first year of graduate school, though, I began to learn 
more about other disciplines that suggested promising approaches to forms of cultural 
activity other than literature.  Particularly interesting for me were anthropology and 
intellectual history.  These two disciplines may seem to conflict, one focusing on the 
foreign yet ordinary and the other on the familiar yet obscure.  As I learned about them, 
however, they have been complementary.  For me, both present thinking as an ordinary 
activity, a shared experience that forms an important p rt of everyday life across various 
 8
settings.  This mix of anthropology and intellectual history infused the ways of reading 
and writing I had learned through studying literatue, and I began to get a sense for how I 
could transform cultural studies into a way of studying culture that could voice my 
hiphop philosophy.  I would begin working through this fusion by studying 
improvisation. 
 In order to begin exploring my way of studying culture, I started an ethnographic 
project on the hiphop scene in Detroit.  I was a participant observer at a local open mic 
night during the year that it lasted.  My first night there I started a friendship with the 
organizer of the open mic, an aspiring hiphop musician who goes by the name Lacks (aka 
Ta’Raach).  Over the next few weeks Lacks introduce m  to Hodgepodge (aka Big 
Tone) and Elzhi, the other members of his crew, the Breakfast Club.  During this period 
of listening to hungry MCs battle over the mic and hanging out with the Breakfast Club I 
would become familiar with freestylin, the art of improvisational lyricism that would give 
me a sense of how to express what hiphop means to me. 5  I wrote an essay about my 
experience of doing ethnography, working to present fr estylin not only as the art of 
kicking lyrics off the top of the dome but also as a way of thinking on your feet.  
Freestylin involves diligently improvising, not only on stage or in the studio, but 
throughout the different parts of the world an MC moves through.  The experience of 
learning how to do improvisational lyricism flows through artistic activity to infuse other 
aspects of his or her life in the form of meaningful and effective ways of doing things in 
general, ways that balance the competing demands of structure and spontaneity, 
convention and singularity.6  Freestylin, then, is hiphop’s equivalent to the pragmatism 
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James developed and that Stein and Du Bois elaborated upon.  Or, James and his students 
could be understood to have been engaged in freestylin before the letter. 
 From this perspective, it seemed to me that independent hiphop musicians like Lacks, 
Tone, and El—artists who strive to retain a sense of artistic integrity throughout the 
inevitable compromises they make—provide compelling examples of how to go about 
doing my own work as a hiphop scholar.  This lesson was brought home for me during 
the interview I did with the Breakfast Club, capping my experience as a participant 
observer. We had been trying to arrange a time when we could all get together for a 
while, without success.  Finally, when we were all h nging out after an open mic one 
night, around two in the morning, we decided to head over to a nearby all-night café to 
talk for a few hours while we ate.  Admittedly, this was not exactly what came to mind 
when I heard the word “interview,” but the results were beyond what I could have 
expected.  Rather than asking a series of preformulated technical questions, I was more 
interested in just talking about how Lacks, Tone, and El had gotten into hiphop, what it 
meant to them, why they wanted to be musicians.  We reminisced about our similar 
experiences digging the sounds of our favorite MCs, DJs, and producers, wanting to 
make those sounds our own by learning how to put together our own versions of hiphop 
style.  When our conversation turned to the present, the tone shifted as the positive 
energies of aspiration met the resistance of the reality of being an independent hiphop 
musician in Detroit, where venues, labels, and audiences are unpredictable and often 
temporary. 
 By the time we did the interview, Lacks had become frustrated with the experience of 
organizing his open mic.  He explained that he wanted to recreate the freestylin events 
 10 
that had played such an important role in his own hiphop education, to provide an 
opportunity for younger MCs to learn their craft.  But he found that the effort was more 
of a struggle than he had expected.  The people who showed up to claim their share of the 
mic time seemed more interested in imitating the sort of artists who made platinum 
records than developing new styles and participating in the common activities that make 
up the shared experience of hiphop that he was working to maintain.  The frustration of 
trying to teach his peers the basic principles of the art of freestylin with limited success 
compounded the struggles he was having getting his career off the ground.  Lacks felt 
less sure that he could bring back the vibe of freestylin on his own, and decided to take a 
less active role in organizing the open mic, letting the owners of the venue do what they 
could with it.  “I’m just going to let it continue itself,” he said, “and if it rises it rises.  I’m 
not going to put everything into it, but I felt like I had to because there was nothing.”  
Lacks still wanted independent hiphop to be as strong in his home town as it seemed it 
could be during the freestylin sessions he participated in a few years back, but he had 
learned that “only the people can bring the vibe back.”  Although he held out hope, Lacks 
was less positive about this possibility than he had been at first.  “People are lost,” Lacks 
told me, “they don’t know what to do.” 
 Lacks’s sense of struggle resonated with me, but Iwas also a bit taken aback by what 
I took to be a note of defeat in his voice, an assumption that soon proved to be mistaken.  
I asked what he thought needed to change, putting the emphasis on the last word.  Lacks 
rose to the challenge, straightening his posture, his eyes widening.  “Thinking!” he said 
with force.  “Howdoyouhowdowehowdoyou go about  c h an g i n g  
t h i n k i n?” I asked, clearly thrown for a loop, “Or do you just assume that it’s 
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going to change?”  By this point Tone was laughing as he listened to our exchange, but 
not in a mean way.  It was more like he was saying, “I know how you feel.  I’ve been 
there myself.  But that’s just the way it is.”  As Tone gave me what sounded like a pat on 
the back, Lacks answered my question.  “Hope . . . teach,” he said, more relaxed but his 
voice still sounding strong, “teach through being a example, yaknowwhati’msayin.”  
The note Lacks ended on, one that had been sounded continuously throughout the course 
of our conversation, made it clear that my mistake had not strained our relationship.  He 
knew that the learning process is a bumpy road, and still considered me someone with 
experiences similar to his, pursuing the same prospect .  Like me, Lacks wanted to 
communicate and contribute to what hiphop means to u .  What he had learned, and what 
he was teaching me, was that there are certain limits to what anyone can do on their own.  
Lacks recognized those limits and decided that his example could be made more effective 
through his music than through struggling to keep a mediocre open mic alive. 7  
 Although at first this decision confused me, the more I thought about Lacks’s 
position, the more it made sense.  It made sense becaus  I began to realize that Lacks was 
also teaching me that there are limits to what hiphop as a whole can do.  It was not just 
the harsh realities that the open mic Lacks started would pass away and the coffee shop 
where it took place would also soon go out of busine s that tempered my expectations.  
Despite these failures, hiphop was still meaningful for us, perhaps more so.  In fact, such 
mistakes are valuable in themselves because without em we would not continue 
learning and striving to change for the better.  My experience doing ethnography taught 
me that what makes freestylin a meaningful way of thinking and doing things is not 
necessarily its practical applications, although these are important.  What makes this kind 
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of improvisation a common activity in our everyday life is simply the fact that it is 
artistic.  As the example of James’s pragmatism will show, the aesthetic dimension is in 
fact at the very heart of practicality.  Art can shape a shared experience that teaches a 
lesson and touches on ethics without being anything other than art.  It is through the 
engagement of the existential problematic of expressing singularity that the pedagogical 
imperative of turning an audience into an attuned ensemble is pursued.  This is what it 
means to “teach through being an example.”  This is how one keeps hoping that more and 
more people will catch the drift of “yaknowwhati’msayin.”  This was the tone that I 
would seek to emphasize as I revised my paper about doing ethnography.  During the 
process of revision, I would infuse the presentation of my experience doing ethnography 
with an additional stream of meaning that was now my strongest point.  What I now 
knew about freestylin mixed with my interest in rend ring the sounds of hiphop, and the 
combination painted a picture of hiphop lyricism as a form of music, infusing music 
through language by treating words as sounds.  In making this presentation, I compared 
the process of lyrical improvisation with the notion f sampling as “processing” that I had 
picked up from Goldie, and which I found further fleshed out in the work of Joe Schloss.8 
 The aspect of Schloss’s work that I found particularly insightful was his definition of 
the basic operations that make up the sampling process.  Interviewing a number of hiphop 
producers, Schloss found that they shared a way of talking about three basic ways of 
working with samples.  He traces these ways of sampling back to the unique forms of 
working with records developed by the DJs who provided the initial spark setting off the 
whole style of hiphop.  For producers, the most fundamental form of sampling—the basic 
concept that the other two main techniques are in fact variations on—is flipping.  
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Flipping is a matter of creating an unexpected effect through the manipulation of sampled 
sounds—or, more difficult, taking something familiar, thin, uninteresting, or corny and 
making it sound fresh, dope, wild, chill.  Often this is done through making effective 
mixes of things that do not seem to go together, drawing out real commonalities while 
also maintaining a certain independence for each of t e various elements.  For example, 
part of what makes a hiphop record remarkable is that drums from a funk 45 and strings 
from a classical LP, when layered one on top of the ot r, sound good together without 
sounding like the same thing.  Not that a hiphop track is always in pieces.  A good song is 
a whole, but a whole that is composed through the ongoing tension of its parts, making 
constructive use of dissonance.  Further, since sampling works with readily available 
sound recordings, flipping is rooted in that aspect of improvisation that involves using the 
limits of the materials we are currently given in order to change them.  The tension that 
sustains a good record is neither steady equilibrium nor swirling randomness.  It is 
regular fluctuation achieved and sustained through constructive dissonance.  At the heart 
of sampling, freestylin, and hiphop style as a whole is this sensibility of constructive 
dissonance, a feel for mixing what we find to improvise new things.  This is one of the 
main things it shares in common with Jamesian pragmatis . 
 As Schloss points out, one of the main things producers enjoy about flipping is the 
challenge of achieving self-expression through the processing of found objects, 
channeling spontaneity and building structure by drawing upon—and stretching—the 
embedded constraints of source material.  Towards this end, producers often alter the 
tone, timbre, or tempo of the sample.  Sometimes thy break a sample into pieces and 
rearrange them, engaging in the second main technique of sampling, called chopping.  
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Chopping is often contrasted with looping, the third basic form of sampling.  Looping 
entails making a beat out of one or more sampled phrases that are layered and repeated.  
Chopping is more technically complicated, but even in looping a certain degree of skill is 
involved in making the breaks that form a sample in the first place.  Both kinds of 
flipping can sound just as good.  The way hiphop producers chop samples into small 
pieces and put them back together to make a seamless beat is astounding.  Loops can be 
equally entrancing by letting the energy of a favorite sample build through repetition and, 
especially when loops are layered, bringing out unexpected nuances from the background 
of a familiar stream of sound.9 
 Schloss’s work proved useful for my interest in freestylin because I found the same 
processes of flipping, chopping, and looping to be basic forms of lyricism as well as 
producing.10  The difference is that while producing transforms sound recordings through 
the process of sampling, lyricism transforms language by treating words like sounds.  In 
combination beats and lyrics hold together overlapping sequences of potentially 
conflicting materials to form connections that are s flexible and fluid as they are sound 
and sensible.  A good hiphop joint is one that balances singularity and convention by 
making constructive use of dissonance.  This hiphop improvisation composes a unique, 
balanced, and versatile fusion of words and sounds that motivates us to keep reworking 
what it means to be fresh, dope, wild, chill.   Freestylin and sampling are overlapping 
aspects of hiphop style, forming shared experiences and common activities through 
which we take up the challenge of continuously making and remaking culture.  The forms 
of hiphop art, and the sensibility of constructive dissonance through which we approach 
and sustain the regular fluctuation of hiphop style, not only makes music.  In making 
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music it sounds unique ways of thinking and living.  In short, when successfully 
combined through constructive dissonance, lyrics and beats make a music of fusion that 
configures our experience through hiphop culture, oganizing a common way of life and a 
shared world of sounds in which improvisation plays  leading role.  As episodes of 
improvisational lyricism in their own right, the works of James, Stein, and Du Bois also 
work to infuse language with music and realize the ethical implications of this type of 
aesthetic experimentation.  That is to say, what I experience hiphop doing at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, they experienced pragmatism doing at the turn of the twentieth. 
 Forming this picture went a long way towards helping me express what the sounds of 
hiphop mean to me, but it was not the end of the task that I had set myself.  I was not just 
interested in presenting this view of hiphop as a fact.  The music does this on its own, and 
if I was going to contribute to the development of what musicians have created I would 
have to make a further contribution that gestures towards the broader prospects of hiphop.  
In addition to painting a picture, I wanted to find out and make known how this picture 
works.  As Lacks had taught me, this question of working did not begin and end with the 
question of how hiphop music could have practical, even political, effects.  In order to get 
into this ethical territory I would first have to figure out how, artistically, these fusions of 
sounds and words can be made.11  Further, I needed to get a sense of how musicians learn 
to do so.  Finally, I wanted to know what exactly hiphop music does that sounds good 
and why these sounds are so meaningful.  Working to address these questions led me to 
consider what lessons I could draw for my way of studying hiphop from the more 
developed field of studying jazz.12  This comparison would help me to realize how 
hiphop’s sounds of fusion moved through a broader field of improvisation.  In the 
 16 
process, I would begin to get a sense for how hiphop culture, beyond forming meaningful 
experiences of its own, composes a promising way of thinking about life and the world in 
general.  In particular, being a hiphop scholar came to mean not only studying hiphop.  
What I really wanted to do was make studying into a way of doing hiphop.   The unique 
rendition of American modernism, with improvisational lyricism at its heart, that this 
project performs is an attempt at just that.  According to the terms of this undertaking it 
makes sense to view contemporary independent musician  as latter-day pragmatists, and 
to hear James, Stein, and Du Bois as hiphop artists before the letter. 
 Pursuing this second possibility, James can be heard—in the many lectures that he 
gave, some of which formed the basis of his most significant publications—sounding the 
same sort of edutainment KRS-One both prescribes and performs on “My Philosophy.”  
Stein can be read to “process” grammar in the same way wildstyle graffiti processes 
typography.  Du Bois can be understood to “teach through being an example” like Lacks 
does, thereby working to inspire the formation of an attuned ensemble that stages a 
plumbing of the depths of singularity, breaking conve tions to make way for the sort of 
affective resonance that catalyzes liberatory experiments in sociality.  Both hiphop and 
pragmatism are aesthetic practices with ethical upshots.  They are ways of changing 
thinking (enriching feeling, broadening experience) in order to craft new modalities of 
personal interaction.  Hiphop can be understood as a remix of American modernism, but 
this is so only because pragmatism’s practical aesthetics enacts operations similar to 
those that form the core toolkit of sampling and freestylin. 
 In charting this course I am informed by, engaging, and intervening in several 
overlapping bodies of scholarship, the most obvious and prominent being the secondary 
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literature on James.  This material is quite voluminous, covering a vast range of topics 
from epistemology to ethics.  Most pertinent for myown purposes has been the work of  
a handful of scholars who have chosen to stress an aesthetic approach and in doing so 
have written, so to speak, the prolegomena to my own rendering of Jamesian pragmatism 
as a philosophy of improvisation including as a core component an insistence that its 
articulation be artful.  Pioneering this strain of inquiry, Jacques Barzun has illustrated 
how James’s experience as a painter shaped the composition of his first major work, The 
Principles of Psychology.  In doing so he makes a compelling case for the argument that 
for James matters of aesthetics suffuse consciousness, experience, and everyday life in 
general and writ large.  On this basis, he goes on to argue that what distinguishes 
pragmatism as a philosophy is that it is also an art, going so far as to claim that “the artist 
is the pragmatist par excellence.”13  In his extensive reading of Principles, Barzun pieces 
together a picture of the human psyche as born and bred improviser.  It was on the basis 
of this psychology of improvisation, he goes on to suggest, that the lectures collected 
under the title of Pragmatism both outline and embody a philosophical program of 
artistic expression. 
 Following Barzun’s lead, Richard Poirier seizes on James’s call for “the reinstatement 
of the vague” in Principles as the opening salvo of an improvisational campaign of 
experimental literature.  Arguing that the distinguishing feature of pragmatism is “a kind 
of rapid or wayward movement of voice,” Poirier suggests that for James philosophy was 
equivalent to poetry—particularly, I would add, of the lyric variety.14  Supplementing and 
working to make concrete the claims of Poirier, in Mallarmé’s Children: Symbolism and 
the Renewal of Experience, Richard Cándida Smith shows how the French Symbolists 
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and the members of the American avant-garde informed by them drew on James’s notion 
of the self as something that is constantly improvised rather than ready made from the 
outset in order to pursue their artistic experiments.  My own work seeks to add to this 
aesthetic approach to James by foregrounding, more than has been done previously, the 
role of musicality in his work.  Part of this slight retuning is drawing on The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, rather than Principles or Pragmatism, as the primary point of 
reference.  By examining how in his lectures James not only meditated upon the 
philosophical import of music but also attempted to approximate its experiential effects, I 
provide a fuller picture of pragmatism as improvisational lyricism—that is, singular, 
affectively intense experience conveyed through a spoken-word art in which aurality is 
emphasized.  In doing so, I not only forge a connection between James and the hiphop 
artists whose work he provides an echo for but broach, to an unprecedented extent, the 
role that topics that have come to the forefront of the theoretical scene, such as affect, 
enaction, and embodiment, play in their joint efforts. 
 This development of the aesthetics tacit in James suggests, as will be heard to sound 
in Chapter Three, a reading of Stein that can be placed in conversation with the Freudian 
approach that has thus far been most prevalent in the scholarship on her work.  It also 
intimates a novel approach to the work of Du Bois, ne that draws on the recent work on 
pragmatism and the African American vernacular in which he has played such large a 
part but also goes beyond it in addressing some of its shortcomings.  Most relevant here 
is Posnock’s Color and Culture: Black Writers and the Making of the Modern 
Intellectual.  As Poirier draws on “the reinstatement of the vague” to hint at a hearing of 
pragmatism as improvisational lyricism, Posnock draws on another oft-cited Jamesian 
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figure—“the unclassified residuum”—to bring into relief the visceral uniqueness of 
personal experience—what I call singularity.  Towards this end, Posnock launches a 
critique of identity politics that never lacks in passion but nevertheless ultimately fails to 
shift the terms of debate, providing a mere antithes s to his bête noire (pun intended) 
rather than a full-fledged sublation and therefore continuing to trade in the same old stale 
conventions.  Posnock attempts to draw on Du Bois as a primary influence, but in doing 
so fundamentally misreads him.  Rather than simply being “antirace,” as Posnock would 
have it, my work shows that Du Bois struck a more complex and nuanced position—one 
that combats racism’s positing of “race,” while at the same time sounding an antiracist 
raciality, a possibility Posnock appears either to be unaware of or to hastily reject.  My 
reading of Du Bois, by contrast, is more responsive to recent advances in critical race 
theory that go beyond the terms by which one is simply “for” or “against” racial identity 
and are more focused on understanding and counteracting the ongoing operations of 
racism.  This theoretical purchase is attained by tuning in to the sort of raciality 
characteristic of the ongoing play of differentiation and mutual borrowing at work in 
hiphop rather than the stultifying effect of mainstream white neoliberalism’s terse and 
self-interested dismissal of any further discussion of “race,” and by implication racism. 
 On a similar note, but from a somewhat different angle, the complexity and nuance of 
Du Bois’s position and positionality may be perceived to have hindered his “popularity,” 
when compared to other leaders of the era such as Booker T. Washington and Marcus 
Garvey, among his contemporaries.  In fact, Washington and Garvey could be considered 
more “pragmatic” than their erudite foil.  But this is true only if one has a gross and 
inadequate definition of pragmatism, one that most certainly does not foreground an 
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aesthetic approach.  It should be recalled that Du Bois was always respected and admired 
by creative artists and intellectuals, even those who disagreed with him on certain points.  
Moreover, Du Bois is more generally remembered and embraced today than either of his 
competitors.  At the end of the day, Du Bois’s work evidences a richness and depth that 
so far exceeds that of Washington or Garvey that an ttempt to compare them always 
runs the risk of fundamentally misunderstanding them. 
 My critique of Posnock is informed by West’s contentious engagement with the 
“neopragmatism” of Richard Rorty, whom Posnock—with his exemplification of 
“postmodern bourgeois liberalism”—often seems much closer to than either James or Du 
Bois.  West encourages a regrounding of Rorty’s airy fo mulations in the sense of tragedy 
he finds inherent to any pragmatism worth the name, as well as its comic upshot: namely, 
parody—a modality I find fundamental to Du Bois’s work.  Contra Washington and 
Garvey, West follows Du Bois (and James) in holding that an appreciation of “the 
ordinary experiences of common folk” goes hand-in-ha d with “genuine artistic 
concern.”  Only by striking this balance does one occupy what West calls “the common 
ground of pragmatism,” upon which “[u]nique selves acting in and through participatory 
communities give ethical significance to an open, risk- idden future.”15 
 This is exactly the territory that the divergently circular trajectory of improvisational 
lyricism pursued by my project—running from hiphop t  pragmatism and back again—
both limns and inhabits.  Chapter One begins covering this ground by exploring how 
James, the seminal psychologist and philosopher, crafted a sound-based performance art 
in order to articulate his version of pragmatism.  Departing from generic conventions, he 
developed a distinctive style of public speaking that crossed the distinction between 
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academic and popular and bordered on poetry.  Further, he sought to embed artifacts of 
this oratorical situation in the published works that came out of his lectures, producing a 
blueprint of the enactive model of literature Stein and Du Bois worked to implement.  In 
the process, he surveyed the aesthetic as a domain f ffectively intense experience.  
Doing so required him to wrestle with such experiences from his own life, past and 
present, engaging and thereby delineating the outlines of the existential problematic of 
expressing singularity: the double conundrum that what is most meaningful is the most 
difficult to communicate and that one feels most oneself when in closest touch to 
otherness. 
 His students would undergo similar personal journeys.  That is to say, the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity would form the chord sequence they performed 
variations on as they pursued their creative endeavors in improvisational lyricism.  The 
latter, in fact, can be considered as the resource th ough which they enabled themselves 
to work through the former.  Chapter Two explores how Stein, the doyenne of the fin-de-
siècle avant-garde, launched a vast program of literary experimentation to effect an 
always partial and incomplete communication of the singular experiences that served 
both as her most powerful motivation and heaviest burden, most meaningful but also 
most difficult to put into words.  In order to work through this conundrum, Stein 
attempted to infuse musicality—understood not only as mellifluousness but also as 
signature patterns of semantic departure and syntactic disruption.  By being imbued with 
a sonority that broke with conventional language, St in’s work triggered novel and 
distinctly musicalized responses in those who engaged it.  In effect, Stein wrote scores.  
And the instrument meant to play these pieces was the reader’s body.  In this way she 
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sought to trigger in her audience a reenactment of the eelings motivating and inhabiting 
her creativity.  Stein thus sketched the outlines of a model of literature as the staggered 
enaction of affective resonance, the sharing of simulated states of being across otherwise 
unbridgeable spatial and temporal gaps.  In the process, she liberated imagination from 
ocularcentrism, repurposing this faculty as the visceral immersion of fully embodied 
responsivity in affectively intense experience. 
 While Stein sought to realize this enactive model of literature with all her readers, 
during her lifetime it was only fully implemented in her intimate and working 
relationship with her lifelong companion, Alice B. Toklas, and even today it remains 
easily accessible only to a select and highly trained few.  Chapter Three shows how Du 
Bois—the preeminent African American scholar, leader, and artist—took over Stein’s 
program and not so much made it less complicated as endowed his interlocutors with the 
skills needed in order to engage it, in all its complexity.  He took the prototype she 
developed and duplicated it into a device available to the multitude.  Du Bois tended the 
seeds of affective resonance Stein sowed, facilitating its growth into an enveloping 
ecosystem sustained through an ongoing process of attunement that expands to global 
proportions.  Through this generation of an attuned ensemble, the line between artist and 
audience is blurred, as receivers are empowered to bec me senders, in turn.  To a large 
extent Du Bois was able to pioneer these innovations by virtue of emphasizing the ethical 
upshot of an aesthetics that has at its heart the capacity for and cultivation of affectively 
intense experience.  More than either James or Stein, and to the same degree as 
contemporary hiphop artists, Du Bois insisted that e breaking of conventions to make 
way for expressions of singularity was necessary not o ly in the creation of art and 
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philosophy but also in forming patterns of sociality and the design of political systems.  
Particularly important for him on this front was the deprogramming of the racist codes 
nested into the deep structure of American society that prevented those individuals who 
fell on the wrong side of the racialized divide from realizing their full potential and in 
fact compromised the humanity of those who were, conversely, granted privilege and 
entitlement.  Believing oneself to be inherently superior due to the 
overconventionalization of certain variations in superficial appearance, it turns out, 
prevents one from truly plumbing the depths within. 
 In charting this trajectory, this project puts unique, interweaving spins on pragmatism, 
modernism, and hiphop.  As far as modernism is concerned, my efforts here contribute to 
the body of work that seeks to take leave of the “high” and “proper” to focus on the 
marginal and dissident.  Though not unprecedented—I am thinking here particularly of 
the work of Poirier and Jonathan Levin—placing James as the prime instigator of literary 
modernism remains a noncanonical yet nonetheless productive maneuver.16  While Stein 
and Du Bois are often addressed under the rubric of modernism, it is more likely to find 
them cited as accessory figures rather than main components.  Taking them as the main 
exemplars of American modernism allows us to foreground rather than dismiss issues of 
gender, sexuality, and race in our discussion of aesthetic matters.  Their examples also (as 
does James’s, in fact) emphasize the degree to which mixed-media experimentation was 
integral to the modernist literary enterprise.  The enactive literature they crafted drew for 
inspiration upon innovations in visual and, especially, musical and performance arts.  
Finally, by placing it in direct juxtaposition with iphop, my work comes at modernism 
from a unique and illuminating angle.  Jumping off from this approach to modernist art, 
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this project seeks to address a methodological shortcoming shared by the existing 
secondary literature on both pragmatism and hiphop, and thereby make similar 
interventions in both fields of scholarship.  Students of hiphop seem at times myopically 
focused on its social and political effects, often to the detriment of the artistic 
accomplishments through which any such consequences would be achieved.  Similarly, 
those who research pragmatism remain for the most part occupied with its 
epistemological and ethical aspects, failing to consider that aesthetics too was a major 
concern and in fact provided the foundation upon which pragmatists made advances in 
other philosophical subfields.  To the end of addressing these oversights, and getting this 
project underway, I would like to turn now to the thus far unaddressed issue of the 
fundamental role that musicality and the affective int nsity of experience it conveys 
played in the work of James.  Following this line of inquiry, we will discover that the 
crafting of a distinctive sound-based performance art w s elemental not only to the 
voicing of his philosophy, but to its very formulation.  In addition, this artistic 
achievement was crucial to his ongoing personal development, serving as the 
breakthrough through which he engaged the existential problematic of expressing 
singularity that he had left unattended for much of is career. 
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The Music of William James: 
Pragmatism as Improvisational Lyricism 
 
 
 In 1890, with the publication of The Principles of Psychology after twelve long years 
of research and writing, William James made the leap from struggling academic to 
established scholar.  The early and middle years of the decade found him making use of 
the respect this success granted him to broaden the reach of his work.  In addition to 
publishing Psychology: A Briefer Course in 1892, a condensed and more straightforward 
version of Principles, James added public lectures to his repertoire.  The first of these 
popular talks were delivered before small groups of tudents or fellow teachers and 
scholars, but many of them were made available for a la ger audience in The Will to 
Believe and Talks to Teachers in Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals— 
published in 1897 and 1899, respectively.  The publication of these volumes coincided 
with the expansion of the venues in which James was called on to speak his mind.  In 
addition to academic lectures and popularizations thereof, James was increasing asked to 
talk on topics and occasions of broader concern.  The unveiling of the Robert Gould 
Shaw memorial in 1897, at which James gave the keynot  speech, is a case in point.  
Shaw was the Civil War colonel who led the North’s fir t black regiment.  James had a 
personal reason to be excited—and anxious—about the opportunity to play a key role in 
the mythologization of this national figure.  His brother Wilkie had served as one of 
Shaw’s subordinate officers, and had been gravely injured in the unsuccessful attack on
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the Confederates’ Fort Wagner.  James himself, by his father’s request, had not 
participated in the war. 
 While pleased by the offer, James privately admitted o having “hesitated a good 
deal” when confronted with the challenge of “harangui  the multitude.”  He was 
understandably wary about shouldering the additional degree of public exposure this 
speech would entail, and probably shy to speak expertly upon military heroics when he 
himself had been a nonparticipant.  Perhaps, too, he felt that in immortalizing Shaw he 
would also be performing a eulogy for Wilkie—who had died in 1883—and was 
overwhelmed by these joint responsibilities.  Neverth less, realizing that this speech was 
an opportunity to popularize his work in yet another arena, James eventually accepted the 
invitation.  He eased his worries about his ability to perform up to expectations by 
acknowledging that the problem he faced “resolves itself into the labor of making one’s 
phrases impressive.”1  In this moment, James can be heard making his init al recognition 
that the voicing of his unique brand of philosophizing would be achieved through the 
practice of improvisational lyricism.   More than saying new things, this poetic task 
would involve developing a new way of saying that could partially convey the unsayable.  
In order to pull this off, James would draw on his knack for using dissonance 
constructively.  This aesthetics of constructive dissonance saturates James’s version of 
pragmatism, which he began giving voice to a little ov r a year after he gave his Shaw 
speech.  For James, “making his phrases impressive” would mean talking in a way that 
used the old to make the new, that balanced structure and spontaneity, and that infused 
language with music by treating words like sounds. 
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 Producing the “immed[i]ate oratorical effect” he dsired, James argued, would mean 
playing upon “the instinctive reactions of the audience.”  In order to accomplish this 
sensorimotor rapport between his voice and the ears of his listeners, James sought to 
model his speech on the shape of the Shaw memorial itself.  He would begin by directing 
his audience’s attention towards the sculpture, tracing its outlines with his words, 
showing how “the very soul and secret” of Shaw, his regiment, the Civil War, the United 
States are “symbolized and embodied” through “the mingling of the elements which the 
sculptor’s genius has brought so vividly before the ey .”  To provide the setting for this 
opening gesture, James hoped to give his speech “in t e open air somewhere near the 
monument.”  “The hearing seems to me a secondary affair, compared with the nsemble 
of the ceremony,” James argued.  As far as he was concerned, to have to speak 
somewhere lacking direct visual reference to the Shaw sculpture would be “curiously 
divided and discordant.”  It would be to errantly make a supplementary part stand in for 
what should be an integral whole.  The organizers of the event felt differently, however, 
and insisted that his speech be given inside the nearby Music Hall.  Consequently, 
James’s work became more difficult—but also more rewarding, insofar as he could draw 
upon rather than be frustrated by the discord caused by the need to abandon his original 
plan.  James would still begin with the gesture towards the sculpture.  Lacking direct 
visual reference, however, this gesture would have to be accomplished by arousing the 
appearance of the monument in the minds of his audience—and thereby summoning the 
ritual setting of which his speech was a part—through the sound of his own voice.  The 
necessitated indirection, in short, would allow him to achieve affective resonance as well 
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as sensorimotor rapport.  To have this absorbing and expansive effect, James concluded, 
his speech would have to be “executed like a musical composition.”2 
 Music, in fact, would come to play an important role in James’s thought.  It serves as 
a symbol of the fundamental, though nearly inexpressible, message his philosophy is 
meant to convey—that which he finds it difficult to put into words but nevertheless 
continues struggling to do.  What made James’s public speaking so complicated was that 
he not only wanted to create an effect that could capture the imaginations of a broad 
audience, but also to use this effect to convey a rathe  weighty message.  Consequently, 
as in the case of the Shaw speech, he feared that what he had to say would be “too quiet 
and pensive,” “too academic for any real effect.”  What was required, James believed, 
was “to get a little more colour and rankness and flavor into it.”3  He sought to do so by 
taking oratory lessons and working to memorize the sp ech, to lend his performance the 
degree of flexibility and vibrancy—the musicality—that comes from not having to rely 
completely on a written script.  James was beginning to develop the improvisational 
stance that he would utilize when giving the lecture series that later works like The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, Pragmatism, and A Pluralistic Universe were based 
upon.  The effect of the lectures rests in large part upon the way they convey philosophy 
through a kind of performance poetry, an aural enactment that infuses the intellectual 
constructions of language with the affective weight of music.  The effect of the books that 
served as their written reports depends upon James’s ability to simulate these sounds of 
improvisational lyricism in writing, to give the reader a feel for the oratorical situation 
out of which his words emerge. 
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 This chapter follows James as he moved from inventing a modern psychology that 
balanced laboratory experimentation and impressionitic description to crafting a 
philosophy that sought a third way through the seemingly irresolvable conflict between 
the two schools that reigned prior to his intervention: British materialism and German 
idealism.  In the process he trail-blazed the approach to creative inquiry and endeavor 
that his students sought to make their own and expand upon, and that can be heard 
echoing through the work of contemporary hiphop musicians.  This artistic undertaking—
the accomplishments it facilitated, the personal crises that precipitated it and that it 
worked to address—form the crux of what is at issue her .  To this end, the chapter 
begins with a closer consideration of James’s Shaw speech.  Finding it necessary to work 
in circumstances not of his own choosing and upon a topic that pushed the limits of his 
expertise, James almost stumbled into an improvisation l mode.  Working with found 
objects that fell into his lap as if by accident, he made up his method as he went along, 
assembling the components of the lyricism that would infuse his later work and bringing 
himself to the brink of achieving the unforeseen.  I  his efforts to prepare for and perform 
this public talk, James begins sketching the outlines of the work in his imminent effort to 
give voice to a philosophy that bordered on poetry.  While the Shaw speech itself failed 
to fully live up to what it promised to be, James would make progress in fulfilling its 
potential as he purposefully took on further projects to articulate the philosophy implicit 
in it, a new turn of thinking that is also a renewed r cognition of the fundamental role 
feeling plays in intellectual activity.  The upshot is pragmatism as improvisational 
lyricism, a train of thought made manifest only through the pursuit of an artistic itinerary. 
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 This chapter next considers “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” 
(1898), a piece in which James manages the initial phrasing of his distinctive brand of 
pragmatism.  In doing so, he warms up for the lectur  series that would occupy much of 
his time and energy in the coming years and result in the publication of Varieties.  In 
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” James adds additional detail to his 
mapping of improvisational lyricism, though it still remains more of a destination to 
survey than a habitation that he was ready to fullyoccupy, jump and immerse himself in.  
The prospecting that he does in this essay, however, sets the stage for the dive he was 
soon to make in impending projects.  Here James draws on the work of his friend and 
colleague Charles Sanders Peirce, but puts a unique spin upon it and in doing so adds a 
crucial something that was missing or downplayed in its previous incarnations.  For both 
Peirce and James, pragmatism is a philosophy of experience.  But whereas the former 
focuses merely on its practical nature, the latter wishes to foreground its particularity.  
That is, James seeks to supplement Peirce’s protocol for the motivation and organization 
of inquisitive habits with an equal interest in theat times unruly affects that form, as it 
were, the unavoidable other side of the coin, the excit ment that accompanies and in fact 
propels even the most formalized programs of research.  In short, James makes a break 
with Peirce’s concern with conventionalization in order to make room for singularity.  In 
doing so, he makes explicit what remains implicit yet overlooked in Peirce: that 
aesthetics generates the foundation for ethics, which in turn lays the groundwork for both 
epistemology and politics. 
 Finally, this chapter turns to Varieties itself, showing how James takes an experiential 
and ultimately (and paradoxically) secularizing approach to religion, tracing an indirect 
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path into a more general consideration of aesthetics as a realm of affective intensity.  In 
pursuing this itinerary, philosophy itself becomes a type of art.  In Varieties, James 
broaches the existential problematic of expressing ularity both as a topic of concern 
and a performative predicament, something he not only needed to explicate but to enact 
an engagement with during the course of composing and delivering his lectures.  
Undertaking Varieties, then, not only resulted in an addition to his bibliography but 
entailed a signal event in his biography.  In wrestling with the intellectual puzzles 
involved in this project, James was also working through personal issues that haunted his 
present and in doing so brought his past back to life. The latter endeavor was 
inextricably interwoven with the former.  Art—particularly music and performance—
wove the common thread here.  An enactive musicality emerged as the primary resource 
for cultivating and conveying singularity, tapping a capacity for affectively intense 
experience and crafting an expression capable of eliciting affective resonance from a 
large and diverse audience.  Aesthetic issues were thus paramount in James’s work.  
Exactly because they were so important, however, he was often ambivalent about them.  
Consequently, they tended to surface as fugitive elem nts in seeming digressions that 
both belied and emphasized their centrality.  Jamesian aesthetics are accessible not so 
much in what he said or did but rather in how he went about saying and doing.  Stein and 
Du Bois were able to pick up on what more scholarly commentators overlook because 
they were just as interested in the style as in the content of James’s work.  In fact, they 
took the two as inseparable and thereby drew on their teacher as both an intellectual 
influence and, more importantly, an artistic example. 
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The Demicadence of Democracy 
 
 James would eventually take his art of improvisational lyricism to great heights.  The 
initial attempt, however, left something to be desir d.  The day before he was to deliver 
his Shaw speech he lost his voice.  When the time came to actually perform, James had 
recovered enough to go through with it but he nevertheless found it “a curious kind of 
physical effort to fill a hall as large as Boston Music Hall.”  Despite his discomfort, 
James still tried to communicate his message.  But he found it “very difficult to manage.”  
He opens, of course, by gesturing towards the sculpture—a large bronze relief with Shaw 
on horseback in the foreground and a group of his African American troops marching 
alongside him in the background.  What is interesting about James’s evocation of this 
piece is that he directs attention towards the renderi g of Shaw only after focusing upon 
the subordinate figures: the African American soldiers.  He attempts to utilize this 
flipping of figure and ground as an emblem of “our American religion,” “ the faith that a 
man requires no master to take care of him, and that common people can work out their 
salvation well enough together if left free to try.”  It is almost as if, with his opening 
rhetorical move, he effaces the man who is, at leasin title, the primary subject of his 
speech.  Almost, because honoring Shaw in this case means insisting that, though he may 
have been a leader, he was “no master.”  In placing the background of the artwork on 
display before its foreground James is also attempting to illustrate that, according to the 
democratic faith he is preaching, a nation at peril stays on the road to recovery when “the 
civic genius of the people does the saving day by day, by acts without external 
picturesqueness.”  The stirring shapes of the memorial are turned against themselves, as 
James insists that the actions they portray are nothing if not ordinary, everyday 
occurrences.  At the same time, however, he emphasizes that this quotidian activism is 
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exceptionally difficult, possesses an internal drama that compensates for its lack of 
“external picturesqueness.”  The ethos of democracy is materialized through “common 
habits” that—despite their commonality—are possessed of an “inner mystery,” a mystery 
that though shared defies complete communication.  Thus, sustaining “civic genius” can 
often be experienced as the most private of trials.4 
 James took it as his job to remind his audience of this, and in reminding them prepare 
them for the task they faced as citizens of the United States. “What we really need the 
poet’s and orator’s help to keep alive in us,” he explains, is a “lonely kind of courage.”  
Without their aesthetic and idiosyncratic labors the tenets of “our American religion” 
would, as he would put it a couple years later in the introduction to Talks to Teachers and 
Students, lose their “passionate inner meaning.”  They become slogans “so familiar that 
they sound now rather dead in our ears,” mere words extracted from a mysterious 
penumbra of simulated music.  These beliefs need be kept close to one’s heart, but 
insofar as they are they will, somewhat paradoxically, retain an essential strangeness.  
Released from the immanent complication of “inner mystery,” the “common habits” 
become automatically repeatable, unthinking routine lacking the affective charge—the 
“ontologic emotion of wonder”—that triggers intellectual activity.  Bereft of their 
“passionate inner meaning,” they are unable to fulfill their function as the manifestation 
of democracy.  This is especially true, James suggests, of what he takes as the most 
fundamental element of “civic genius”: “the well-known democratic respect for the 
sacredness of individuality.”  Respect becomes insult, individuality becomes a travesty of 
itself, the profession of democracy becomes sacrilegious, when there is no room for 
singularity to struggle with and reshape, remake convention.  As long as an untempered 
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attachment to conventionality drowns out the affectiv  intensity that characterizes the 
singular, we lose access to the “crepuscular depths of personality” that, as he argues in 
another talk to students given two years before the S aw speech, are “our deepest organ 
of communication with the nature of things.”5  Thus, according to James, fostering the 
political health of a nation is tied up with broader philosophical (some may say 
mystical—at the very least existential) concerns and is accomplished through a deeply 
personal development motivated and actualized by an artistic achievement: namely, a 
performance of improvisational lyricism that exemplifies an aesthetics of constructive 
dissonance. 
 The problem with James’s Shaw speech, however, is that he fails to follow his own 
hypothetical example.  He underplays the ambivalence lurking in the depths of the 
monument he draws inspiration from and seeks to comme orate, and is thereby unable to 
follow through on his oratorical mission.  His inital poetic gesture is drenched with 
tension—between the ideal and the actual.  In attempting to create a popular effect, he 
hastily defuses rather than draws on this discord.  Consequently, his effort to exemplify 
and inspire the lonely courage he finds to be essential to the functioning of democracy 
falls somewhat short.  The challenge the Shaw sculpture poses—and that James 
references in pointing towards it—is to dwell upon the difficult fact that despite all its 
unquenchable promise, democracy as actualized in the United States has been at times “a 
thing of falsehood and horrible self-contradiction.”  This is so not just because of 
questionable practices, but because of a “singular anomaly” woven into the very fabric of 
the theoretical ideal that practical arrangements are designed to approximate.  
“Democracy is still upon its trial,” James argues.  It is so, in large part, because “the 
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founders had not dared to touch the great intractable exception” lodged in the semi-sacred 
documents of “our American religion.”  The United States may be, when compared to 
certain other nations, “a land of freedom.”  But it is only “boastfully so called” as long as 
its citizenry fails to acknowledge and attempt to redress all the consequences of the fact 
that its constituting plan has “human slavery enthroned at the heart of it.”  James himself 
resists sounding the depths of this dilemma, in effect drawing a hasty conclusion to the 
democratic trial he is seeking to initiate.  To suggest, as he finds himself doing, that—in 
the face of the tension between freedom and slavery that is fundamental to its founding—
“the only alternative for the nation was to fight or die” is to short-circuit the sort of open-
ended soul-searching that forms the substance of “civic genius.”  It is also to foreclose the 
ground from which the artistic motivation of democratic action issues.6 
 In the end, James—as he was to acknowledge himself —fails “to break away from 
the vulgar claptrap of war sentimentalism.”  He seems to be arguing that the Civil War 
was not only inevitable but desirable—transforming historical contingency into 
normative appeal.  This implies the espousal of a sort of fate-based view of history that 
would seem to undercut what he is actually trying to say.  In downplaying the tension at 
the heart of American democracy, he also smoothes ov r the dissonance between 
achieving an affecting delivery and conveying a complex message.  Despite his 
disappointment with his performance, he received positive feedback from trusted 
acquaintances who heard the speech.  He did manage to cr ate a powerful effect amongst 
his audience, in the form of “the most harmonious and ideal waves of sentiment.”7  This 
was not, however, the effect he had been going for.  Lacking was a sense for the 
messiness of actuality, an appreciation of discord, an unfeigned foregrounding of the 
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“singular anomaly.”  In order to sound a better balance between the affective force of his 
voice and the complexity of what he had to communicate, future performances would 
have to avoid this sort of false harmony—a forced conclusion bought at the price of 
violence: the exploitation and hasty erasure of singularity.  In order to master the art of 
improvisational lyricism and convey his philosophical viewpoint James would have to 
aim to find a way of cultivating rather than muting dissonance, a way of using it 
constructively. 
 James would begin applying this new-found knowledge when he embarked on his 
next, and more involved, project.  Soon after completing the Shaw speech, he was offered 
the Gifford Lectureship on Natural Religion at the University of Edinburgh and quickly 
accepted.  During the course of his Gifford Lectures—which were delivered in 1901 and 
1902 and became Varieties when they were published shortly afterwards—James 
continued to dwell upon the democratic ethos he had begun to survey and in doing so 
transgressed the boundaries of American exceptionalism that had originally 
circumscribed it.  The result was a portrayal of “the feelings, acts, and experiences of 
individual men in their solitude” that simultaneously broadened the reach and refined the 
focus of his exploration of the personal development and artistic motivation of “lonely 
courage.”8  In approaching “religious experience,” James reverses what he sees as the 
conventional treatment of the topic by viewing it as primarily a matter of private feelings 
and only secondarily of public institutions.  Consequ ntly, the “religious” is figured as a 
synedoche for the broader realm of intimate and visceral—singular—experience that he 
sought to place at the heart of his philosophy.9  Though James’s approach here initially 
focuses on the private at the expense of the public, the democratic (and pragmatic) ethos 
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that is his ultimate end and cause implies an imperative to leap the chasm between the 
one and the other.  James would make this move not by including issues of organized 
religion among the materials he covered, but through the very act of delivering his 
lectures—and publishing the book based upon them.  Thus, his own struggle to convey 
what he called his “music” through language is itself exemplary of the “lonely courage” 
he sought to profile.  In composing and performing Varieties, James crafted a work of art 
capable of communicating the nearly inexpressible aspect of personal experience—the 
affective intensity of singularity—that was most fundamental to his viewpoint.  In the 
process, he began to give voice to pragmatism—not just as a philosophical position, but 
also as a practice of improvisational lyricism guided by and manifesting an aesthetics of 
constructive dissonance. 
 
The Keynote of the Universe  
 
 At the outset of his preparations, James considered the task undertaken by his Gifford 
Lectures to consist of “setting forth the philosophy best adapted to normal Religious 
needs.”  During the long and at times convoluted course of laying down the tracks that 
would eventually assemble themselves into Varieties, however, it became clear that the 
“normality” of the urges and yearnings he sought to document did not preclude their 
oddity.  Although experienced everyday by ordinary people, there is something about 
them that is irreducibly extraordinary.  In seeking to make “philosophy” accommodate 
these desires, then, James was doing something more than fashioning a mere adaptation.   
He was, in fact, embarking on an out-and-out redefinition.  James was led to such lengths 
because he felt compelled “to defend (against all the prejudices of my ‘class,’) 
‘experience’ against ‘philosophy’ as being the real b ckbone of the world’s religious 
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life.”  In other words, against his professional interests as a philosopher (and perhaps his 
better judgment!), he aimed to show that the search for “our destiny and the world’s 
meaning” requires that we pay attention to what is “immediately and privately felt” 
before moving on to consider “high and noble general views.”  In the process, philosophy 
would become as much a matter of the former as it had been of the latter.  Pragmatism is 
an issue of improvising this fusion between feeling a d thinking—this feelingful thinking.  
Accordingly, a philosophy is pragmatic insofar as it i  inseparable from the artistic 
practice through which it is enacted.  As a philosophical work, the aim of Varieties, 
James explains, was “to make the hearer or reader beli ve what I myself invincibly do 
believe.”10  This is accomplished primarily through aesthetic means, through a poetry that 
lends substance to—and thereby makes felt—what could otherwise be dismissed as 
empty rhetoric. 
 In this case, the message James sought to convey to his audience was that religion 
reduced to “mere creeds and theories” is an utter absurdity.  Nevertheless, he 
immediately amends, “the life of it as a whole is mankind’s most important function.”  
Religion, taken in this broader and more significant sense, functions as something more 
than itself, strictly so-called.  As James uses it here, I would argue, it stands for nothing 
less than the root of culture, the prologue to art. Divinity and grace are, in effect, 
secularized—made primarily an issue of ontology rather han of theology.  The “religious 
experience” portrayed in Varieties consists of “what goes on in the single private man, as 
he livingly expresses himself.”11  In order to adequately speak upon this topic, James 
would have to enact it at the exact same time as he surveyed it.  In making this move he 
would place himself in a difficult position: both an exemplar and one example among 
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many, a figure simultaneously occupying both foreground and background and as such 
seeming both overwhelmingly present and hard to focus upon.  These contortions would 
make the composition of Varieties a struggle, but the conditions in which James worked 
made them necessary.  For, his joint philosophical and artistic mission motivated and 
drew its substance from an ensemble of intensely intimate moments, a constellation of 
personal developments.  The communication of his thinking would fall flat unless infused 
with the feeling of these nearly incommunicable experiences.  Improvising this fusion 
would lead James to supplement the intellectual clarity of language with the affective 
force of music.  Philosophy thus becomes like poetry, insofar as its performance involves 
treating words like sounds. 
 During the summer of 1898, a few months after he officially received and accepted 
the Gifford Lectureship, James strained his heart hiking in the Adirondacks.  By 
November he complained that it was “kicking about terribly.”  This was the beginning of 
a long series of cardiac troubles that would eventually lead to James’s death in 1910.  
Despite the ill consequences it held for his physical health, however, he had no regrets 
about his excursion in the Adirondacks.  “I’m glad I had the experience,” James 
confessed, “even at that price!”  The mountains were a place he had vacationed since 
1875, and in 1898 it was the setting for not only the usual relaxation and refreshment but 
also a singular moment of insight that granted him pri ary material to work into his 
Gifford Lectures.  On a morning at the beginning of July, James woke up at three and left 
his lodgings by seven, hiking for five hours with a p ck weighing nearly twenty pounds 
to the top of Mount Marcy, the tallest in the range.  After resting for a few hours, James 
descended a ways, coming to a camp where he met his young friends Pauline and Charles 
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Goldmark and a group of their college-aged acquaintances.  When night came his 
companions dropped off to sleep, but James “was not aware of sleeping at all.”  Instead, 
he experienced “a state of spiritual alertness of the most vital description.”  The next day 
he recounted the moment—something like a waking dream—in a letter his wife would 
compare to “a piece of exquisite music.”12 
 Infused with the visceral, affectively intense exprience of singularity, James’s 
writing simulates the sounds of improvisational lyricism, is transformed from a hollow 
report into a “vital description.”  James here can be heard stumbling upon not only the 
substance of his philosophy but also the artistic pra tice through which it will be made 
manifest, through which raw material will assume th s ape of crafted form.  “The 
temperature was perfect,” he writes, “the moon roseand hung above the scene.”  These 
“influences of Nature” mixed with “the problem of the Edinburgh lectures” and, he 
explains, “fermented within me till it became a regular Walpurgis nacht.”  “I spent a good 
deal of it in the woods,” James goes on, “where the s reaming moonlight lit up things in a 
magical checkered play.”  This external scene is interwoven with the internal course of 
his thinking at the points where they both impact affect.  Or as James puts it, “the gods of 
all the nature-mythologies were holding an indescribable meeting in my breast with the 
moral gods of the inner life.”  Although the two parts of this fusion “have nothing in 
common,” “the whole scene” they create in their unforeseen combination has an “intense 
significance of some sort.”  It is because of the intensity of this experience of constructive 
dissonance—the feeling of finding a common ground between otherwise dissimilar 
elements—that James finds it so significant.  But it is also for this very same reason that 
he begins to doubt whether he “could tell the significance.”  The weight of meaning, 
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James seems to be suggesting, is proportional to the difficulty of its communication.  
Within his experience on Mount Marcy, “intense inhuman remoteness” and “intense 
appeal” extraordinarily coincide.  Meditating upon and struggling to “livingly express” 
the meaning of this moment, James strives to preserv  both “its everlasting freshness and 
its immemorial antiquity and decay.”  He sets off in search of a balance of the old and 
new, the familiar and the foreign, the near and the far.  The experience is one of “memory 
and sensation all whirled inexplicably together,” one that “was indeed worth coming for, 
and worth repeating year by year, if repetition could only procure what in its nature I 
suppose must be all unplanned for and unexpected.”13 
 Hoping to work through the interwoven fusions of this moment—the innumerable 
ways in which dissonant elements are held together and mixed up, retaining their identity 
at the same time they construct something new together—James was faced with the 
problem of improvisation: how to balance the demands of structure and spontaneity, how 
to make one a means for the other and vice versa, how to repeat and renew what in the 
end “must be all unplanned for and unexpected,” howto express singularity by struggling 
with and remaking convention.  These issues would beat themselves into the very fiber of 
the work he had in front of him.  This intense, visceral, and solitary experience on Mount 
Marcy provided the theme James would repeatedly riff upon—altering the tempo or 
rhythm a bit, changing a note here and there, modulating the phrasing or emphasis—as he 
prepared his Gifford Lectures, eventually getting them into their artfully unfinished form.  
First and foremost, despite (or perhaps because of!) all of its poly- and pantheistic 
(honestly, downright pagan) over- and undertones, the “indescribable meeting” of 
exterior (“influences of Nature”) and interior (“inner life”) that James partook of that 
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night serves as the prototype from which he abstract  the basic definition of “religious 
experience” operative in Varieties.  “Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in 
the broadest and most general terms possible,” James proposes, “one might say that it 
consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmonious adjusting ourselves thereto.”  The harmony that James posits here as his end, 
though, is of a strange sort.  For, James seems to suggest, it is only via “a certain 
discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperamnt” that “the religious attitude” 
flowers in its fullest.14 
 It is as a run of blue notes limbering up the lines of a prewritten score that 
“harmonious adjusting” realizes itself.  A fundamental part of this self-realization is the 
recognition that it will forever remain incomplete.  It is by eliciting a sensibility of 
constructive dissonance that this interweaving of the personal and the cosmic “adds to 
life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything else.”  
What James is pointing towards here is the feeling of experience’s mysterious self-
sufficiency, its improvisational constitution, the “self-sustaining in the midst of self-
removal which characterizes all reality and fact.”  What James finds himself endlessly 
circling around—as if he were navigating the impossible trajectory of Escher’s 
staircase—is the felt meaning attainable through “effective occupation of a place in life, 
with its dynamic currents passing through your being.”  In characterizing this enmeshing 
of world and person as of “an unseen order,” James is making both a negative and a 
positive qualification.  The affective force of inte se experience is “unseen,” not a matter 
of vision.  Nevertheless, it is undeniably and strongly sensed.  It is heard.  It is 
fundamentally musical.  James describes it as “the keynote of the universe sounding in 
 44 
our ears.”  The feel of “religious experience” is “the sense of perceiving truths” that are 
“more or less unutterable in words”—or, at the very l ast, are saturated with a “deeper 
significance” that is “not confined to rational proositions.”  Thus, it is “not conceptual 
speech, but music rather,” that forms the substance of our “conversations with the 
unseen.”  It is music that best conjures “vague vistas of a life continuous with our own, 
beckoning and inviting, yet ever eluding our pursuit.”15 
 In short, James argues, “[m]usic gives us ontological messages non-musical criticism 
is unable to contradict.”  Music conveys and thereby provides the occasion for reenacting 
those moments when “[o]ntological emotion so fills the soul that ontological speculation 
can no longer overlap it.”  Consequently, James suggests, “the erection of its procedure 
into a systematized method would be a philosophic achievement of first-rate importance.”  
This is exactly what pragmatism, as a philosophy, attempts to accomplish.  It functions as 
a cultivation of “ontological imagination” that makes constructive use of the 
dissonance—and therefore sounds the common ground—between “emotion” and 
“speculation.”  This is a somewhat difficult proposition because “[p]hilosophy lives in 
words, but truth and fact well up into our lives in ways that exceed verbal formulation.”  
Because of the fundamental musicality of experience, when language—and especially 
philosophical language—attempts to approach it “[s]omething forever exceeds, escapes 
from statement, withdraws from definition, must be glimpsed and felt, not told.”  But 
there is something in James’s phrasing even here—in its rhythm, its forward-falling 
movement, its style, its ound—that nevertheless manages to convey (or at least 
effectively hint at) that which he cannot state or tell.  Although language is “purely 
tentative and suggestive” here—although “the subtlety of nature flies beyond it”—it still 
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remains “an imperative human function to go on verbalizing and formulating as if the end 
might so be reached.”  Towards this end, James seeks to use words to “stir chords within 
you which music and language touch in common.”  He infuses language with music by 
striving to enact words as sounds.  The overlap is only ever partial, but an interchange—a 
mutual enrichment—is opened, a fusion improvised.  In the process, philosophy becomes 
akin to “lyric poetry.”16  Pragmatism emerges through and as the practice of 
improvisational lyricism. 
 This is something James began to realize as early as the night of his experience on 
Mount Marcy, as attested to by his wife’s response to the letter in which he recounts it.  
Part of what made it “one of the happiest lonesome nights of my existence” is that 
afterwards he could say: “I now understand what a poet is.”  “He is,” James explains, “a 
person who can feel the immense complexity of influences that I felt and make some 
partial tracks in them for verbal statement.”  In July 1898, immediately after his Marcy 
experience, James felt unable to accomplish this poetic task.  Nevertheless, he saw that 
the conveyance of his philosophical message would depend upon resolutely facing up to 
it—and with it his potential failure.  Nothing for James was more significant than feeling, 
nothing more deserved the attention of thinking.  In the moment, however, he had little 
purchase for this meditative and communicative work because he was unable to “find a 
single word for all that significance.”  Consequently, “the immense complexity of 
influences” he experienced occupied and overwhelmed his mind as “a mere boulder of 
impression.”  He remained hopeful, however, that with the passage of time he would 
become able to unravel and reconnoiter the rich textur  of this concentrated and 
concretized moment of experience.  It is this sustained hope that led him to predict that 
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“things in the Edinboro’ lectures will be traceable to it.”17  The articulation of Varieties 
would emerge out of James’s struggle to get a handle on—to track—initially slippery and 
elusive traces, his struggle to remake convention in a way that made room for singular 
reverberations.  During the course of composing and performing his Gifford lectures, 
James found himself directly confronting a fundamental difficulty, an existential 
problematic that he had faced earlier in his life and managed to set aside, but which his 
experience on Mount Marcy had begun to rekindle: th complication of expression, of 
conveying the density of felt meaning that comprises the experience of singularity, of 
making peace with the fact that whatever affective resonance that can be enacted between 
sender and receiver is forever partial and incomplete.  Before the fire of James’s creative 
turmoil burst into flames, however, it remained for a time a mere pile of smoldering 
embers.  As long as it did so, James was able to observe the source of its heat without 
becoming engulfed.  Despite its safety, James ultimately found this critical distance 
unsatisfactory and impossible to permanently sustain.  His reconnoitering of the topic 
would serve as a prelude to a plunge into its very h art. 
 
The Symphony of Intellectual Life 
 
 In August 1898, two months after his night on Mount Marcy, James gave a talk at the 
University of California at Berkeley.  The lecture was organized under the auspices of the 
school’s Philosophical Union, but was open to the general public.  This location at the 
margin between the academic and the popular was similar to the site he would be 
working within during his Gifford Lectures, so James viewed his Berkeley address as an 
opportunity to prepare for his larger project.  “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results” can be read—in this case, virtually heard—as the opening gambit of his poetic 
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pursuit of experience’s aftermath.  As such, it functions as both a “rehearsal for Edinbro” 
and the initial voicing of a philosophy built on the model of poetry, improvised as 
lyricism.18  James here begins enacting pragmatism as a reshaping of language saturated 
with musicality, a thinking that dwells upon and conveys the felt meaning of experience.  
It is as much the style as the content of this talk that marks it as a precursor to Varieties—
and to Pragmatism and A Pluralistic Universe, for that matter.  In fact, from the outset 
the lecture foregrounds what is usually left in the background: that when language seeks 
to inhabit experience, style and content are inextricable, at times nearly indistinguishable.  
Sound enmeshes with sense when feeling infuses thinking.  James focuses his audience’s 
attention on this fact by opening his talk with a gesture towards the context within which 
it occurs.  By thus expressing a concern with the particularities of his oratorical situation, 
James manages to convey what it means for “philosophical conceptions” to have 
“practical results.”  In effect, he offers a vivid—if partial—illustration of what gets lost in 
the telling. 
 “An occasion like the present would seem to call for an absolutely untechnical 
discourse,” James tells his audience at the beginning of his lecture.  “I ought to give a 
message with a practical outcome and an emotional musical accompaniment.”  He 
attempts to fulfill this imperative by paraphrasing—and putting his own spin on—one of 
pragmatism’s founding documents: Peirce’s “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878).  
According to James, it turns out that clarity of thought is attainable only by recognizing 
its inescapable fuzziness.  In other words, thinking is inextricably intertwined with 
feeling.  The latter, in fact, is at the very heart of he former.  While Peirce may shy away 
from drawing this conclusion in such stark terms, it nevertheless can be shown to follow 
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from his assumption that “the production of belief is the sole function of thought.”  
Especially given that he characterizes belief as “the demi-cadence which closes a musical 
phrase in the symphony of intellectual life.”  Hoping to play off of the connection 
between feeling and music he figures during the opening of his talk, James lifts this 
phrase verbatim in his exposition of “Peirce’s principle.”  As Peirce writes and James 
rehearses, belief brings thinking to this incomplete closure—brings it into partial touch 
with the feelings that motivate it—because “it involves the establishment in our nature of 
a rule of action, or, say for short, a h bit.”  “[T]he establishment of habit,” Peirce argues, 
“is the final upshot of thinking”—that which it continuously points towards but beyond 
which it cannot go, which thereby serves as the crit rion for marking off one moment of 
thinking from another, distinguishing different thoughts.19 
 Consequently, as James puts it, “to develop a thoug t’s meaning we need only 
determine what conduct it is fitted to produce.”  He is quick to point out, however, that 
this approach to interpretation is double-sided.  To attend to the conduction of belief is to 
pay attention to not only “what reactions we must prepare” but also “what sensations we 
are to expect from it.”  According to James, then, the meaning that pragmatism points 
towards is both what we could do and what we can feel.  In making this move, he puts his 
mark on “the principle of pragmatism,” implying tha “it should be expressed more 
broadly than Mr. Peirce expresses it” in print.  But part of the reason James feels 
compelled to lobby for this expansive expression is that before he read Peirce’s argument 
he “first heard him enunciate it.”   Having attended one of Peirce’s first lectures, given in 
the fall of 1866, James reported to his sister that he “cd. not understand a word but rather 
enjoyed the sensation of listening.”  It was the aesth tic appeal of the sound of Peirce’s 
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enunciation that motivated James’s effort to make sense of the words—which he had, as 
he suggests in “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” by the early 1870s.  
For James, then, there was something fundamental in Peirce’s vocal delivery of 
pragmatism that Peirce was unable to convey in writing.  Consequently, in making his 
own voicing of the topic he urges his audience’s awareness towards the ways in which 
“[m]y very words to you now are an example of what I mean.”  The oratorical situation 
through which James’s pragmatism is conveyed—its enactive arena—serves as its chief 
illustration.  “As I talk here, and you listen,” James is saying, I’m able to convey 
something of the felt meaning of experience.  Affective resonance “cannot take place at 
all and leave your conduct unaffected,” because thinking emerges out of feeling and leads 
into action.20  Thus, the “emotional musical accompaniment” of James’s philosophy—the 
sound of his voice—is instrumental, not incidental, to its “practical outcome.”  By 
infusing music into language, James is able to stimulate an embodied response in his 
listeners.  Responsivity is as much a matter of finely-grained affective undulations as it is 
of gross sensorimotor movements.  Anything like what we would call today “political 
activism” is, I would argue, distinctly secondary. 
 In other words, pragmatism has an integral, perhaps primary, aesthetic component.  
Through the practice of improvisational lyricism James is able to resound the 
“ontological message” of musicality motivating his philosophical explorations.  Further, 
he seeks to echo this aural conduction in writing by making an additional twist in the 
feedback loop that comprises its enactive arena.  James’s procedure for making books out 
of lectures involves “taking my cue from what has seemed to me the feeling of the 
audiences.”  Of course, he could draw this hint from nothing other than their reactions, 
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their conduct, spoken or unspoken (or written).  Although he describes the resulting 
interchange as “absolutely untechnical,” it involves l ss the rejection of “technicality” 
than its redefinition.  Rather than drawing on the analytical rigor of scientific method as 
his guide, James is aligning philosophy with the imaginative subtlety of artistic 
technique—foreshadowing the enactive approach to literature that his students, Stein and 
DuBois, would pursue.  In doing so, he suffuses Peirce’s focus on the reliable 
repeatability of habit with an enveloping awareness of the unruly particularity—the 
singularity—of feeling that accompanies, and in a sense complicates and exceeds, any 
given performance of habitual conduct.  The effect is less a reversal than an enrichment 
of Peirce’s position.  The conductance of belief comes to an incomplete closure, James 
shows, because the affective intensity of experience that motivates the attempt to 
communicate also entails the perpetual partiality of communication.  Language, and 
conventionalized conduct more generally, provides an imperfect and uncertain access to 
the felt meaning of individual experience.  Consequently, “[t]here is no point of view 
absolutely public and universal.”  After every attempt to manifest and convey the 
interiority of feeling, “[p]rivate and uncommunicable perceptions always remain over.”21 
 It is this unavoidable surplus of meaning that effects belief’s demicadentiality, 
imbuing each movement of the mind’s symphonic maneuvers with just enough discord to 
keep thinking on the trail of a complex harmonics that exceeds any and every easy 
harmony.  It is this dissonance that James seeks to u e constructively in his attempts to 
realize two paradoxically enfolded goals.  In part, his realignment of philosophy away 
from science and towards art is meant to broaden its appeal.  At the same time, however, 
this concern with accessibility is engendered by an intensity of feeling that pushes the 
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limits of experience’s communicability.  In other words, James’s effort to make his 
lectures “popular in the extreme” is complicated by the very thing that motivates it: “the 
well-known democratic respect for the sacredness of individuality.”22  Part of what makes 
experience such a powerful resource for philosophy is that while we somehow know that 
it serves as something of a common fund, this knowledge is both compromised and 
enriched by the fact that each individual has his or her unique access into and way of 
processing felt meaning.  These differences mark distances that are only ever 
incompletely closed.  This abiding openness both frustrates and perpetuates our efforts to 
convey our experiences.  In fact, the ongoing efficacy of communication depends as 
much on these ineluctable divergences as it does on the establishment of shared ground.  
Channeling this double-sided message entails not merely crafting communicative conduct 
to efficiently convey its proper content.  Perhaps more importantly, communication must 
be made to gesture towards that which it draws upon but ultimately cannot contain: the 
inner complexity of a singular moment of experience.  In the end, in any given instance, 
what the individual feels exceeds what the group can comprehend.  Beyond the limits of 
communication, the most anyone can hope for is a still partial and incomplete 
communion with—at most—a handful of significant others. 
 To fulfill its function, philosophical language must foreground its partiality by 
imperfectly conjuring the nascent presence of that which simultaneously inspires and 
exceeds it: the musicality of experience and the intimate exchanges it motivates.  This is 
the task James’s pragmatism sets itself, the spur for its pursuit of improvisational 
lyricism.  Forever lacking tools that could secure perfection, James makes do with—in a 
sense, misuses—the available instruments to approximate an end that will always remain 
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to a certain extent unprecedented.  He troubles the working of words as words, 
modulating their movement by enacting them as sounds, attempting to simulate the 
breadth of felt meaning that cannot be simply told an can only be imperfectly conjured, 
the aspects of experience music comes closer to than language.  The message he has to 
convey, James tells his audience in Berkeley, is “something simple enough . . . yet with 
just enough of ingenuity and oddity about it.”  In short, what he wants to get across is a 
feel for the constructive dissonance at the heart of experience’s somewhat paradoxical 
dynamic—the productive tension between accessibility and particularity, 
communicability and intensity, “self-sustaining” and “self-removal.”  Success in this 
endeavor is indicated by his ability to “catch and i spire.”  The “perfectly ideal discourse 
for the present occasion,” James suggests, “would let loose all the right impulses and 
emotions” in his auditors.  Ideally, he would know that this sensorimotor rapport and 
affective resonance was accomplished because  
everyone, on hearing it, would say, “Why, that is the truth—that is what I 
have been believing, that is what I have really been living on all this time, 
but I never could find the words for it before.  All that eludes, all that 
flickers, all that invites and vanishes even whilst inviting, is here made a 
solidity and a possession. . . .”23 
 
 Of course, the genre constraints of a formal lectur  make the actualization of such an 
ideal call and response unlikely—and those of a printed essay more so.  It would be 
unlikely to hear something like this coming out of s meone’s mouth during even the most 
unconstrained and informal conversation.  Even if this imagined rejoinder were somehow 
manifested the original speaker would forever remain uncertain of its veracity because of 
the unavoidable imperfection of affective resonance and the consequent partiality of 
belief’s conduction.  The moment of communion James gestures towards never achieves 
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the status of “a solidity and a possession.”  But his flickering evocation of it nevertheless 
sounds good.  There is something in its carefully phrased insistence, artfully placed 
emphases, striking combination of smooth and rough timbres that points towards the 
elusive fullness of experience in the very act of underscoring its inability to completely 
grasp it.  This is the work of improvisational lyricism: playing on communication’s 
limitations, it keeps it open to that which both inspires and escapes it.  Pushed to its 
margins, language is shown to be submerged in an ocean of musicality too vast to fully 
absorb.  Worried, words melt at their edges, becoming fringed with the shadow and 
shimmer of the sounds they strain themselves to approximate.  Enacting words as sounds 
is the ideal, but is only ever incompletely actualized in writing.  “I have something of this 
kind in my mind,” James confesses.  His imperative is to “produce it on the present 
occasion,” to enact its manifestation before his audience’s ears, actual and virtual. “—and 
yet, and yet, and yet” he cautions while continuing to promise, “I simply cannot.  I have 
tried to articulate it, but it will not come.”24  James is unable, at this point, to abandon his 
critical distance, to plunge into the existential problematic of expressing singularity.  
Highlighting this breakdown of articulation, however, is part and parcel of persevering in 
the effort of improvising fusions between music and language, feeling and thinking, 
experience and philosophy, ideal and actual, self and other.  This is true because 
loosening the bounds of expression makes way for a style that provides a partial inroad to 
that which cannot be completely circumscribed, thatin doing so compensates for—takes 
the place of—an elusive content. 
 Maintaining the hope of finding words that communicate the felt meaning of 
experience means working against the philosophical abit of making truth “a solidity and 
 54 
possession.”  It means amplifying the fluidity of language by playing on the way music is 
simultaneously there and not there, how words are hunted by sounds.  James knew this 
by the time he delivered “Philosophical Conceptions a d Practical Results,” and he 
attempted to get it across to his audience by sharing the moment of poetic insight he 
experienced on Mount Marcy, dramatizing it by figuring its workings in terms of the 
ground upon which it occurred.  “Philosophers are aft r all like poets,” James explains.  
“They are path-finders.  What everyone can feel, what everyone can know in the bone 
and marrow of him, they sometimes can find words for and express.”  The unpredictable 
frequency with which this trail-blazing hits its mark imbues language—both poetic and 
philosophical—with an “accidentality.”  Words and phrases trace workable trajectories.  
No matter how systematic, however, this routing of thinking is unable to fully 
comprehend the “forest of human experience.”  Therefore, philosophers should cultivate 
an awareness “that what their formulas express leaves unexpressed almost everything that 
they organically divine and feel.”  Effective thinkg, then, depends in large part upon an 
abiding appreciation for the intractability of feeling.  Not only is there always more work 
to do, but going the wrong way and getting lost are ev r-present dangers.  The condition 
of getting somewhere is therefore knowing that you are never exactly where you wanted 
to end up.  Once launched upon the search for a way to convey the felt meaning of 
experience, however, there is no going back.  The only option is to keep going.  Over 
time, the effort pays off but it also takes its inevitable toll. 
 “So I feel that there is a center in truth’s forest where I have never been,” James tells 
his audience in Berkeley, 
to track it out and get there is the secret spring of all my poor life’s 
philosophic efforts; at moments I almost strike into the final valley, there 
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is a gleam of the end, a sense of certainty, but always there comes still 
another ridge, so my blazes merely circle towards the true direction; and 
although now, if ever, would be a fit occasion, yet I cannot take you to the 
wondrous hidden spot to-day.  To-morrow it must be, or to-morrow, or to-
morrow; and pretty surely death will overtake me er the promise is 
fulfilled. . . . Of such postponed achievements do the lives of all 
philosophers consist.  Truth’s fulness is elusive; ever not quite, not quite! 
 
This passage, perhaps better than any other, exemplifi s James’s practice of 
improvisational lyricism—it both enacts it and illustrates it, treats it as both style and 
content simultaneously.  James’s work is punctuated—in fact, held together and moved 
along—by bursts of this sort of artful voicing, this infusion of language with music, 
thinking with feeling.  While it works at tracking the mystery of experience’s musicality, 
part of fulfilling this function is remaining conscious of the fact that this habitation has a 
“complex sacrificial constitution.”25  As James acknowledged in the first reports of his 
epiphany on Mount Marcy, to have an experience is always also to pay a price.  The more 
it gives—the more it accumulates and yields to articulation—the more it demands in 
return and disappears into the distance.  The actual springs out of the ideal as philosophy 
undertakes the endless struggle to dwell upon and make known the felt meaning of 
experience.  Somewhat paradoxically, however, the boundlessness of ideality is borne 
witness to through the marked finitude—the mortality—of its actualizations.  This is a 
key component of the message James spent the rest of hi  career attempting to articulate.  
As such, it was not merely a topic of discussion but rather was a problem he lived 





Things that Sound a Knell 
 
 The lack of center that James tracks in “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical 
Results,” the perpetual postponement of completion—the elusive “ever not quite” that 
compromises any final homogeneity or equilibrium but in doing so secures the continued 
possibility of “fulness”—is something James mourned an  fretted over.  It was also 
something he celebrated and eventually found to be a relief.  Because, ultimately, the end 
that gleams is death.  The moment it becomes something more than an ungraspable 
flicker, when it attains that status of a “sense of certainty,” is the moment it overtakes 
life.  This is why James’s sense that he would expir  before reaching his destination was 
so strong.  To cope, he had to redefine the terms of his journey.  The demise of taking 
hold of truth as “a solidity and a possession,” he came to recognize, is the rebirth of 
something else—of a protean multitude of potentials.  While this brings hope, this hope 
rests on the fact that “life and its negation are beaten up inextricably together.”26  
Warding off death’s biggest blow, then, relies upon keeping a sense of its numerous 
partial infringements close to heart.  The realization of one possibility depends upon the 
abandonment of another.  While what was abandoned can return, it is forever marked by 
its intervening absence.  Further, its recovery often necessitates the passing of that which 
had stood in its place.  Consequently, as much as maintaining the widest spectrum of 
possibility requires turning away from narrow paths, it also unavoidably involves letting 
go of the drive to actualize the totality of potential’s range.  In fact narrowness of focus 
and reaching towards totalization are two sides of the same coin.  Steering a delicate 
course between these obstacles, James figures an ambivalent incompletion—of truth, of 
meaning, of life—as the motivation of his philosophy and the art through which that way 
of thinking is enacted.  What is more, it is also the guiding thread of his career: the 
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dominant theme of both his body of work and his pattern of personal development.  Like 
hiphop freestylin, pragmatism’s improvisational lyricism blurs the boundary between art 
and life in a way that supports rather than attacks the autonomy of aesthetics and affect, 
that seeks to foreground without exhausting the musicality of experience.27 
 At the end of the previous section, I placed the telling and characteristic phase of 
thought that James sounds as the opening phrase of his initial voicing of pragmatism 
within the context of what he had lived through in the Adirondacks a few months earlier.  
In doing so, I suggested that the former echoed the latt r.  There seems to be little room 
for doubt that the force of the figure that structures the passage quoted above derives in 
large part from the fact that it is drawn from James’s experience of hiking and mountain 
climbing, pastimes that gave him deep enjoyment and as such he considered essential.  
That these activities had recently granted him a moment of preternatural insight, an 
experience of affective intensity, grants additional weight to the language, infuses it with 
musicality.  A year later, James would again make his annual pilgrimage to the 
Adirondacks.  While from the perspective of 1898 his speech in Berkeley seems merely 
to be shaped by his experience on Mount Marcy, from the vantage of 1899 James’s poetic 
profession of his philosophy reveals itself to be an extrapolation of that happenstance—
an invention based upon, but exceeding, found materials.  As such, it foreshadows what 
would occur upon his return to the site of discovery.  The line of influence between life 
and art curves back on itself in a spiral without end.  Rather than one deriving from the 
other, the two terms of the relation turn out to be mutually constitutive and revisionary.  
Sandwiched between his two experiences in the Adiron acks, “Philosophical 
Conceptions and Practical Results” speaks to the way figurative work and literal labor 
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intertwine to form the recursive fabric of experienc  and its philosophical exploration: a 
form of self-reflection that is transcendent to the exact degree to which it remains rooted 
in immanence.  In particular, as concerns James’s situation, placing the speech within its 
dual context reveals the degree to which spiritual awakening is inseparable from physical 
sufferance.  What happened to James in the summer of 1899 both follows and departs 
from what occurred the year before.  It is both a reve sal and a complement: one could 
say consummation—although one that is incomplete, at best.  That is, what James faced 
was a case of closure in which partiality turns out t  be for the best.  The perambulations 
of James’s poetic and philosophical path-finding serve as an amplification of 
experience’s “complex sacrificial constitution,” bear witness to the fact that what James 
considered to be the source of “primeval sanity and health of soul” was also a cause of 
bodily pain and mortal fear.28 
 What is more, this duplicity—this ineliminable discrepancy—is ultimately what 
James found so engaging.29  The effort of improvising, of making constructive use of this 
dissonance, is what gives life its broadest significance.  For James, it was “human nature 
strained to its uttermost and on the rack, yet getting hrough alive, and then turning its 
back on its success to pursue another more rare and arduous still” that “inspires us, and 
the reality of which it seems to be the function of all the higher forms of literature and 
fine art to bring home to us and suggest.”  What makes this aesthetic motivation so 
extraordinary is that it can be observed happening every day, in the most seemingly 
ordinary and uninspiring of conditions.  It remains true that for a considerable proportion 
of the earth’s human population just getting through the day constitutes an amazing 
achievement.  Especially when (infrequently) we turn our attention to those areas of the 
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globe that are struck by extreme poverty and destabilized by sectarian violence (some of 
which, despite what we would like to believe, are within our very own borders), we find 
endless examples of human bravery and fortitude “snatching victory from the jaws of 
death.”30  We read a novel or see a photograph that “brings home” an instance of such 
everyday heroism, and a large part of the effect it has on us is the not-quite-articulated 
knowledge that the chosen example stands out not becaus  it is isolated but because it is 
in fact indicative of countless other examples.  The c oice is ultimately arbitrary, but this 
heightens rather than diminishes the significance of what is chosen.  Such art is 
successful to the degree that it extrapolates upon the story that inspires it to evoke the 
others that remain untold, some of which are right under our noses in the most seemingly 
undramatic and inconsequential of circumstances.  Some of which are beating silently 
within our own chests.  This multiplicity does nothing to decrease the impressiveness of 
any given instance.  In fact, to a large degree singularity is uncanny exactly because it is 
inherently plural. 
 James wrestled hard with this paradox, and this struggle of his is one reason why the 
composition and performance of Varieties offers not only a suggestion but also an 
enactment of mortality’s strange—but also strangely common—ability to momentarily 
and ever-so-partially exceed itself.  In fact, I would argue, it is on the basis of this 
previous achievement that James would be able to conclude the monumental argument of 
his 1908 Hibbert Lectures at Oxford on “The Present Situation in Philosophy” (which 
would form the basis of what would turn out to be his last major work, A Pluralistic 
Universe) via a reference to “experiences of an unexpected life succeeding upon death.”  
“By this I don’t mean immortality,” James cautions, distinguishing his worldly approach 
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from that of traditional Christian theology.  “The phenomenon,” he clarifies, “is that of 
new ranges of life succeeding on our most despairing moments.”  In other words, while 
literal death hovers as an ever-present and perhaps pres ing concern at these times of 
despair (it was a distinct possibility for James in 1899—and 1908, for that matter), what 
he attempts to bring to the forefront of attention is something figurative, symbolic: “the 
deathlike termination of certain mental processes within the individual’s experience.”  
During the course of Varieties, drawing on numerous case studies, James sketches the 
experiential pattern he finds typical of people who have a feel for the “religious.”  To 
paraphrase, this pattern consists of: first, opening o eself to the passing of habitual trains 
of thought and behavior; second, realizing that this act of “letting go” sets the stage for 
the birth and (particularly significant in James’s case) rebirth of wider streams of feeling 
and ways of being.  Specifically, for James the “unexpected life succeeding upon death” 
consists of flashes of feelingful thinking that “open out the strangest possibilities and 
perspectives,” experiences that due to their emotionally-charged inspiration easily find 
themselves buried by conventional means of expression but that—by virtue of that very 
same affective intensity—can motivate a revisionary st uggle with convention that can 
effect their unforeseen resurrection.31  In short, at the heart of Varieties (and James’s 
work in general) is the confrontation and partial resolution of the mortal difficulty of 
manifesting, and thereby making communicable, singularity.  As he wrote his Gifford 
Lectures, he was living through this struggle at the same time that he was compiling other 
case studies and defining its general structure.  To a large extent, the quality of his 
description depended on the playing-out of his enactment behind the scenes and in the 
process of delivering his lectures. 
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 As intimated above, it was during his time in the Adirondacks in the summer of 1898 
that James first developed the heart troubles that would eventually lead to his death in 
1910.  It was the day after his nocturnal rapture on M unt Marcy, he believed, that the 
damage was done—“racing with those greyhounds of Goldmarks,” his much younger 
friends.  “We plunged down Marcy,” he wrote his wife at the end of the day.  Charles, 
who had “blazed a trail the year before,” was in the lead.  They then hiked up and down a 
series of nearby peaks.  “It was the steepest sort of work,” James wrote, “and, as one 
looked from the summits, seemed sheer impossible.”  H  complained of sore hands and 
legs during the next few days, but the injury of his eart would not become apparent until 
later in the summer.  The price James was paying, then, was not only for the revelation he 
had experienced the night before but also for the ability to look away (for a little while 
longer at least) from the fact  that the process of aging would hamper his athletic routine.  
Maintaining this illusion was so important to James b cause a large part of the 
significance hiking and mountain climbing had for him had to do with the fact that he had 
sublimated into these activities certain aspirations—in particular, artistic ambitions—
from his youth, which he had set aside (if not abandoned) in navigating his difficult 
passage into adulthood.  When, in Talks to Teachers and Students, James speaks of the 
widespread inability to follow through on the youthful hope “to enjoy poetry always, to 
grow more and more intelligent about pictures and music, to keep in touch with spiritual 
and religious ideas, and even not to let the greate philosophic thoughts of our time 
develop quite beyond our view,” it is hard not to hear him as talking to himself as much 
as to his audience.32 
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 “We say abstractly,” James writes, applying his pragmatic maxim to the particular 
issue at hand: 
“I mean to enjoy poetry, and absorb a lot of it, of c urse.  I fully intend to 
keep up my love of music, to read the books that shll give new turns to 
the thought of my time, to keep my higher spiritual side alive, etc.”  But 
we do not attack these things concretely, and we do not begin to-day.  We 
forget that every good that is worth possessing must be paid for in strokes 
of daily effort.  We postpone and postpone, until those smiling 
possibilities are dead.  Whereas ten minutes of day of poetry, of spiritual 
reading or meditation, an hour or two a week at music, pictures, or 
philosophy, provided we began now and suffered no remission, would 
infallibly give us in due time the fulness of all we desire.  By neglecting 
the necessary concrete labor, by sparing ourselves the little daily tax, we 
are positively digging the graves of our higher possibilities.33 
 
This passage rings somewhat hollow, I would argue, unless we recognize that James is 
speaking from personal experience.  For him, hiking a d mountain climbing—and, as it 
would turn out, philosophizing—were the “necessary concrete labor” that maintained the 
aesthetic dimension as an active—if not fundamental—aspect of his experience.  They 
led into his insight into poetry on Mount Marcy and o doubt reminded him of the 
landscape painting he had engaged in (and shown a proficiency for) as a teenager.  Such 
substitutive labors, however, lack something that att cking the problem more directly 
would offer.  Perhaps more to the point, though, what James was obscuring from view by 
ignoring the degree to which his advancing age would inhibit his physical activity was 
the suspicion that it was too late for such a direct attack.  But there are different indirect 
routes, and in combination they can come close to hitting home.  James would rescue his 
“higher possibilities” from an early grave, and hismeans for doing so is suggested by the 
proximity of the religious and the philosophical to the poetic and artistic in his 
(re)enlistment of youthful ambition.  At the time leading up to his Gifford Lectures, 
James was shifting his energy from psychology (which e associated with science, and 
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saw to be increasingly dominated by attention to what he considered to be the trivialities 
of laboratory research) to philosophy (which, as we have seen, he associates with art in 
its aspiration to engage broader and more intimate concerns).  As James’s physical health 
deteriorated, the “philosophy of religion” that he pursued in Varieties would open up into 
a new means of securing the survival of artistic aspir tion.  In setting off in this new line 
of work, he would continue to draw on his embodied an affectively intense experiences 
in the Adirondacks as a figurative resource for foregrounding the aesthetic dimension. 
 Before being carried away by this upshot, however, w  need to trace the downstroke 
that preceded and set the stage for it.  Perhaps the most expedient way to do so is to 
juxtapose this most recent passage from Talks to Teachers and Students with that from 
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” with which I concluded the previous 
section.  The latter bears witness to the inevitabil y of postponement.  The difficulty of 
expressing the musicality of experience—the affectiv  intensity of singularity—in 
language leads towards the acknowledgement that the c ualization of our ideality is 
unavoidably incomplete.  The former, however, reminds us that there is a crucial limit 
beyond which it is fatal to postpone, that although our dearest ambitions will always be 
marked by incompletion we must nevertheless struggle to make the fullest 
accomplishment we can muster (partial though it maybe).  At the same time, we must 
always keep in mind that pushing too hard broaches mortality as much as not pushing 
hard enough.  Navigating this threshold, then, is like walking a tightrope, or tiptoeing 
across a razor’s edge.  It involves an elaborate balancing act that Michel de Certeau has 
called “tact”: the ability “to maintain a balance tha  is never permanently acquired,” in 
part because “the practitioner himself is part of the equilibrium.”  This tactical occupation 
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of the margins involves an effort to manifest “a formal relationship in spite of the 
variation of the elements,” to create a fusion of found materials that exceeds its sources 
and thereby can recall and reenvision that which—as James puts it—“must be all 
unplanned for and unexpected.”34  This improvisational struggle has a sharp duplicity, an 
inherent doubleness: it is both exciting and dangerous, and these two qualities are both in 
tension and mutually constitutive.  If the former aspect is what James took away from his 
ascent of Mount Marcy in 1898, the latter is what he would be left with upon his return 
the next year.  That is, in 1899 James would come fac -to-face with and be unable to turn 
away from the danger of trail-blazing’s literal labor.  Having this brought home would 
have a commensurate impact on his figurative work of poetic and philosophical path-
finding. 
 James’s health had stabilized during the 1898-1899 school year, so much so that 
despite his lingering concerns about the condition of his heart when early summer rolled 
around he saw fit to take advantage of the window of time between the end of the term 
and leaving for Europe (where he was to spend his sabbatical preparing for the Gifford 
Lectures) to revisit his favorite haunts in the Adirondacks.  What ensued would haunt 
him, serving as a reminder of the ever-unfinished an  often confusing nature of 
exploratory endeavors.  Exploration promises discovery.  But it can make one lost, as 
well.  Further, insofar as our “spurts and sallies forward” are “like the thin line of flame 
advancing across the dry autumnal field,” they can st rt burning out of control in the very 
process of clearing away unwanted undergrowth.  James’s entry into this maelstrom 
would begin innocently enough.  He was lured by a deceptive sense of ease, aggravated 
by his willed ignorance of his ailments.  Having thus misled himself, in June of 1899 
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James “got lost in the Adirondacks and converted what was to have been a ‘walk’ into a 
13-hour scramble without food and with anxiety.”   As he would explain the incident to 
Pauline Goldmark, his companion from the prior year: “ fter some slow walks which 
seemed to do me no harm at all, I drifted one day to the top of Marcy.”35  Perhaps he 
hoped to revisit and renew the ecstasy he had experi nc d in 1898, but if that was the 
case he did so only to find these hopes dashed.  This painful disappointment of aspiration, 
however, would—paradoxically—enable him to realize th  revisitation and renewal he 
had been aiming for in the first place by forcing him to face and to a certain extent 
resolve difficulties which he had been avoiding.  Having made a crucial sidestep, what 
seemed like an indirection was in fact an entry into the necessary labor that would get 
him back on track—or, rather, allow him to forge new tracks. 
 James made his way leisurely up to this familiar peak, paused to admire the view 
momentarily, and then set off on what should have be n an easy “downward saunter.”  
Not realizing that new paths had been cleared since his last visit, however, James mistook 
an unknown trail for the one Goldmark’s brother had blazed and led him down the year 
before.  Being made myopic by a false bravado, and over-estimation of what can be 
accomplished through sheer willpower alone, James failed to do in practice what he 
professed in theory: always pay attention to the particular—and in doing so maintain an 
awareness of experience’s messiness, its tangle of irreducibly plural possibilities.  “My 
carelessness was due to the belief that there was only one trail,” James explained to 
Goldmark, “so I didn’t attend particularly.”  Consequently, he found himself at a dead 
end and spent a long and laborious time hacking his way through uncharted wilderness, 
returning to camp four hours later than he had intended.  By the time he recounted the 
 66 
incident to Goldmark, he was appropriately humbled.  “Anyhow I was an ass,” he 
confessed, “and you ought to have been along to steer m  straight.”  Much of his vigor, 
James discovered, had to do with the company he kept.  Without the friends who served 
for him as the symbolic manifestation of what he now c nsidered his forever-lost youth, 
he exhausted himself.  That his mortality had been brought home to James is attested to 
by the way he concludes his recounting to Pauline: “I f ar we shall ascend no more 
acclivities together.”36  His present failure made him afraid of a severely circumscribed 
future: one in which his activity would remain permanently grounded and solitary. 
 As it would turn out, however, this brush with death is what would enable him to 
reclaim his youthful possibilities and achieve new heights.  This work was hindered by 
the fact that his misadventure had injured more than his pride.  It had also caused “a very 
much worse condition of the cardiac organ, with entir ly new symptoms.”37  Beyond 
being unable to hike or mountain-climb, James experienced unbearable pain when he 
took only a few steps in the least strenuous of conditions.  As a result, he would leave for 
Europe earlier than expected, seeking what was then considered state-of-the-art medical 
care at a retreat center in Germany.  But it was exctly the hindrance of his heart 
problems that, in an important sense, made James’s work of recovery and renewal 
possible.  First of all, it enabled him to take an extra year of leave from his teaching 
duties at Harvard and to lighten somewhat the load of delivering his Gifford lectures.  
Giving his first lecture in May 1901 rather than Janu ry 1900, as originally planned, 
James shortened what was traditionally a two-year appointment to a mere seven months.  
The drawing-out of his preparation time proved productive, however, as he was able 
deliver a full course of lectures within his abbreviated time-frame.  More significantly, 
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however, because for James physical ailments were always symptoms of broader 
psychosomatic syndromes (and it should be noted that psychosomatic is used here in the 
non-derogatory sense that has become current in contemporary behavioral medicine), 
James’s heart condition complicated and consequently riched what was already a 
difficult task.  In prolonging his work on Varieties—and tripping him up when he 
actively applied himself to research and writing—his physical complaints opened the 
room for (and, in a sense, forced) James to delve further into the aftermath of his moment 
of insight on Mount Marcy in 1898.  His struggle to verbalize the meaning of the 
“boulder of impression” this experience left him with marked the initial resurfacing of the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity.  James had seriously and extensively 
wrestled with this issue at the outset of his career, found it overwhelming, and side-
stepped it in order to move on with his life.  His heart condition and the psychological 
complications it involved fanned the flames set off by the initial spark he had experienced 
in the Adirondacks and in doing so brought him back even closer to the time during 
which—up to then—the fire had burned most fiercely. 
 Much was riding on the Gifford Lectures for a variety of reasons: the prestige of the 
appointment, the breadth of the material he had to cover, the pivotal place the lectures 
played in James’s program of moving away from psychology narrowly conceived and 
into the wider possibilities of philosophy.  The heaviest weight, and the biggest payoff, 
however, came from the fact that his Gifford Lectures would give him the opportunity to 
focus his attention on religion.  It came with such freight, not only because it was a topic 
he had long been interested in and wanted to explicitly address, but also because he 
utilized it primarily as a synecdoche for a larger (and more dangerous) concern.  By 
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arguing that “[i]f religion is to mean anything definite for us” it must be defined as “an 
added dimension of emotion,” James in effect secularized it.  He made it a part of the 
broader and more worldly aesthetic dimension of affectively intense experience, which is 
exemplified for him by music and can be accessed through words only insofar as they 
“stir chords within you which music and language touch in common.”  James was not 
alone is ascribing such a preeminent role to music: th s position was shared by many of 
his contemporaries.  Walter Pater’s well-known contention that “[a]ll art constantly 
aspires towards the condition of music” can be taken as emblematic of this stance.  
According to Pater, this aspiration is motivated by the fact that of all media musical 
sound is the most autonomous from the demands of repres ntation.  The meaning of 
music is, essentially, itself.  It refers to something, but something that it itself manifests 
and that is derived from our inner lives rather than the outer world.  As philosopher 
Susanne Langer suggests, music serves as an exteriorization of the “knowledge of human 
feeling.”38  It enacts, and arouses in its auditor a reenactment of, a topological exploration 
of our affective landscape—what James charts as the felt meaning of experience. 
 For James, the project that came to be Varieties was meant not only as a survey of 
this vast territory and winding terrain of musicality.  It was also to be, in itself, a further 
manifestation of this aesthetic dimension.  James had set himself a tough task, and it was 
made even more difficult by his health problems.  His frustration was compounded by the 
fact that, while it seemed that his physical condition was improving, his suffering 
continued unabated.  “The doctor finds the objectiv state of my heart and aorta greatly 
improved,” James reported to a colleague shortly afer his arrival in Europe in the fall of 
1899.  “Subjectively,” he hastened to add, “my discomfort is as great as ever and I can 
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make no exertion of any sort without symptoms of sever  distress.”  Further, the work 
James found himself unable to do involved not only ph sical effort but also—and 
perhaps more so—“mental hesitation, trepidation, or flur y.”39  In short, James had to 
face the fact that his heart condition was not at the root of his problems.  Rather, it had 
aggravated the psychological burden of depression and anxiety that James had managed 
to keep at bay for much of his professional career but which had been nearly 
insurmountable during his early adulthood.  His physical ailments—and the threat of 
mortality that they harbored—were significant barriers, but they were so in large part 
because they brought back to the surface a deeper strain of suffering.  The challenge of 
James’s Gifford Lectures may have unearthed this buried freight even if he had not 
injured his heart.  In order to get Varieties into satisfactory shape, James would have to 
trace this psychosomatic syndrome (what would today be diagnosed as a mood disorder) 
back to its origins and, in effect, relive an existential problematic he had set aside.  The 
act of abandonment and compromise that had once allowed him to get on with his life 
had outlived its usefulness and was preventing him fro going any further.  He would 
have to thematize anew what had been avoided and attempt to address it more 
satisfactorily.  It was, in fact, this process of recovery (in a double sense) that offered him 
the primary example from which he derived the model of “religious experience” he 
would put forth in his Gifford Lectures.  What James lived through—and relived—during 
the course of composing Varieties would make up a large part of its content. 
 Upon beginning his convalescence in Europe, James reported that he had “no hopes 
of delivering my Edinburgh lectures, and hardly any of writing them.”  This was because 
he was finding the effort of getting them written, a d envisioned the endeavor of their 
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deliverance, to be “a curiously exciting and prostrating performance.”  “The old way of 
just sitting at a table and sweating through a lot of hours with a solid resistance and solid 
result,” he confessed to his brother Henry a few months into his stay, “is so far away as to 
seem as if it never could have been a daily possibility.”  James was forced to alter his 
work routine.  Rather than spending extended periods of time sitting at a desk—a practice 
which we now know to be a prime cause of repetitive str ss injuries such as carpal tunnel 
syndrome and back pain (the latter of which James was known to suffer acutely, and 
which Linda Simon has gone so far as to call “the barometer of his emotional state”)—he 
found himself “spending an hour in bed, each morning over my Gifford lectures—writing 
them, I mean.”  As the awkwardness of his phrasing here suggests, the reasons for 
slowing his pace and making his workspace more comfortable went beyond physical 
complaints.  What truly made Varieties taxing in a way his previous projects had not been 
was the mental strain James experienced due to the fact that processing the material he 
was working with was particularly difficult—in large part because the putative content of 
his lectures was freighted with what he was going through while he wrote them.  This 
present struggle, in turn, was complicated by the resurfacing of buried issues from the 
past, which also beat themselves into the substance of Varieties.  So, the problem was not 
that James was drawing a blank but that he was buckling under the weight which he had 
taken (somewhat unintentionally) onto his shoulders.  “The internal mind of me is 
actually boiling over with Gifford lectures,” he explained, “and I only lack the strength to 
write them down.”40 
 Rather than athletic prowess, say, the vigor James found himself lacking was most 
distinctly the “intellectual vitality” that had sustained his career up to thatpoint.  His 
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weakness, as he saw it, was less a matter of being unable to power his way through 
marathon writing sessions and more of having a hardtime making his way through a 
complex subject matter that he had intense feelings about.  Even more to the point, the 
work of composing Varieties required James to relive problems that he had abandoned 
and recover potentials that he had compromised.  Doing so would require letting go of 
much that he had depended on and profited from, which James feared he was not strong 
enough to do.  When, in a notebook he kept while working on his Gifford Lectures, 
James dwelled upon “the probability of dying soon with all my music in me,” what he 
fretted would remain unsung was not only the “great Philosophy of Religion” he aspired 
to manifest but also his capacity for cultivating affectively intense experience and holding 
open a plenitude of possibilities—in short, his singularity—that had led him to pursue art 
at the exact moment his late adolescence was passing into his early adulthood.41  James 
had given up painting within a year of deciding upon it as a vocation, moving on to study 
at Harvard’s Lawrence Scientific School and later a the university’s medical school.  
Throughout his childhood James had displayed an impressive knack for drawing and he 
seemed to enjoy his time studying in Newport, Rhode Island, with the painter William 
Morris Hunt, so his abrupt decision to turn towards another path warrants some 
explanation.  Multiple justifications have been offered up in the existing scholarship: 
James’s father disapproved of art and wanted his son to be a scientist, artists were not 
held in high regard by society in general, it was an impractical line of employment, he 
just decided that painting was not for him and his talents would be better applied 
elsewhere.  But one reason has yet to be considered, and it is—I would argue—most 
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likely the most dominant: James was overwhelmed by the burden of affective intensity 
and protean possibility artists have to continually carry, dwell upon, and work with. 
 With Varieties, he was asking himself to shoulder this freight once again.  “Religion” 
functioned for James as a synecdoche for a wider aesthetic dimension.  Philosophy and 
art are inextricably intertwined for James, in large part because—as with hiking and 
mountain climbing—he sublimated into the former the en rgies driving his artistic 
impulse.  This was most likely why, in the spring of 1873, he decided against 
“philosophical activity as a business,” and instead took a job teaching anatomy and 
physiology at Harvard, effectively opening a door into the emerging science of 
psychology.  He would keep up philosophy “on the side,” as it were.  Insofar, it fared 
better than drawing and painting—which, as early as the fall of 1872, James “regretted 
extremely letting . . . die out.”  For a time, the combination of philosophy and mountain 
climbing—a unique blend of speculative and physical activity—served to keep the 
aesthetic dimension alive in his experience.  But, as his physical health declined, a more 
sophisticated retapping of the artistic impulse wasin store.  James had a message to 
share, a message that had been with him for a long time, a message worthwhile because it 
grew out of singularity and was consequently difficult to express.  Working to get this 
message across he had begun to discover that insofar as his philosophy would be made 
manifest it would be so by virtue of being enacted through an art of improvisational 
lyricism.  James had begun to make inroads towards ctualizing this program in the 
lectures he gave in the 1890s.  Further, the seeds of this development can be observed in 
the artistic flourishes many commentators have found scattered amongst the voluminous 
and for the most part scientifically-oriented pages of Principles.  Particularly significant 
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in this regard are the places where James uses metaphors drawn from the aesthetic 
dimension to navigate points at which the psychological verges upon the more broadly 
philosophical.  Key instances include his use of musical overtones to illustrate the 
“fringe” that surrounds each pulse in the stream of th ught, the margin that defines (and 
in doing so both transcends and suffuses) each field of consciousness, and his comparison 
of the process of cognition with the work of sculptre.42 
 In Principles, however, James remained hampered by having to accommodate his 
views to scientific conventions.  There was little room for change in this regard, and 
consequently the fringe of singularity was limited o merely poking its head momentarily 
above the water of the stream of thought.  James’s hesitation, his drawing up short, in 
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” suggests that even in the summer of 
1898 James still found himself confined by the conventional—unable to alter it 
sufficiently, to make it serve rather than compromise his purposes.  It would not be until 
Varieties that the “extramarginal” would truly wind its way through and enrich the 
typical field of consciousness, thus allowing psychology to pass fully into the 
philosophical.  In order to work towards the simultaneous enactment and description of 
this potential, during the course of writing his Gifford Lectures James would have to dive 
more directly into the existential problematic of expressing singularity, challenging 
convention to a greater degree, grappling with it until it was remade to make more room 
for divergent—feelingful—thinking.  In large part, this challenge would involve 
suggesting that art, as much if not more so than science, provided the means for 
epistemological guidance and ontological insight.  Making this leap would require James 
to revisit a time in his life after he abandoned painting but during which the pursuit of art 
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was still a live—if tenuous—possibility.  It was also the time when he most seriously 
struggled with the psychosomatic syndrome of depression and debility, anxiety and 
ailment, that would once again rear its head in the wake of his heart injury.  The “boulder 
of impression” that cannot quite be put into words, the “internal mind boiling over” that 
will not spill satisfactorily onto the page, were foreshadowed by and in turn evoked an 
“endless fullness” that “bursts and cracks at every s am,” that James was both attracted to 
and repelled by in the late-1860s and early-1870s, a period during which—like when he 
took up and then quickly abandoned painting—he was at an important transition in his 
life: on the brink of turning thirty and near the completion of his professional training, 
facing the necessity of definitively assuming adult responsibilities.43  The fact that in 
order to make it through the phase of maturation he traversed circa 1870 James 
abandoned this daunting territory and compromised his artistic impulse set the stage for 
the return of the aesthetic dimension and revocation of his scientific compromise when 
the next major turning point in his life came around, circa 1900. 
 
Between a Piano-String and a Damper 
 
 It is in a letter to his brother Henry written in the winter of 1869 that James gives his 
clearest and most general statement—until Varieties—of the dilemma he faced when 
attempting to put his experience on Mount Marcy into words as well as trying to get his 
Gifford Lectures written, delivered, and published.  He had been back in Cambridge for 
about a year, returned from an eighteen month stay in Germany (most of which was spent 
in the city of Dresden) during which he partook of a much needed break from his 
scientific studies and sought to find relief for a variety of physical ailments (headaches, 
digestive problems, and back pain) as well as the broader state of malaise and angst of 
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which they were symptoms.  He had finally managed to finish his professional degree, 
but having decided against practicing medicine he floundered around, engaging in his 
cherished speculative pursuits, and yet “so sickened & skeptical of philosophical activity 
as to regret much that I did not stick to painting.”  He fretted over his future acutely and, 
in general, was more at sea than he had been during his unsuccessful convalescence in 
Europe.  This state of uncertainty bordering on hopelessness—broken up, luckily enough, 
by fleeting but strongly felt bursts of hope—would last six years.  In 1875 he finally 
assumed himself to have found a workable answer to the elusive query of what to do with 
himself, the sticky “question of ‘what to be’” that had been “tormenting” him since he 
was sixteen.44  For James, this issue was surprisingly far-reaching because he took it to be 
a matter not merely of employment, or even of personal identity, but of ontological 
status.  Henry, meanwhile was in the midst of beginning his own European tour.  Having 
published a number of short stories and reviews, to which he received a positive 
response, he was preparing to write his first novel.  Hampered by his own psychosomatic 
syndrome (similar to, but less intense than, his brother’s), he was finding it difficult to 
handle the vast emotional territory and extensive network of possibilities this longer and 
more involved project required that he navigate. 
 Presented with Henry’s concerns, James replied—in rhapsodic, rhythmic language 
that would not be matched in his writings until hisreport of his moment of insight in the 
Adirondacks he wrote to his wife thirty years later (and his figural use of it in 
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results”)—that he could “well sympathize with 
what must be the turmoil of your feeling before all this wealth—” 
that strange impulse to exorcise it by extracting the soul of it and throwing 
it off in words—which translation is in the nature of things impossible—
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but each attempt to storm its inaccessible heights produces, with the pang 
of failure, a keener sense of the reality of the ineffable subject, and a more 
welcome submission to its yoke. 
 
We have sketched here, perhaps in the firmest lines it can be, the existential problematic 
of expressing singularity.  While James acknowledged th  extreme difficulty of capturing 
in conventional language the preeminent realm of affective intensity and protean 
potential that is the aesthetic dimension, he encouraged his brother to struggle with and 
remake convention in an effort to approximate its manifestation.  In part, because it is the 
very matrix of the “[i]deals of which the very essential peculiarity consists in the fact that 
they are not realized—certainly not here, possibly not anywhere.”  As James would 
recollect while writing Varieties, “our dumb fidelity to such ideals [is] our deepest 
vocation.”  For a man engaged in the struggle, perturbing conventional conditions in the 
service of such a cause “is the deepest meaning of his existence” because in doing so 
“one certainly feels as if one were in a very central, very real ontological position.”  “One 
feels as if no formula could exhaust the life,” he adds, “or be quite adequate to its 
mystery.”  In short, “the aesthetic relations of things,” James believed, “reveal a deeper 
part of the universal life.”  Because of this fundamental importance, he urged Henry, “[i]t 
does not do to trust the matter remaining in the mind—Nothing can take the place of 
notes struck with the animal heat of fever upon them, and I hope you are making some 
for your own use all the time.”45  In other words, writing infused with the musicality of 
experience can set the stage for achieving a partial, yet ever so important, communication 
of affective intensity and its plurality of possibil ties, a resonance between sender and 
receiver that always remains incomplete yet nevertheless serves a definite and significant 
function even (or especially!) when one person occupies both positions.  For, if 
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singularity is to exceed convention at any given moment, it must exceed itself over the 
course of time, necessitating that even the one that gives witness to it reflect upon it, take 
time to process it with the aid of traces it leaves through works of art. 
 “I had a touch of fever at Dresden,” James confessed to his brother upon his return to 
Cambridge, “and I can’t help hoping that with your larger opportunities, there will be a 
distinct intellectual precipitate from your experienc , which may be communicable to 
others.”  In envying what he took to be his brother’s g eater artistic abilities, James 
suggests that—at least in 1869—he was himself unable to cultivate and convey the 
aesthetic dimension.  In encouraging his brother, h was in effect designating a surrogate 
for an undertaking he found too demanding.  His singularity was, perhaps, too real—
overwhelming to the extent that he soon found his “submission to its yoke” to be 
intolerable.  If so, it was in large part, I would argue, because he conflated 
communicability with the achievement of “a distinct intellectual precipitate.”  In other 
words, James found it hard to accept the partiality nd incompletion of the affective 
resonance that could be generated through the improvisational effort to remake 
conventions.  In fact, James would be unable to make peace with this state of affairs until 
the time of Varieties.  To understand why the “touch of fever” James experienced in 
Dresden flared out before it actualized itself in “notes struck with the animal heat of fever 
upon them” and thereby became a sustainable (and endurable) creative heat, it is 
necessary to return to the locale of its enactment, paying attention to its prelude and 
aftermath as well as its climax.  The way he framed th  issue, the only options seemed to 
be a fire raging out of control or an extinguished blaze.  At the time he found the latter to 
be ever so slightly more bearable, and was resigned to the fact that this choice would 
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define who he was for all time, without any room for alteration or variance.  In short, 
James chose to adopt “the belief that there was only one trail” in order to alleviate the 
need to “attend particularly.”  Pursuing a narrow, conventionalized path, singularity was 
put on hiatus—if not assumed to be eclipsed.  For, as he would argue in Principles, “in 
most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften 
again.”46  In 1869, it did not occur to James that he may be among the exceptions that 
prove the rule, or that the stuff out of which peopl  are made remains plastic even after 
the passage into adulthood (as recent neurophysiological research suggests). 
 The previous year in Dresden, however, the “plaster” had yet to set and James found 
that it was still responsive to his efforts to sculpt himself.  Taking a much-needed break 
from his unfulfilling medical studies, he even found himself entertaining the notion that 
he may be made of a different material altogether—one that would prove more pliable 
over time.  James was unable to fully embrace this possibility and consequently found his 
constitution hardening because getting back in “touch” with his own “larger 
opportunities” proved to be not only thrilling but also overwhelming.  Trying to launch 
himself on an alternative career-path, James spent much of his time in Germany testing 
his hand at philosophy.   Further, James’s philosophical ruminations during his time in 
Dresden focused upon the point where the life of the mind most directly impinged upon 
the practice of art: aesthetic theory.  As evidenced by the diary he kept at the time, he 
pored over the works of the German masters in the field: Lessing, Goethe, Schiller.  
Under their influence, he launched himself on a program of aesthetic appreciation, 
gathering first-hand experiences that could serve as primary material for his own 
speculations.  Things seemed to be coming together during the second week of April 
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1868, during which James viewed a sculpture exhibition—plaster casts of Greek 
originals—at a local museum and attended a German production of Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet.  With these two examples at the ends of the spectrum, James found himself 
pondering “the difference between Classic & Romantic” in an effort to put his finger on 
that elusive quality that characterizes the contemporary moment of modernity.  In doing 
so, he was in effect charting the same territory that would be revisited by poets like T.E. 
Hulme, T.S. Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and Ezra Pound half a century later.  Like these 
“high modernists” James found himself wondering in particular whether the romantic 
mode—which he considered to emerge out of the Italian and English renaissances and to 
come into its own in the culture of late-eighteenth and nineteenth century German 
culture—is “a final one or only a mid stage on the way to a new and fuller classical 
one.”47  In querying this cultural transition he was also trying to navigate his own 
maturation process.  For, while attracted to the aff ctive intensity and protean possibility 
championed by proponents of romanticism, he also feared that laboring under its weight 
would make him loose his sense of direction and cause his life to spin out of control. 
 While he undertook a brief flirtation with the romantic in Dresden in 1868 (and would 
return to and explicitly embrace it by the time of Varieties), back in Cambridge a year 
later he would find himself for all intents and puroses beginning to propose and put into 
action (at least insofar as his personal development was concerned) a new classicism.  
Grasping after the stability implied by clean lines, static shapes, and solid volumes, it 
could be said (drawing on James’s own imagery from Principles) that he essentially 
made himself into yet another “plaster cast” of a Greek model.  Specifically, the pose he 
adopted was none other than “the Stoic.”  Rather than being purely a positive step 
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forward, this posture—the outline of which began to be sketched in 1869, but would not 
truly take hold for another six years—was in large part an expression of desperation and 
fear, a defense mechanism against the turbulence Jam s experienced in Dresden and the 
extreme state of flux he found himself in upon his return home.  As James would put it in 
a notebook he kept while preparing his Gifford Lectures, “the Stoic” manages to stand his 
ground only “by deliberately annulling certain considerations and keeping himself 
insensible to a lot of naturally depressing objects of attention that all the while are 
hammering away at the gates of his instinctive constitution.”  Stated in this way, this 
“cast” shows itself to be hollow rather than solid through and through.  Instead of a stable 
foundation, the “plaster” is but a shell containing a more fluid and exploratory 
“constitution” that seeks for the smallest crack to escape and regain contact with the 
exterior world.  Thus, the strength of Stoicism is found to be grounded on “an element of 
weakness.”  Due to the “instability” hidden at its core, it is “an attitude which is ready to 
break down, and at the last extremity always does br ak down.”48  This fact was borne 
home to James as he worked on Varieties, by his life-threatening heart condition, and—
more to the point—by the way his physical symptoms summoned back to the surface the 
strains of depression and anxiety that he had managed to keep at bay for the most part 
during his professional career up to that point. 
 In order to persevere in the work of negation and desensitization, James would go on 
to argue in Varieties, the Stoic “must hold his breath and keep his muscles tense.”  This 
“athletic attitude” takes its toll, and becomes especially problematic “when the organism 
begins to decay, or when morbid fears invade the mind”—as was the case for James 
while he was preparing his Gifford Lectures.  When this happens, he writes, putting a 
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new spin on a metaphor we have been working with, the Stoic stance “appears but as a 
plaster hiding a sore it can never cure.”  Stoicism had outlived its usefulness and came 
with a heavy and unexpected downside.  As this out-dated palliative began to crumble, 
James had no choice but to develop a new way of dealing with the wound it covered up, a 
treatment that would work to heal it rather than merely hide it from view by revealing 
that the putative cure was in fact the true cause of pain.  This is in effect what James 
accomplished during the course of Varieties by pushing aside “the Stoic” and bringing 
“the Twice-Born Sick Soul” to the center of the stage.  The latter is a figure more of a 
romantic than a classical cast, and while it is drawn from a multitude of sources (as 
James’s voluminous citations indicate) it was ultimately a matter of James’s own 
invention (as attested to by the fact that perhaps is most significant citation is a 
disguised and probably at least partially fictionalized account of his own past 
experience).  James’s “Twice-Born Sick Soul” was a work of improvisation, of using 
found materials to generate novelty.  When compared to “the Stoic” it was not only a 
different posture but a different kind of posture, a dynamic pattern of experience rather 
than a static pose.  Taking James’s secularization of religion seriously, it should be 
viewed as not only a model of spiritual insight butalso of creative growth.  With his 
Gifford Lectures, James not only described but enacted this role.  In order to do so—in 
order to be “Twice-Born”—he would have to revisit and recover what had disturbed him 
in Dresden in 1868, the after-effects of which continued to reverberate upon his return to 
Cambridge and drove him to the brink of breakdown.  He would have to let go of the 
crutch that had propped him up but was now reduced to splinters.  He would have to open 
himself once again to the experience of being a “Sick oul,” dwelling within it—as hard 
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as it is—in an attitude “of happy relaxation, of calm deep breathing.”49  In the process, he 
would realize that his wound was less a fault and more a loss, and launch himself onto the 
path of recovering the positive value that could be derived from his suffering. 
 The position of “the Stoic” is relatively easy to sum up:  Stoicism essentially amounts 
to reigning in affect in order to make way for a focused actuation of the will.  The 
influence of this stance is readily apparent in the pivotal portion of Principles’s “Will” 
chapter, in which James argues that when “any strong emotional state” grips the mind 
“no images but such as are congruous with it” are allowed to step upon the stage of the 
mental theater.  It is the mark of the “strong-willed man,” however, that he is able not 
only to smuggle “reasonable ideas” (which are assumed to run counter to the sway of 
affect) into the scene but also to hold them so steadily, solidly, and inertly at the center of 
attention that they swallow the emotion and usher in the advent of volitional action, 
properly so-called.50  Exactly what “the Twice-Born Sick Soul” amounts to is much 
harder to comprehend, in part because it challenges the conventional dichotomization of 
affect and volition and overturns the scheme of valuation that frames the latter as 
somehow “better” or “more effective” than the former.  More to the point, though, this 
second bearing is less a static stance than a dynamic sequence of events.  It comprises a 
compound figure, made up of multiple parts—or, more accurately, phases.  There are the 
two obvious segments of “Sick Soul” and “Twice-Born.”  Hidden in the interstice 
between the pair is a third, intermediary stage: “the Divided Self,” which gets an entire 
chapter of its own in Varieties.  Further complications arise when we consider howthis 
pattern was manifested in James’s own particular case.  To begin with, for James “the 
Divided Self” was none other than “the Stoic” viewed from the perspective attained by 
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recovering and renewing singularity’s affective inte sity and plurality of potential.  With 
this revision, James was able to recognize that the division of consciousness is an 
inherent feature of being alive and that the attempt to “get it together” that constitutes 
“the Stoic” is merely one, provisional way of coping with the sense of loss that flows 
from the concurrence of this inevitable duplicity and the singular nature of biological 
existence. Another reason why “the Twice-Born Sick Soul” is more complex and 
nuanced, then, is that its constitution necessitate  greater degree of maturity, an 
additional leap of personal development.  Finally, perhaps the most obvious factor 
making the comprehension of this pattern of experience difficult is that over the course of 
listening or reading it has to be constructed gradually from bits and pieces scattered 
across the thick volume of Varieties. 
 This presentation of the issue was not accidental.  Not only is the extra interpretive 
effort necessary for the listener or reader to takehe content of these Gifford Lectures to 
heart, but James’s primary source for “the Twice-Born Sick Soul” was his own example.  
His enaction of this process of recovery and rebirth, like its recounting, is messy and 
protracted.  It stretches from the time he was trying to figure out what to do with his life 
circa 1870 through the period thirty years later, when he found himself at another crucial 
transitional point in his life.  In order to make sn e of what James was trying to describe 
circa 1900, then, I propose tracing how it played out—from “Sick Soul,” to “Divided 
Self,” to “Twice-Born”—in his own experience.  Doing so, I would argue, activates what 
could very well remain implicit but is of the foremost importance to recognize: the 
intertwining of art and life that Varieties consists of.  This requires that we approach the 
work less as a finished product and more as an ongoing process, an unfinished 
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performance.  It is therefore nothing but appropriate that the staging of Hamlet that James 
attended in Dresden during the spring of 1868 serve as our point of entry into this 
reconstructive process.  “Unsuspectedly from the bottom of every fountain of pleasure,” 
James writes, trying to put across what life is like for a “Sick Soul” in some of the most 
oddly lyrical phrases that grace the pages of Varieties, 
something bitter rises up: a touch of nausea, a falling dead of the delight, a 
whiff of melancholy, things that sound a knell, forugitive as they may be, 
they bring a feeling of coming from a deeper region and often have an 
appalling convincingness.  The buzz of life ceases at their touch as a 
piano-string stops sounding when the damper falls upon it. . . . Of course 
the music can commence again;—and again and again—at i tervals.  But 
with this the healthy-minded consciousness is left with an irremediable 
sense of precariousness.  It is a bell with a crack; it draws its breath on 
sufferance and by an accident.51 
 
In essence, James describes here (in terms both generalized and particular in their 
metaphoricity) the strong ambivalence towards the aesthetic dimension—the 
simultaneous attraction and resistance to affective intensity and protean potential—that 
threw him into a state of insecurity and flux, thereby compelling him to abandon the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity and compromise his artistic impulse. 
 While it could be imagined that this is what shattered his initially “healthy-minded” 
(which, in James, is a euphemism for naïve, small-minded, and one-dimensional) 
flirtation with painting in 1860, it doesn’t truly begin to surface in the record which we 
have of his experience until his report of the impression left upon him after seeing—and 
hearing—Shakespeare’s iconic tragedy during his failed German convalescence.  It is no 
accident that when he sought to revisit and render this condition for the audience of his 
Gifford Lectures he would do so through a swath of per ormative prose poetry woven 
from musical threads, with the figure of a piano at its heart.  James’s first response to the 
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play was positively ecstatic.  “What a thing the human voice is though!” he exclaimed to 
his brother in a letter written upon returning to his pension after the performance, 
sounding “notes struck with the animal heat of the fever upon them.”  James was giddy 
with the way in which the vocal efforts of the actors—especially the lead Emil Devrient, 
member of a theatrical family and the preeminent German actor of the era—infused the 
language of the script with a musicality that both exceeded it and amplified its effect.  “I 
never felt the might of it so before,” James wrote th  same night in his diary.  “The 
endless fullness of it—How it bursts and cracks at every seam.”52  While part of him 
found this affective intensity and protean possibility alluring, a split second later another 
part of him rose in revolt against the audacity of singularity and the force of the aesthetic 
dimension.  Immediately, “something bitter rises up” from this “fountain of pleasure,” 
especially insofar as it is channeled through and concentrated in its central figure.  To 
understand why this is so, it must be remembered that James was not content merely to 
sublimate his frustrated desire to paint into an appreciation of the artistic works of others.  
He also wanted to draw on some of its dormant energies to motivate the philosophical 
pursuit of aesthetic theory.  This additional aspiration brought him face to face with the 
problem of how to evoke the musicality of experienc through the limited means of 
language, of singularity struggling with convention n an effort to express itself. 
 As we have seen, James later made advances in solvg this problem in his lectures, 
peppering the printed versions with enactive traces of the oratorical situation through 
which they emerged and thereby triggering the embodied responsivity of the reader, 
activating echoes of their previous experiences of witnessing performance.  In 1868, 
however, he found himself unequal to the task.  Hisattempts to tackle it in his letter to his 
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brother and his diary are quickly swamped by doubts.  In large part, this occurred because 
James’s powerful feelings about this particular performance of the play led him to 
strongly identify with its main character, something that he was predisposed to do at any 
rate.  What motivated this identification, and at the same time made it troublesome, was 
that this fictional prince of Denmark was gripped by forceful emotions of his own—to 
tragic and fatal effect.  “Hamlet,” then, insofar as it gives a shape to what James was 
experiencing circa 1870, could be considered one of the earliest sources of “the Sick 
Soul.”  James was not unique in being drawn to this figure and making use of it to 
understand his own life.  As George Cotkin notes, in America and Europe during the late-
nineteenth century “Hamlet” had a marked currency as the exemplar of one of the central 
concerns of modernity: “the plight of an individual f cing an uncertain and chaotic 
world.”  Informing this “cultural commonplace” were the reigning interpretations of the 
character’s plight:  Goethe’s opinion (voiced via the character of Wilhelm Meister, who 
himself undergoes his own prolonged identification with “Hamlet” as he labors to prepare 
to play the lead role in Shakespeare’s play during his Apprenticeship) that this “fine, 
pure, noble and highly moral person . . . goes to pieces beneath a burden that it can 
neither support nor cast off,” and Coleridge’s amendation that the reason why this 
happens is because he is possessed by “an overbalance of the imaginative power” and 
therefore is unable to effect “a just coincidence of xternal and internal action.”  By 
James’s time, an alternative take on the character had arisen, one which was less a 
revision than a revaluation.  For the French Symbolists—most notably, Stéphane 
Mallarmé, Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, Jules Laforgue, and Paul Valéry—Hamlet exemplified 
the solitary artist hampered by a hostile society, yet trying to realize his impossible 
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dreams in works that were valuable yet difficult to comprehend.  This Symbolist spin on 
Hamlet may be what allows James Livingston to argue that Hamlet suffers less from 
indecision than from the difficulty of accommodating received frames of reference and 
fresh happenings to one another.53 
 But, especially in light of this latest way of phrasing the issue, it is important to 
remember that, as Cotkin writes, “James encountered Hamlet not only through the 
hermeneutic of previous interpretations but also thr ugh direct experience.”  The existing 
takes influenced his understanding of the play, but they did so at least in part because 
they resonated with what he himself was going through.  Further, he put his own twist on 
the diagnosis of the dilemma of “Hamlet,” grasping it as exemplifying the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity—in particular, the difficulty of putting affectively 
intense experience into words.  This issue was paramount to James in 1868 because he 
had been unable to fully act on his artistic impulse, and had instead sublimated it into 
aesthetic theorization.  The overflowing passion of Shakespeare’s play evoked the wider 
potentials he was on the brink of abandoning, reminding him of the lack of confidence he 
felt in the face of them and his consequent inability to manifest them through his own 
works of art.  The resources of philosophical language are brought in to save the 
situation, but ultimately prove incapable of this application because “the fullness of 
emotion becomes so superior to any possible words, that the attempt to express it 
adequately is abandoned.”  The effort to philosophize—especially when it is trained upon 
the aesthetic dimension—turns out to be yet another rehearsal of the trouble art itself 
broached.  Even at this additional distance, the material—as fascinating as it is—proves 
overwhelming.  In large part, this is because the means through which art is placed at 
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arm’s distance—conventional language—proves incapable of grasping it.  Confronted 
with a powerful work, James’s meditations begin spinning out of control like one of 
Hamlet’s soliloquies.  With “one form of words seeming as irrelevant as another,” he 
explained to his brother Henry, “crazy conceits & counter senses slip and ‘whirl’ around 
the vastness of the subject, as if the tongue were mocking itself.”54  It did not occur to 
James—or, perhaps more accurately, he was not yet prepared for the undertaking—that 
this challenging of linguistic convention, this injection of singularity, sets the stage for 
the remaking of words that would prove capable of pursuing his desired end: the 
evocation of experience’s musicality.  This latter step would require him to sincerely 
embrace the challenges of art once again, something he would not devote himself 
wholeheartedly to until the late-1890s. 
 “In this matter I am prevented from expressing myself clearly by reason of the 
fogginess of my ideas,” James confessed to Henry by way of wrapping up his comments 
on Hamlet.  To query the philosophical import of artistic end avor, he found, was to 
“clutch at straws of suggestions that the next day destroys.”  Unable to get his thoughts 
into what he considered clear and lasting—much less communicable—shape, James 
entertained the possibility that “such analyses are made by everyone more or less for 
himself and understood by no one else.”  Here he touches upon the fundamental paradox 
of singularity: it is both what makes everyone uniqe and the most universal of 
conditions.  Each of us finds it exceedingly difficult to put across to others exactly how—
and in what multitude of at times dissonant forms—we grasp the felt meaning of 
experience; yet it is exactly this difficulty, and the struggle to come to terms and perhaps 
partially overcome it, that is the condition of possibility for any genuine connections we 
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are able to make.  Unable to make this leap—at leasin 1868—James resigned himself to 
the fact that the philosophical inroads into the aesth tic dimension that he had begun to 
make were, in the end, utterly illusionary.  “All I have written or may write about art is 
nonsense,” James chastised himself in his diary.  “Perhaps the attempt to translate it into 
language is absurd—for if that could be done what wd. be the use of art?”55  But it is 
exactly the challenge affectively intense experience and its plurality of possibilities pose 
to the conventions of language that constitutes one of its most significant functions.  
Realizing this, though, requires the willingness to take on the burden of the aesthetic 
dimension and thereby pursue without reserve an artistic endeavor such as painting or the 
poetic remaking of philosophical terms, the infusion of words with the musicality of 
experience.  Because at the time James was ultimately ov rwhelmed by the weight of 
singularity, he was unable to follow through on such a program and consequently 
questioned whether art was of any use at all.  James was frustrated by the confines of 
language, but felt unable to get around them. 
 Usefulness, he believed, depended on the ability to motivate purposeful action.  This 
motivation, in turn, James thought in 1868, depended upon the capability of framing clear 
ideas; clarity, here, being synonymous with being able to be stated in easily 
understandable language.  Not meeting this criterion, art—and, most particularly, the 
artistic endeavor of struggling with and remaking convention to effect a partial 
expression of singularity that James would eventually embrace as the primary upshot of 
his philosophizing—was not considered to be action properly so-called.  In retrospect, 
then, James’s inability to act or even make decisions circa 1870 could be considered a 
consequence of working with a perniciously narrow definition of what constitutes an 
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effective undertaking.  In the midst of this paralyzing condition, James laid blame on the 
weight of affective intensity and protean potential he was attempting to shoulder.  To get 
on with his life, he eventually decided, would require him to abandon—at least 
temporarily—this burden.  Drawing on the example of Shakespeare’s play, it seemed to 
him that the very pretension of being able to carry this load bordered on delusion.  Just as 
the effort to put the conundrum he faced into words le  inevitably into “the slipping aside 
into some fancy,” James wrote in his diary, “so does action of any sort seem to Hamlet 
inadequate and irrelevant to his feeling.”  He considered this presumed swamping of 
volition by affect to be the very definition of craziness, a primary cause of uncertainty 
and instability.  Thus he found himself begging his brother to overlook “the bosh wh. my 
pen has lately got into the habit of writing” almost a  soon as he had got it on the page.  
“I fear you begin ere now to be in the same doubt about my sanity as most people are 
about Hamlet,” James added in explanation of his request.56  The threat of insanity would 
be ever-present and very real in the years that followed.  It was so not only because of the 
overwhelmingness of shouldering singularity but also because pursuing the artistic 
impulse to dwell with affective intensity and its plurality of potentials came to be 
understood by James as unproductive and consequently irresponsible. 
 Wholeheartedly devoting himself to the exploration of the aesthetic dimension may 
indeed have been too much for him to handle.  Or, perhaps James drove himself crazy by 
closing the trail he most passionately wanted to foll w.  That the latter is at least possibly 
true is attested to by the fact that circa 1900, in tur ing towards philosophy, James was 
able to reclaim and renew his artistic impulse.  Part of doing so was destabilizing the 
boundary between and overturning the relative valuation of affect and volition, coming to 
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understand “action in the widest sense”—a category that most definitely included not 
only works of art but also responsivity to them.  “You must remember that when I talk of 
action here,” James told the audience of his Talks to Teachers and Students, “I mean 
yeses and noes, and tendencies ‘from’ things and tendencies ‘towards’ things, and 
emotional determinations; and I mean them in the future as well as in the immediate 
present.”57  This last clause is crucial, because comprehending how affect can facilitate as 
well as impede action often requires allowing it to play out across an extended period of 
time.  This was something James found himself, somewhat to his surprise, capable of 
doing while he labored over his Gifford Lectures.  During that feverish spring in Dresden, 
however, he simply lacked the patience.  James was desperate for something to happen, 
to get something done, to cross some decisive threshold.  The weight of affective 
intensity and protean possibility was packed into a sm ll space, given a short time to 
unfold its effect.  This made singularity very powerful, but also difficult to tolerate—as 
can be observed in the aftermath of James’s confrontati  with “Hamlet” and even more 
so in the next major artistic event that he experienced, about a month and a half later.  
James would spend the latter part of April 1868 at a spa in Teplitz recovering, one 
assumes, from the excitement and pressure of his artistic flirtation.  While there, he 
would spend much of his time reading Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, 
empathizing no doubt with the main character’s struggle to find himself, especially his 
own interest in but eventual departure from the theater, Hamlet in particular. 
 Upon his return to Dresden in the second week of May, he was in for a surprise that—
in intensifying his courtship of the aesthetic dimension—proved to be both tantalizing 
and devastating.  In the time while he was away, James’s pension had acquired a second 
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boarder: another American of his age who was also in Europe seeking relief from the 
psychosomatic symptoms that appear to have been so prevalent amongst their 
demographic in the late-nineteenth century.  Thus, James fell into the company of a 
young woman named Kate Havens and was soon enjoying not only her conversations but 
also her daily recitals on the piano that constituted a prominent piece in the common area 
of their boarding house.  Havens and her performances—momentarily, at least—helped 
James to get past the sense of futility he was struck with in the aftermath of attending 
Shakespeare’s play.  Her example, James confessed to his good friend Tom Ward, 
“stirred chords in this desiccated heart wh. I long thought turned to dust.”  He went on to 
add that “she has a real genius for music.  I never hea d a piano speak as she makes it.”  
Here, in James’s response to this musical revelation, is the seed which would bloom once 
he sincerely took up the challenge he confronted and backed away from in his attempts at 
aesthetic theory.  If a piano could be said to “speak,” perhaps there was a way of 
speaking that was itself “music.”  Philosophical terms, in order to be adequate to art, 
would have to be artistically remade in their own right.  Language would have to be 
infused with the musicality of experience.  Havens’s example proved more heartening 
and suggestive than “Hamlet,” not simply because she was a real person and not a 
fictional character but also by virtue of the fact that she was someone he could both 
identify with and imagine as a counterpart.  His appreciation for her “extraordinary 
musical talent” was inseparable from the fact that he found her “a peculiar and agreeable 
person in every way.”58  That is, in admiring her he allowed himself to entertain a healthy 
desire towards her.  She awakened not only his artitic impulse but his need for 
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companionship and love, and while this made their encounter promising it also led James 
to view it as ultimately too risky. 
 James’s “feelings came to a sort of crisis” one night, a couple weeks into their 
acquaintance, while listening to Havens play.  It followed the same pattern that the 
predicament that swamped him in the face of Hamlet, the feeling of pleasure in the end 
being tainted with something bitter that is so characteristic of “the Sick Soul.”  James 
took in the “buzz of life” sounding from the strings of Haven’s piano, but found that “the 
reverberation dies away so soon in the soul and the bog closes around one again.”  The 
only conclusion he could come to was that he himself was the “damper.”  As he had told 
Ward, Haven’s music “has struck into me so deeply as quite to rejuvenate my feeling.”  It 
did so because it was the means of manifesting “an absoluteness in the phenomena of this 
young person.”  This “absoluteness” should be distinguished from the capital-A 
“Absolute” that became James’s philosophical bête noire.  For James, the imperative 
was: “To get at something absolute without going out of your own skin!  To measure 
yourself by what you strive for & not by what you reach!”  Rather than an 
extraphenomenal totality, then, this “something absolute” is a node in a network of 
singularity immanent to phenomenality, in which each burst of affective intensity can be 
felt to be “hanging by some sort of navel-string to the Infinite womb” without their 
combined result ever exhausting this source of protean potential.  The “absoluteness” of 
the aesthetic dimension invests each of its exemplars with “a something whereby their 
place in the phenomenal series of which they were members seemed not to exhaust their 
significance.”  An individual pursuing the artistic impulse exceeds any category that 
could be used to contain their singularity, remaking convention to improvise the 
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unforeseen.  In doing so they undercut any pretension to “the Absolute,” resisting the 
reification (if not deification) of a narrow view into a totalizing gesture by activating the 
cutting-edge of phenomenality, the mainspring inherent to it that is generative of novelty.  
While James would eventually embrace and enact this improvisational stance, and was 
encouraged by Havens’s exemplification of it, on that fateful evening in the middle of 
May 1868 he would feel unequal to it.  “The intuition of something here in a measure 
absolute,” he conceded in his diary, “gave me such an unspeakable disgust for the dread 
drifting of my own life for some time past.”59 
 In part, James was allowing his feelings for Havens to get in the way of his 
enjoyment of her music.  He longed for her companionship and love, but—given her 
imminent departure from Dresden—he despaired of cementing a bond that would survive 
being at a distance.  In addition, he had more general doubts about his ability to be a 
successful suitor, much less a good husband.  But on a more profound level something 
else, although something connected to this failed “romance,” was going on.  James had 
witnessed Havens manifesting singularity through works f art, and feared that he was 
incapable of responding in kind.  Overwhelmed by the burden of affective intensity and 
its plurality of potentials, James had abandoned art and aesthetic theory.  Not even his 
desire to be a suitable companion for Havens could make him shoulder this load again.  
Ultimately, James could not pursue the promise of love that he heard in her playing 
because he found himself unable to reciprocate.  Given his limits, he decided, he should 
buckle down and navigate a narrow course into the responsibilities and fruits of maturity.  
Doing so would mean leaving off the entertaining of “ideas disproportionate to any 
practical application,” among which he included “emotions of a loving kind indulged in 
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where one cannot expect to gain exclusive possession of the loved person.”  Here we see 
again that James’s perceived incapacity was the effect less of a lack of potential than a 
mistaken definition of the task at hand.  Unable to take up the challenge of working with 
the unavoidable partiality and incompleteness of affective resonance, James framed both 
art and love as matters of all or nothing.  Finding the “all” too much to handle (or, it may 
be more accurate to say, impossible), he felt that he had no choice but to settle for 
“nothing”—adopting the pose of “the Stoic” and turning his back on what he had lost.  
The only problem was that with the fact of loss thus obscured, James worried that he 
suffered from an irremediable fault.  That James waable to eventually navigate this 
impasse, at least as far as personal relations were concerned, is attested to not only by his 
marriage to Alice Howe Gibbens in 1878 but also by the fact that in courting her he was 
able to claim that it was in the act of making an effort “without any guarantee” of success 
that he heard “a voice inside which speaks & says ‘thi is the real me!’” and thereby “felt 
himself most deeply and intensely active & alive.”60 
 James would begin setting the stage for transferring this personal development into 
artistic achievement as early as his honeymoon in the Adirondacks, during which Alice 
listened to and recorded him vocally improvising his first major philosophical articles.  
These experimental essays included “On Spencer’s Definition of Mind as 
Correspondence” and “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in which he argued for importance 
of “the personal and aesthetic factor” in speculative endeavors as well as more concrete 
instances of cognition (which, we should remember, is for James always a mode of 
action).  In doing so, he not only undercut the “viciously intellectualist” position of the 
proponents of “the Absolute” but also began to disassemble his own “Stoic” stance, 
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which set affect against volition and thereby suggested that “emotions” were nothing but 
“ideas disproportionate to any practical application.”  This reintegration of James’s 
“Divided Self,” this work of recovery and renewal tha  constitutes the state of being 
“Twice-Born” would play out over the twenty years between James’s marriage and his 
struggle over Varieties.  Meanwhile, back in the spring of 1868 James was still in the 
thick of “the Sick Soul” phase.  Havens left Dresden around the end of May, and while 
she and James would keep up a correspondence for a number of years he proved 
prophetic in his letter to Ward when he suggested that he would “probably see her in this 
life no more.”  James himself would head back home within a matter of months, 
returning to his lackluster medical studies and completing his degree in the spring of 
1869.  Having decided against practicing medicine, James was, as suggested above, at a 
loss about what to do with himself.  In the beginning of December, James found himself 
reminiscing about—and perhaps wanting to reclaim—the “ ouch of fever” he had 
experienced while in Germany.  But its overwhelmingness once again speedily swamped 
its appeal, and by the end of the month James found his mood deteriorating to an 
unprecedented degree, his physical symptoms becoming so severe that for much of the 
time he had to give up “all pretence to study or even serious reading of any kind.”61 
 
A Bell with a Crack 
 
 This waning of “intellectual vitality” aggravated the sense of isolation he felt in 
Germany (especially in the wake of his perceived inability to make a connection with 
Havens).  He explicated and generalized this feeling of alienation in an effort to get a 
handle on it and face it head-on, in the guise of “the Stoic.”  “Nature and life have 
unfitted me for any affectionate relations with other individuals,” James concluded in his 
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diary near the end of December.  Because of this perceived affective shortcoming, James 
found himself unable to “study, make, or enjoy.”  While he believed “it is well to know 
the limits of one’s individual faculties, in order not to accept intellectually the verdict of 
one’s personal feeling and experience as the measur of objective fact,” however, he also 
thought that “to brood over them with feeling is ‘morbid.’”  Distrusting “feeling,” James 
faced the predicament of living under an imperative for action even though its main 
source of motivation had been undercut.  Or, as he put it: “The difficulty: ‘to act without 
hope,’ must be solved.”  James hypothesized that the solution may lie in willingly 
adopting a stance of studied detachment.  “I can find some real life in the mere respect for 
other forms of life as they pass,” he told himself, “even if I can never embrace them as a 
whole or incorporate them with myself.”  Here we have nother instance of James stating 
the matter of affective resonance in all-or-nothing terms.  Again, this framing of the issue 
set the stage for the rapid vacillation between extremes that he was so prone to during this 
period of his life.  In this respect he was typical of “The Divided Self,” which he 
described in Varieties as an individual “whose existence is little more than a series of zig-
zags, as now one tendency and now another gets the upper hand.”  At the turn of 1870, 
James was pushing himself towards the brink of a severely confined optimism.  He was 
unable to maintain his balance on this working edge, however, plunging off the cliff into 
the depths of “morbidity.”  By the first of February, he confessed in his diary, he had 
“touched bottom.”62 
 It was during these first, harrowing months of 1870, I would argue, that the incident 
he uses to conclude his chapter on “the Sick Soul” in Varieties occurred.  He cites this 
ordeal of his as an instance of “[t]he worst kind of melancholy”: “that which takes the 
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form of panic fear.”  This experience is so paradigmatic of what life is for “the Sick 
Soul,” that after recounting it he proclaims that “[t]here is no need of more examples” 
and promptly brings the chapter to a close.  James’s somewhat hasty treatment of this 
material indicates not only expository economy, but also how difficult—and therefore 
important and resonant—he found it circa 1900 when h  was struggling to get his Gifford 
Lectures in shape.  James found the matter so sensitiv  that, though he wanted to draw on 
it, he also disguised its source.  James ascribes the account to an anonymous 
correspondent in Varieties, only revealing that it was in fact his own experience in a letter 
to its French translator in 1904.  The fact that James thus “disguised the provenance” of 
this episode is one reason why many commentators have suggested that this passage is at 
least in part fictionalized.63  I am willing to accept that this is the case.  But I want to 
suggest, however, that its literariness is in fact an indication—rather than an indictment—
of its genuineness.  Because of his prominent use of figurative means, James is able to 
convey the felt meaning of this experience to his audience better than he would have 
through a literal report.  Artfulness here is synonymous with effectiveness.  Therefore, in 
returning to and recounting this incident during his Gifford Lectures, James is able to 
embrace what he could not bring himself to accept at the time.  Around the age of thirty, 
James had abandoned art, and even philosophy to a lesser degree, in order to gain the 
stability of a career in science.  Having established imself, as he approached the age of 
sixty, James felt at liberty to pursue the wider possibilities that he had felt unequal to 
three decades prior.  His return to philosophy would involve, as a key component, its 
enaction as art: pragmatism manifested as improvisational lyricism.  Given that James’s 
last fling with the aesthetic dimension took the form of a responsivity to drama and 
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music, it makes sense that when he once again opened himself to the affective intensity 
and protean possibility of singularity, an aurally-based performance art would be the 
outcome. 
 According to James’s account of his panic attack in Varieties, he found himself in a 
protracted “state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits about my 
prospects.”  One night during this period, he goes on, 
suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of 
the darkness, a horrible fear of my own existence.  Simultaneously there 
arose in my mind the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the 
asylum, a black-haired youth with greenish skin, entir ly idiotic, who used 
to sit all day on one of the benches, or rather shelves against the wall, with 
his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse gray undershirt, which 
was his only garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure.  He sat 
there like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving 
nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human.  This image 
and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other.  That 
shape am I, I felt, potentially.  Nothing that I possess can defend me 
against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him.  
There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely 
momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto 
solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of 
quivering fear.  After this the universe was changed for me altogether.  I 
awoke morning after morning with a horrible dread at the pit of my 
stomach, and with a sense of the insecurity of life that I never knew 
before, and that I have never felt since.  It was like a revelation; and 
although the immediate feelings passed away, the exp rience has made me 
sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others ever since.64 
 
Here we have the climax of “the Sick Soul” stage, th  entry into “the Divided Self” 
phase, and the seed for becoming “Twice-Born”—although the last would not begin to 
sprout until James recultivated it while composing a d performing his Gifford Lectures, 
having had “the insecurity of life” brought home to him again by virtue of his heart 
problems.  If James’s psychological state in Dresden could be described as “a bell with a 
crack,” this phenomenon of an inner barrier melting away—thereby creating an opening 
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to influences of questionable consequence whose forc is measured by the fact that they 
come somehow simultaneously from both the interior and the exterior—that James 
recounts registers the moment when this fissure reaches the status of acute awareness.  It 
could no longer be ignored and was as such intolerabl .  Oddly enough, by the time of 
Varieties James would find such giving way of solidity to be promising, liberating, even 
empowering—insofar as it makes possible an acceptance of the fact that “the healthy-
minded consciousness . . . draws its breath on sufferance and by an accident.”  In the 
winter of 1870, however, James was unable to acknowledge much less turn to his 
advantage this “irremediable sense of precariousness.”  The ground under his feet was too 
unstable and he was enveloped in a “quivering fear” that refused to pass into fluid motion 
and thus threw into question his very being. 
 At the very moment of its coming to awareness, to dwell upon this wound—to treat it 
attentively and take the time to make peace with the fact that it would never heal 
completely or without scar—was to suspend himself over what seemed a bottomless pit.  
If he had done so, James confesses in his rendition of the incident in Varieties, “I think I 
should have grown really insane.”65  He coped with the fracture by aggravating it, but in a 
way that obscured its location within him, framing t rather as something that separated 
him from certain sectors of the external world.  Although in the wake of this incident 
James claimed that, while he gained the ability to be “sympathetic to the morbid feelings 
of others,” he himself would never again entertain such sentiments—a pretension that 
what he experienced while struggling over his Gifford Lectures would prove incorrect.  
There were people who could not “Stoically” push this “ orrible dread” aside, and then 
there was him: able to sympathize yet falling short of true empathy, and in consequence 
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assuming a somewhat patronizing pose.  For the short-term at least, James was able to 
keep his mind off the fact that in positing this separation between himself and others he 
was in fact exacerbating rather than alleviating a division internal to himself.  The crack 
in the bell was rent fully asunder, the curved space of the psyche being bent back and 
flattened.  Once close, the two edges of the fissure were now at opposite ends of a rigidly 
regular plane.  The blunter of the two was foregrounded while the sharper receded into 
the distance.  The effort to keep the cutting (in a double sense) edge obscured entailed 
overshadowing much of the material in-between.  Consciousness dulled, incisive insights 
promising both risk and reward are jettisoned.  Betwe n James’s marriage and his work 
on Varieties, the bell would gradually recover its curvature but the crack would remain.  
It was by accepting and taking advantage of this fracture, in fact, that he would achieve 
the greatest degree of affective resonance.  Upon being struck, a curved instrument gives 
a fuller sound than a flat sheet.  But it is the brak in the circle that traces that 
instrument’s surface that allows it to sound the strange harmonics that strike a chord with 
singularity’s powerful feelings and multiple possibilities. 
 That the institution of detachment could be instigated by “a species of combination” 
may seem odd.  But it only makes sense that James’s effort to separate himself from that 
which he believed ailed him would start by his projection of it into a figure both alien and 
familiar.  This act of externalization raises the potential of connection but it also allows 
for the possibility of severance.  This may have ben a necessary stage in the maturation 
process James was charting for himself.  For, he seem  to imply, it is impossible to 
become “Twice-Born” without first suffering the condition of “the Divided Self.”  Or, at 
least as far as James’s case is concerned, “the Sick Soul” sets the stage for its own 
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division.  For, James’s response to witnessing Shakespearean tragedy in Dresden 
constituted a rehearsal of this quick shift from identification to separation.  The brooding, 
inhibited form of the “epileptic patient” James fear d he himself would become 
indistinguishable from was prefigured by what James had diagnosed nearly two years 
earlier as “this awful Hamlet, which groans & aches so with the mystery of things, with 
the ineffable.”66  Perceiving the depth to which this “hape” thus weaves itself through 
the fabric of James’s experience helps us understand why his “momentary discrepancy” 
from it was so difficult to manage.  His ability to lengthen this breach—to such an extent 
as to, in effect, put it out of sight—was not the gr atest cause of concern: he proved 
perfectly able to do so.  What truly unsettled James was that while this hiatus would be an 
at least temporary source of relief, it would also entail a definite loss.  While it would 
ease his mind and prevent him from being perceived (by himself and others) as crazy, it 
would also necessitate that he abandon something he held to be valuable.  Delineating 
precisely what was at stake in James’s compromise is diff cult.  Grasping the overlap 
between the “black-haired youth” and “this awful Hamlet” in James’s imagination offers 
the inkling of a clue, which some comments offered by his contemporary Stéphane 
Mallarmé help to more fully unearth and flesh out. 
 In an 1886 essay on Shakespeare’s play, Mallarmé agues that from the Symbolist 
perspective the central figure of this drama is none ther than “the prince of promise 
unfulfillable, young shade of us all.”  “That adolescent who vanished from us at the 
beginning of his life and who will always haunt lofty, pensive minds with his morning,” 
he writes, “is very present to me now as I see him struggling against the curse of having 
to appear.”67  He could very well be recounting James’s own episode of “panic fear.”  
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“Hamlet”—and by extension the “epileptic patient”—is emblematic of the “young 
person” who is capable of manifesting (as Kate Havens did) the “something absolute” of 
singularity.  Exploring the aesthetic dimension, however, this figure is also prone to 
“seizures” of powerful affect.  Pursuing the aesthetic impulse without any clear sense of 
direction, he is swamped by a multitude of possibilities.  The ineffable mystery this shape 
“groans & aches” with is the both exciting and troubling “question of ‘what to be.’”  This 
figure sounds and suffers the full array of its vocational, psychological, and ontological 
implications.  As late adolescence bleeds into early adulthood, this query is complicated 
by an additional twist: “the curse of having to appear.”  One of the reasons James was 
overwhelmed by the burden of singularity was his belief that maturity entailed adopting a 
socially recognized and as such conventional role.  This would require, he thought, 
compromising his protean potential, tempering his capacity for affectively intense 
experience.  “Appearing” responsible, it seemed, meant abandoning the artistic impulse 
that defined to a large extent his sense of “being,” taking leave of the aesthetic dimension 
to take root firmly in the “real” world of “effective action.”  “Hamlet”—and presumably 
the “black-haired youth” as well—had buckled under the pressure of this imperative.  
James was determined that he would not.  Surviving this particular transition may indeed 
have necessitated that he set aside certain problems and resources to come back to when 
he was better able to wrestle with and make use of them.  The trouble was that James 
came to frame the “question of ‘what to be’” in an uncharacteristically linear and 
deterministic fashion that seemed to rule out the possibility of recovery and renewal. 
 James persisted in his attempts to assume the pose of “the Stoic.”  Rather than 
viewing it as a protracted version of the half-way stage which “the Divided Self” 
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constitutes, he took it to be a whole, integral, and fi ished product in its own right.  As 
James would discover during the course of his Gifford Lectures, while compromises 
often have to be made they are never set in stone—or plaster, as it were.  What was 
abandoned can be reclaimed, and while this involves making other compromises, 
suffering different losses, letting go of what has come to be valuable, one ultimately gains 
from being able to shift between multiple partial perspectives rather than sticking with 
just one.  This is in essence the model of “reintegration” that James would argue 
comprises the state of being “Twice-Born.”  In staging selfhood as a multiplicity of 
always unfinished processes rather than an isolated and completed achievement, it—
somewhat paradoxically—challenges the very notion of wholeness.  In the wake of 
having “touched bottom” during the first months of 1870, however, James felt the need to 
cut things down to a size he felt capable of fully grasping and which could be, as such, 
perceived as complete.  By the end of April, he began building the justification for this 
move, in essence sketching the reductive treatment of volition that he would offer in 
Principles, drawing on two major influences: one a French philosopher and the other a 
Scottish psychologist.  In a diary entry, he relates his discovery of Charles Renouvier’s 
definition of “free will”—the “sustaining of a thought because I choose towhen I might 
have other thoughts”—and his determination to put it into action in his own life.  He goes 
on to note that his reading of Renouvier provides an example of “the exceptionally 
passionate initiative” that Alexander Bain argues is the precondition of “moral action.”68  
But, as I have shown, in “The Will” chapter of Principles James suggests that the 
thoughts that volition chooses to sustain are “reason ble ideas” that counteract a “strong 
emotional state.”  Thus, affect provides motivation f r “moral action” only to the extent 
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that it provides material to strive against and reduce.  It is channeled strictly into “the 
acquisition of habits” and prevented from effecting their reworking. 
 Somewhat contradictorily, then, the “acts of thought” that allowed James in this 
moment to “believe in my individual reality and creative power” are ones that led him to 
adopt a conventional role, thereby eliminating the protean possibilities of affective 
intensity.  In doing so, he narrowed his ambitions to an isolated path—the following of 
which he assumed ruled out any subsequent backtracking or change of direction.  This 
course of action was, in fact, foreshadowed in a letter from James to Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., sent in the spring of 1868, a time when is options seemed more fluid but 
during which he was also feeling overwhelmed by strong feelings and multitudinous 
possibilities.  “I am firmly convinced that by going straight in almost any direction you 
can get out of the woods in which the young mind grows up,” James wrote, “for I have an 
idea that the process usually consists of a more or l ss forcible reduction of the other 
elements of the chaos to a harmony with the terms of the one on wh. one has taken his 
stand.”  From April 1870 onward, James would make every effort to achieve this 
“forcible reduction.”  His means of doing so was adopting the stance of “the moralist” 
(which in Varieties is synonymous with “the Stoic,” and as such is contrasted with the 
richer “religious” attitude of “the Twice-Born Sick Soul”) as it is propounded in the 
works of Renouvier and Bain.  In the summer of 1872, this pursuit gained additional 
definition when James was offered a job teaching physiology and anatomy at Harvard.  
“The moralist” was further refined into “the scientific educator.”  From the beginning, 
James’s resolve was tried by his ambivalence.  It was during his first term as an 
instructor, in October 1872, that James wrote his brother Henry that he regretted the fact 
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that he “did not stick to painting.”  Even at this early point, he had an inkling of what he 
would rediscover during the course of his Gifford Lectures: “A man needs to keep open 
all his channels of activity; for the day may come when his mind needs to change its 
attitude for the sake of its health.”69 
 At the same time, however, in the 1870’s—in fact, through the early-1890s—James 
was working with a narrow conception of “activity,” which most certainly did not include 
aesthetic exploration.  Consequently, the same conditi  of being “sickened & skeptical 
of philosophical activity” that made James suggest to his brother that he would “make an 
effort to begin painting in water colors” was instead used as the motivation for 
concentrating upon a scientific career.  During his first two terms teaching James was 
tempted to switch gears and attempt to make a play to become a professor of philosophy.  
When, in the spring of 1873, he was asked to teach the same courses in physiology and 
anatomy during the next school year, however, he acc pted.  “Philosophy I will 
nevertheless regard as my vocation and never let slip a chance to do a stroke at it,” he 
promised himself in his diary.  “But as my strongest moral and intellectual craving is for 
some stable reality to lean upon, and as a professed philosopher pledges himself publicly 
never to have done with doubt,” he added, 
I fear the constant sense of instability generated by this attitude wd. be 
more than the voluntary faith I can keep going is sufficient to neutralize—
and that dream conception, ‘maya,’ the abyss of horrors, would ‘spite of 
everything grasp my imagination and imperil my reason.70 
 
Still strongly associated with art in his mind, philosophy posed risks that critically 
threatened his newfound belief in volition: namely affective intensity and protean 
potential, which threaten to swamp “reason” with “imagination” and thus open an “abyss 
of horrors” where a mountain of promise seemed to lie but a split second before.  Getting 
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on with “life,” it seemed, meant letting go of “that dream conception” that singularity 
spins itself out into.  Yet, the aesthetic dimensio was still something that he found it 
hard to give up, as evidenced by the fact that after completing the courses he taught in the 
fall of 1873 he took an extended leave of absence, traveling to Europe to be with Henry, 
perhaps vicariously enjoying his brother’s literary endeavors.  James returned to Harvard 
to teach the fall term of 1874, but it was not until the following year that the cast he was 
attempting to assume began to set.  In 1875, James taught his first course in psychology, 
finding in the new science room to inject a limited portion of his artistic impulse and 
philosophical bent—enough, at least, for him to strike a workable compromise for the 
time being.  His position would become even more establi hed in 1876, when he was 
promoted from the rank of instructor to assistant professor. 
 At the outset of his academic career, then, James believed that he was—as he would 
put it in Principles—“confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical 
selves and relinquishing the rest.” At the outset, h  thought, people are imbued with 
“ambiguous potentialities of development.”  To actulize—to “disambiguate,” as it 
were—any one of these possibilities, however, “the rest must more or less be 
suppressed.”  “So the seeker of his truest, strongest, d epest self, must review the list 
carefully,” James explains, “and pick the one on which to stake his salvation.”  James is 
in effect describing what occurs during “the Divided Self” phase and framing it as an end 
point rather than a moment of transition.  A narrow point of calm and safety is staked out 
and a barrier is erected between it and a wider realm of affective intensity and protean 
potential—the fruits of singularity that are overwhelming but, James would rediscover 
during his work on Varieties, ultimately life-saving.  But making this move would mean 
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redefining “salvation.”  Up until that revisionary point, to be saved meant merely staving 
off “the Sick Soul.”  Defining deliverance as a simple act of escape rather than a complex 
process of recovery, James refigured “the Divided Slf” as “the Stoic” and staked his life 
on maintaining this pose.  Thus “the psychologist” seemed to definitively unseat “the 
artist.”  As James described the process in 1880: 
Little by little, the habits, the knowledges, of the other career, which once 
lay so near, cease to be reckoned even among his possibilities.  At first, he 
may sometimes doubt whether the self he murdered in that decisive hour 
might not have been the better of the two; but with the years such 
questions themselves expire, and the old alternative ego, once so vivid, 
fades into something less substantial than a dream. 
 
Gradually, as well, however, the surface of James’s cla sicalized cast would begin to 
crack and the romantic “dream” would prove to be of m re substance than he had 
originally thought.  The alter ego would be discovered to be not so much dead as in 
suspended animation.  James’s artistic impulse would be reborn when he turned from 
psychology proper to make way for his broader interests.  Turning to philosophy, James 
would describe it as a means to “paint pictures” and e act it as a performance poetry 
infusing language with musicality.71 
 James can be observed to make this realization and work to unfreeze this expansive 
realm of “ambiguous potentialities” as early as 1884, when he made a case for “the re-
instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life”—a rallying cry he would 
repeat in Principles, thereby setting up an internal tension in that work between “The 
Stream of Thought” and “The Will.”  But the possibility of recovery and renewal did not 
really hit home until, while stuggling over his Gifford Lectures, James came to the 
conclusion that “[t]he tense and voluntary attitude” of “the Stoic” eventually outlives its 
usefulness and then becomes “an impossible fever and torment.”  Thus, he devised—and 
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enacted—the alternative of the “Twice-Born Sick Soul.”  As I argued above, during his 
work on Varieties the difficulty of trying to manage immense and complicated materials, 
compounded by his physical health problems, led to a relapse of the intense depression 
and anxiety James experienced circa 1870.  In order to finish his project, he would have 
to return to the stage of “the Divided Self” and renavigate it, softening up the “margin” 
drawn and reified between “actual” and “possible,” oosening up his mental stance, 
making it permeable to incursions of the “extramarginal” once again.  Thus, James’s 
recipe for becoming “Twice-Born” is a virtual replication of the moment when, as he put 
it, “something hitherto solid within my breast gave way entirely.”  To pass beyond “the 
Divided Self” phase, James argues in Varieties, one has to let go of the division at its 
core.  “Something must give way,” he writes, “a native hardness must break down and 
liquefy.”  This “critical point,” James adds, is foreshadowed by “those temporary 
‘melting moods’ into which either the trials of real life”—like facing an uncertain future 
or struggling with the most challenging project of one’s career—“or the theatre”—
Hamlet, for instance—“or a novel”—say, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, the plot of 
which revolves around a production of Shakespeare’s tragedy—“sometimes throw us.”72  
The aesthetic dimension triggers one’s capacity for a fective intensity, opening up a 
realm of protean potential to be explored via the artistic impulse. 
 While this reverberating responsivity was experienced by James as “quivering fear” 
in 1870, in 1900 its valence would invert.  What changed was not the experience, per se, 
but the way James experienced it.  The change was made possible by James being at a 
different place in his life.  Having occupied convetionality and achieved a certain degree 
of success he began to feel pent in by its confines.  Perhaps just as important—because 
 110 
compromise is unavoidable—having established a certin eputation for himself he now 
had something to sacrifice other than his unfulfilled ambitions and was able to thereby 
revisit these dreams.  Thus, when the surface of “the Stoic” began to crumble James was 
able to feel “[a]n immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining selfhood 
melt down.”  “This auroral openness,” he argues, “gives to all creative ideal levels a 
bright and caroling quality.”  James is not suggesting that—in order for the aesthetic 
dimension to thus sing again, to retap the artistic mpulse to express singularity, to accept 
the incompleteness and uncertainty of this effort—one needs to relinquish selfhood 
altogether.  Rather, what James is proposing is itsrevi ion.  This, in turn, entails a 
refiguring of “salvation.”  The mechanism offered in Principles is not so much rejected 
as put in motion and multiplied, making way for theever-present possibility of retracing 
one’s steps and following out new leads.  “Being saved” is not a finality, but a phase in 
an ongoing process.  “No man is homogenous enough to be fairly treated, either for good 
or ill, according to the law of one ‘type’ exclusively,” James wrote in a notebook he kept 
while working on his Gifford Lectures.  “So a man to ‘save’ himself, can throw himself 
in turn on this or that one of the functions or aspects of character in which he has least 
failed, and treat that as if it were the essence for which alone he should be judged and 
held responsible.”73 
 At no point does a person have to choose a role onc a d for all and abandon all 
others.  It always remains possible to “choose which of his ones to take a stand on” and 
alter this choice over time.  Our various tendencies may be in tension or make for some 
turbulence as we shift back and forth from one to an ther and continuously add to our 
repertoire.  But, as James writes, “[i]t is only as being always out of equilibrium that man 
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manifests any infinity of destiny.”  This condition f irreducible plurality, unfinishedness, 
and disequilibrium is that of singularity struggling to remake convention through 
constructive dissonance: the improvisational stance.  Manifested in language this effort to 
channel the capacity for affective intensity and its protean potential is lyricism: the 
infusion of words with experience’s felt meaning, with musicality.  It was because he was 
able to not only describe but also enact these happenings during the course of composing 
and delivering Varieties that it met a “warm reaction” from its audience.  He achieved 
this affective resonance while accepting its unavoidable uncertainty and incompleteness.  
He could claim at the conclusion of his Gifford Lectures to be “in possession of an 
entirely new tone.”  He was thus able to “look towards the future with hopeful eyes” 
because he had embraced the fact that “one can never again feel invulnerable!”74  It was 
through this emphatic proclamation of vulnerability—this reengagement with the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity—that James became open once again to 
his capacity for affectively intense experience andits plurality of possibilities, able to 
reactivate his artistic impulse to embark on new explorations of the aesthetic dimension. 
 In doing so, he was charting a path that would be followed by two of his most 
singular students: Stein and Du Bois.  The next chapter examines how Stein’s own 
belated engagement with the aesthetic domain requird her, like James, to revisit certain 
dilemmas secreted in her past, memories she had sought to keep at a distance but that 
nevertheless reared their heads as they echoed with the current crisis she found herself in.  
In 1901, Stein was in her late twenties, disaffected from her graduate studies and all but 
certain that she would not be following her original pl n to become a laboratory 
psychologist.  Also reeling from her first major break-up, Stein left the U.S. for Paris and 
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turned from science to the writing of fiction, reign ting an artistic ambition evidenced in 
the theme papers she wrote for her undergraduate composition course but that her 
instructor had done his best to discourage.  It was no urprise that she soaked in the 
encouragement James, by contrast, offered and followed his suggestion to attend medical 
school to pick up the physiological knowledge one ne ded to be a psychological 
researcher in the modern era.  But James’s influence continued even after she abandoned 
this career path—perhaps became even stronger.  In fact, he was one of the few 
authorities who praised her first published piece of literary art, Three Lives (1909).  In 
this work, Stein picked up the Jamesian project of improvisational lyricism, infusing 
musicality into language in an effort to convey affectively intense experience and elicit 
affective resonance among readers.  With The Making of Americans (written during the 
same period as Three Lives, but not published until 1925) Stein deepened her engagement 
with the existential problematic of expressing singularity and made further advances on 
the enactive model of literature James’s oratorical experiments provided the blueprints 
for. 
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Stein and the Reenactment of Writing 
 
 
A cup is neglected by being full of size.  It shows no shade, in come little 
wood cuts and blessing and nearly not that with a wild brought in, not at 
all so polite, not nearly so behind. . . . Why is acup a stir and a behave.  
Why is it so seen. . . . A cup is readily shaded, it has in between no sense 
that is to say music, memory, musical memory. 
 
 Gertrude Stein, Tender Buttons 
 
 The most obvious thing about the work of Gertrude Stein is that it is voluminous, 
heterogeneous, perplexing, at times contradictory.  The most common scholarly tactic for 
managing these difficulties has been simplification, the pretension of finding some 
underlying pattern that makes sense of the seeming chaos.  Thus, for instance, it has been 
all too easy for critics to assume an isomorphism between Stein’s biography, Q.E.D., and 
“Melanctha” (where Stein = Adele = Jeff, and May Bookstaver = Helen = Melanctha).  
While Adele may be assumed to be a somewhat accurate account of Stein when she was a 
medical student at Johns Hopkins, however, the college themes she wrote a few years 
earlier during her studies at Radcliffe suggest an author possessed of a temperament 
much closer to Helen’s.  Despite some defensive posturing as an exemplar of buttoned-up 
bourgeois banality, Stein was in fact a bundle of subtly powerful emotions.  The 
irresolution of this conflict between affective inte sity and the anesthesia of convention is 
indicated early in The Making of Americans by the near simultaneity of Stein’s lobbying 
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for “ordinary middle class existence” and her brief on the part of a “vital singularity” that 
exceeds the bounds of this regime of repeatable habits.  The latter eventually trumps the 
former.  This outcome of Stein’s long novel was foreshadowed by her depiction of Adele 
in Q.E.D, which registers a critical distance and thus space for the reemergence of 
suppressed aspects of self.  Further, as Stein continued to rework this material during the 
composition of “Melanctha,” she came to invest herself at least as much in the 
“wandering” titular figure as in her foil, the straight-as-an-arrow doctor Jeff Campbell.  
This recalibration of the affective register enabled the emergence of an unconventional 
style that is often characterized as symphonic or orchestral.  It is imbued with the 
musicality that is characteristic of improvisational lyricism, distinguishing the piece as an 
iconic achievement of modernism in literature.1 
 This chapter follows Stein as she built off this initial hint of artistic achievement to 
develop a full-fledged literary project, transforming what was in essence a glorified 
hobby into a bona fide career.  Stein struggled long a d hard to gain confidence as a 
writer.  These persistent doubts stayed with her throughout her life, but they became less 
pernicious after she crossed a crucial threshold in the years between 1907 and 1911.  A 
number of factors can be pointed to as contributing to Stein’s increasing poise during this 
period.  The collection Three Lives (of which “Melanctha” is the second, the featured 
attraction bookended by a matched set of shorts) wa published in 1909, and greeted by a 
positive response by a small group of aficionados.  More importantly, it was during this 
time that Stein met and cemented her relationship with Alice B. Toklas, the woman who 
would become her life-long companion.  Most fundamental, however, was the 
composition and completion of Stein’s monumental The Making of Americans, a book 
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that redefined what a novel could be, what it could accomplish.  The assurance Stein 
gained from undertaking this work had nothing to do to an immediate increase in 
notoriety.  The book would go unpublished until 1925, nearly fifteen years after its last 
word was written.  What made The Making of Americans so significant is that in it Stein 
was able to step-up her engagement with the existential problematic of expressing 
singularity, which had dogged her since she was a small child, became more heated as 
she entered into early adulthood, and is heavily regist red in Q.E.D. and Three Lives as a 
cause for broken relationships and ultimately premature death. 
 It was in The Making of Americans that Stein would dive deeper into this conundrum, 
exploring its intricacies, and in the process make it into a means of growth as well as 
hardship.  Drawing on the influence of James’s example, she would not only bear the 
weight of affectively intense experience but revel in it.  This cultivation of singularity 
enabled her to more fully realize the model of litera ure as the staggered enaction of 
affective resonance that had been implicit in her wo k, even in the apprentice pieces of 
fiction she wrote during college.  What follows is a detailed reading of The Making of 
Americans, focusing on a fugitive strain of this dense and etangled work that comes to 
the fore when the long novel is juxtaposed with the s ort stories Stein wrote while at 
Radcliffe, a story both told and reenacted through the process of its telling.  Following 
this itinerary requires a brief detour to address the inordinate influence that Freud has had 
upon the secondary literature on Stein and, by extension, literary criticism in general.  
While there are useful aspects that can be extracted from psychoanalytic theory, it has 
crucial shortcomings that are put into relief especially when applied to a figure influenced 
by James like Stein.  In particular, it is revealed to have certain key presuppositions that 
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prevent a productive encounter with the existential problematic of singularity and thus 
foreclose the cultivation of affectively intense exp rience and the elicitation of affective 
resonance.  Replacing Freud with James serves as a w y to bust through these 
roadblocks.  To this end, this chapter sketches what a J mesian approach to literature 
would sound like.  Involved in this revisionary undertaking is a brief but incisive critique 
of psychoanalysis that, although building off the alt rnative picture of psychic life offered 
by James and the counterexample constituted by Stein, is ultimately of my own making.  
Though critical of Freud, I also believe that certain useful formulations can be extracted 
from his work: namely, those that resonate with andre reshaped by a rendezvous with 
James.  Thus, the stance I take is both Jamesian and post-Freudian. 
 I noted at the outset that the secondary literature on Stein has for the most part staked 
its claims through the maneuver of simplification.  I  fact, Stein herself was the first, and 
perhaps most masterful, simplifier of Stein.  Part of what lies behind the “folksy” tone of 
her autobiographies is a desire to camouflage the ecc ntricity of her “serious” writing, 
relating the domestic routines of her daily life as a mokescreen to cover the complexity 
of her artistic methods.  The present account is asdependent upon simplification as those 
it follows.  The aim, however, is to simplify differently.  The hope is that by sampling at 
an unusual frequency, some of what has as yet gone unaccounted for will be made 
accessible.  The belief is that an admittedly simplified approach to Stein and her work can 
nevertheless preserve more of her and its complexity than has yet been managed, to the 
extent that it diverges from critical precedent andreceived opinion.  Thus, just as I have 
briefly noted certain discrepancies that compromise the integrity of the Stein = Adele = 
Jeff isomorphism, I also wish to undermine the interpr tive overemphasis on the opening 
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of The Making of Americans.  The two extremely brief (especially compared to th se that 
will come later) paragraphs that begin the novel retell and interpret an already twice-told 
tale lifted from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  (Stein had previously made use of the 
fable in one of her undergraduate essays, a coincide e that has encouraged overlooking 
other of the themes as well as certain eccentric strain  of The Making of Americans that 
follow from them.)  The opening sentence of each paragraph—the first a retelling, the 
second an interpretation—set the stage for, respectively, what have been taken as the two 
major projects underway in The Making of Americans: a narrative of intergenerational 
striving, struggle, and strife (“Once an angry man dragged his father along the ground 
through his own orchard.”) and a cataloguing, collating, and categorizing of personality 
types (“It is hard living down the tempers we are born with.”).2  With this tidy little two-
paragraph passage—isolated from the print that follows by four lines of blank space—
Stein seems to be laying out a relatively straight-forward roadmap that can be used to 
successfully navigate her admittedly difficult work.  It is more accurately read, however, 
as an attempt at subterfuge, the camouflaging of potentially incriminating admissions.  
Stein is in fact dropping a red herring meant to lure her potential readers into an 
oversimplification that misses the point altogether. 
 What is truly compelling about The Making of Americans i  neither the 
intergenerational saga nor the charting of what Stein—with her penchant for idiosyncratic 
terminology coined from simple, common words—calls “bottom natures.”  What makes 
this thousand-page-long experimental novel worth reading is a minor, intrusive strand 
that is discrepant, dissonant with declared aims but is nevertheless, as Stein would put it 
in her Lectures in America, insistent.  This marginalized element is none other an the 
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story of writing the novel itself, a story that includes as a crucial chapter a consideration 
of the writing’s reception and echoes the tale toldin the last chapter about James’s 
struggle to compose and deliver Varieties.  Compared to the fable that opens The Making 
of Americans, the fragment of narrative that sets the stage for this side-story is placed at a 
further remove, interwoven more intricately into the recursive fabric of the novel.  Yet, as 
a fictionalized account of a seemingly banal, but strangely significant and moving event 
from Stein’s own childhood, it derives from a source that is equally mythic, if more 
privately so.  Its importance can be indexed by the fact that she returns to it repeatedly.  
In this regard, this passage—which I designate “The Umbrella Incident”—is 
conspicuously unlike the well-scripted beginning, and is more indicative of where Stein 
and her work eventually end up. 
 
Event: Of Umbrellas and Affect 
Most of us balk at her soporific rigmaroles, her echolaliac incantations, 
her half-witted-sounding catalogues of numbers; most of us read her less 
and less.  Yet, remembering especially her early work, we are still always 
aware of her presence in the background of contemporary literature—and 
we picture her as the great pyramidal Buddha of Jo Davidson’s statue of 
her, eternally and placidly ruminating the gradual developments of the 
processes of being, registering the vibrations of a psychological country 
like some august human seismograph whose charts we haven’t the training 
to read.  And whenever we pick up her writings, however unintelligible we 
may find them, we are aware of a literary personality of unmistakable 
originality and distinction. 
 
 Edmund Wilson, Axel’s Castle 
 
  The most compelling and evocative readings of Stein are more often than not 
performed by scholars who draw upon, as a primary resource, the repertoire of second 
wave feminism.  To a large extent, this stance embodies the skill-set necessary to make 
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sense of the figurative seismography Wilson and his generation of critics could not make 
heads or tails of but nevertheless felt compelled to grant a grudging respect.  (“My 
sentences do get under their skin, only they do not k w that they do,” Stein writes in 
The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, by way of explaining the ambivalent response of 
this cohort of readers.)  To be a contemporary practitioner of feminism, then, means to 
have undergone the sensitivity training needed in order to not pathologize a writer like 
Stein.  It leads to the development of an unabashed enthusiasm for “her echolaliac 
incantations.”  From Marianne DeKoven’s pioneering study A Different Language to Lisa 
Ruddick’s more recent Reading Gertrude Stein, this strain of scholarship has traced a 
looping series of interconnected phenomena in Stein’s writing: in this body of work an 
attention to repetition spirals into a concern with rhythm, a feel for chant, a sense of 
aurality, an embrace of musicality.  Stein herself prefigures the aesthetic corkscrewing 
undergone by these empathetic readers in a passage from a notebook she kept while 
writing The Making of Americans: “I believe in repetition.  Yes.  Always and Always.  
Must write the eternal hymn of repetition.”3 
 While Stein never went back on this proclamation, she did invoke a crucial alteration, 
explicitly in Lectures in America but implicitly during the writing of The Making of 
Americans itself.  With time, Stein came to redefine repetition as insistence.  In doing so, 
she foreshadows a further twist in the circuitous path of the feminist approach, flipping 
from music in general to improvisational lyricism in particular.  My interest is in how 
Stein made use of and reshaped (at times to the point of making a break) found 
materials—namely, conventional language—in order to achieve the unprecedented.  The 
unforeseeable accomplishment, in this case, is the expression of singularity in all its 
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affective intensity through a singing that can not only be heard but also jumps off the 
page when offered to and engaged by a responsive audi nce.  In undertaking this project, 
Stein picks up on James’s effort to craft books punct ated by traces of the oratorical 
situation out of which the lectures they were based upon first issued.  As we will see in 
the following chapter, Du Bois also works to instanti te the Jamesian blueprint for an 
enactive literature, infusing language with the musicality of experience by writing works 
that simulate the resonance effected by the sounds of the “sorrow songs.” 
 More than any other demographic, it has been contemporary feminist critics who 
have been willing to undergo the auditions this aesthetic approach seeks to elicit.  They 
are equipped to do so, in part, by their borrowing of certain tricks of the psychoanalytic 
trade.  Drawing specifically on Julia Kristeva’s early work in Desire in Language and 
Revolution in Poetic Language (which, in turn, is indebted to the work of Jacques Lacan, 
who instigated the amalgamation of poststructuralism and Freudian psychoanalysis), 
second wave feminist scholars have adopted a posture capable of relishing linguistic 
unconventionality, valuing the seemingly irrelevant or accidental, observing the degree to 
which the life of the mind is inextricably intertwined with bodily experience—or, to put it 
in more specialized terms, how the aesthetic emerges out of the affective. 
 When critics influenced by psychoanalysis cease taking liberties with the “law of the 
father” and adopt a more textbook Freudian position, h wever, they suddenly become 
much less apt readers of Stein.  A case in point is Ruddick’s contention that Stein’s 
modernist innovations occurred by virtue of the fact that “her thinking swerved away 
from James and toward Freud.”4  It is true that Stein is not a simple imitator of her 
mentor, champion, and friend.  But, as Stephen Meyer has demonstrated in detail, she 
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consciously developed her approach to thinking and writing by running variations on key 
themes in the Jamesian program.  While she was most likely familiar with Freud’s work, 
there is no evidence to suggest she either studied it in epth or took his ideas very 
seriously.  Contrary to Ruddick’s claim that Freud served as a liberating foil to James’s 
example, Stein’s approach challenges many presuppositions of the Freudian stance.  It is 
something of a slight, then, to suggest that his theory somehow serves as a necessary 
justification of her practice.  While she always grappled with uncertainty, she also 
maintained a dogged insistence on the importance of h r work, even when it was only she 
who found it interesting or even acceptable.  When confirmation came, it came from a 
place other than the rather rigid topography of Freud’s metapsychology—a place more 
intimate and at the same time open to difference, on  mapped by James’s more flexible 
illustration of psychic life.  Stein put her own spin on the Jamesian approach to creative 
inspiration.  That said, she nevertheless continued to work under his aegis.  Ruddick is 
able to make Freud look liberatory only by mischaracterizing both him and James, 
ascribing certain qualities to the work of the forme  that are actually better exemplified 
by that of the latter. 
 While Stein struggles with but ultimately delights in the exploration of repetition, the 
only curiosity which the topic elicits from Freud is of the morbid variety, insofar as he 
frames it as a dead-end—and therefore something, ultimately, to be feared above all else.  
For him, repetition is unavoidably compulsive, an “u consciously” manifested symptom 
that requires an interpretation undertaken by the analyst, from his position of external 
authority, to be granted any degree of meaning whatsoever.  Further, this “compulsion to 
repeat” is the main piece of evidence for “the assertion that drives are regressive in 
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nature”—the claim that, as Freud repeatedly states it in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
each and every drive is reducible to “a powerful tendency inherent in every living 
organism to restore a prior state.”5  Thus, insofar as repetition-as-compulsion can be 
considered to be expressive of anything, it is “theexpression of the conservative nature of 
organic life”—that is, its compulsive need to return to an inorganic state.  It is this line of 
argument that leads to Freud’s postulation of “the death drive” as the drive par 
excellence, the drive which all other drives (which, to the dgree that they differentiate 
themselves from “the death drive,” can be, according to Freud, only “partial drives”) can, 
in the end, be traced back.  Conclusively rebutting Freud’s postulations, or even 
following them to the extremes to which he takes them, is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  Nevertheless, I want to throw into question his interpretation and propose an 
alternative understanding, a Steinian/Jamesian perspective.  This latter positioning starts 
with a notion of insistence as the making of difference rather than the strict replication of 
sameness (repetition-as-choice), proceeds to a postulation of the will to live (which 
replaces regressive drives with progressive affects as the primary source of motivation 
and thereby asserts the fundamentally liberal orientation of organisms, their desire for 
novelty), then enacts an appreciation of art as the channeling and broadcasting of 
excitement (that is, affectively intense experience), and finally instantiates a model of 
literature as the staggered enaction of affective resonance (and in doing so effects a shift 
from Freud’s economic index of pleasure and pain to an esthetic register of liveliness 
and dullness that it entails). 
 As an actual phrase, “the will to live” is nowhere to be found in James’s writing, but 
the general gist of it can be traced back to a lectur  he gave in 1895, “Is Life Worth 
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Living?”  Stein attended this lecture and in fact wrote an enthusiastic response to it as one 
of her themes for her sophomore composition course at Radcliffe.  (The notion that “the 
will to live” emanates from this source is supported by the fact that it is collected in a 
volume called The Will to Believe, that James gives a positive response to his query, and 
that—as Stein’s wording seems to suggest—it is James’s calling even more than that 
which is called that provides the reason for living.)  Stein may also be drawing upon an 
essay published, at around a midpoint between James’s lecture and Stein’s own, by the 
poet and critic Max Eastman (also a student of James) entitled, quite simply, “The Will to 
Live,” in which he takes as his subject “a thirst for experience that is very general,” a 
yearning for affective intensity that not only revels in pleasure (liberally redefined), joy, 
and inspiration but also displays, as Silvan Tomkins writes, “a tolerance for the distress 
and discouragement and shame that are inevitably evoked” when we try to share these 
experiences, broach the existential problematic of expressing singularity, confront the 
partiality, incompletion, and uncertainty of affective resonance.  Going back to James, we 
find that the reveling and the tolerance are in fact two sides of the same coin.  “It is 
indeed a remarkable fact that sufferings and hardships do not, as a rule, abate the love of 
life; they seem, on the contrary, usually to give it a keener zest,” he writes in “Is Life 
Worth Living?”  This capacity for affective intensity, James would argue in another 
lecture given around the same time, depends upon the exercise of embodied responsivity.  
“It all depends on the capacity of the soul to be grasped, to have its life-currents absorbed 
by what is given,” he writes.  “Life is always worth living if one has such responsive 
sensibilities.”  This facility for improvisational lyricism—to make use of what one finds 
even when it is a negative affect conventionally coded as not only useless but dangerous 
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to entertain—is what enables the acceptance and even enjoyment of dissonance, to 
engage it constructively (and aesthetically).  Doing so, we become aware that, as James 
puts it, that which truly “excites and interests” u about our interactions with the world 
we inhabit is “the element of precipitousness.”6 
 The contrast between James and Freud I have briefly but starkly outlined—and the 
Jamesian influence on Stein that I have documented i  the process—throws into question 
Ruddick’s claim that Freud’s “ideas of the unconscious confirmed the value of what was 
happening in her artistic practice,” that the formulations of classical psychoanalysis 
definitively designate the agency behind her writing.  Stein herself definitively quashed 
any such suggestion in her refutation of B.F. Skinner’s contention (based on his 
familiarity with research Stein conducted and published on motor automatism under the 
auspices of the Harvard Psychological Laboratory while an undergraduate at Radcliffe—
studies in which Stein served as one of her own subjects) that her literary works were the 
product of automatic writing.  “Gertrude Stein never had subconscious reactions, nor was 
she a successful subject for automatic writing,” she writes in The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas.  Ruddick claims that for Stein repetition was “a force within herself and her 
prose that she identifies with unconscious process.”7  Freud (and Ruddick) may make this 
identification but Stein herself did not.  Repetition was in fact a crucial aspect of Stein’s 
manner of working, but it is a mistake to conflate th Freudian and Steinian stances on 
the issue.  Confusing their positions short-circuits the switch to insistence and collapses 
the looping that leads towards musicality and improvisational lyricism.  All of this is not 
to say that Stein was not interested in and did not e gage through her art the psychic 
activity outside “normal” consciousness that Freud attempted to address under the rubric 
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of the “unconscious.”  She did so, however, against the Freudian grain by charting her 
own explorations according to the alternative guidelines set down by James. 
 As Fred Matthews notes, Freud sought to shore up his stature by “claiming full 
scientific standing for his theory” and James felt that this move “was unwarranted.”  
“James also disliked the kind of reduction indulged in by Freud,” Matthews adds.  In 
short, as Ignas Skrupskelis writes, James “found Freud too rationalistic, too willing to 
sacrifice the flux and variety of concrete experience for a single explanatory principle.”  
Contra the reductionist explanation of eccentric psychic activity—of which affectively 
intense experience makes up a considerable portion—as merely the source of crippling 
symptoms, James argued that it could also generate g owth and enrichment.  Taking an 
artistic rather than scientific approach to this subject matter, he painted consciousness as 
a mobile node in an open field rather than the fixed point in a restricted enclosure that 
Freud takes it to be.  Instead of being bound by a thick rind of “resistances,” then, it is 
instead surrounded by, as James writes in Varieties, “a leaky or pervious margin,” “a 
margin so faint that its limits are unassignable.”  What for Freud was “unconscious,” was 
for James “extramarginal.”  Instead of being inaccessible without the assistance of an 
external “expert,” it was in fact, James writes, “ready at a touch to come in.”8  In other 
words, what Freud takes to be unalterable standards of “normality,” James reveals to be 
merely habitual limitations that have outlived their usefulness and therefore are in need of 
being broken through incursions of singularity.  The “extramarginal” serves as a much 
better model of creative inspiration than does the “unconscious.”  It is no wonder, then, 
that it is the one Stein adopted in order to make the leap from repetition to insistence.  
The “unconscious” is cold, cramped—a one-way road t a dead end.  The 
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“extramarginal” is the lively beginning of a long journey in multiple directions.  The 
“unconscious” is old and derivative.  The “extramarginal” is novel and fresh.  The 
“unconscious” is an enclosed realm of disembodiment and disconnection.  The 
“extramarginal” opens out into embodied responsivity and immersion. 
 As far as Stein and her work are concerned, then, Freud functions better as a point of 
departure than a final destination.  There are most definitely points of comparison and 
commonality between their standpoints.  But, rather an using Freudian paradigms to 
give Stein’s work a seemingly more intelligible shape, I propose we make use of this 
partial overlap as an opportunity to consider how her modified Jamesianism complicates 
Freud’s views and in doing so unravels certain conclusions he wishes to make.  
Approaching him improvisationally, Freud functions ot merely as a foil but also a 
source to sample and flip.  By taking phenomena like repetition seriously, Freud, like 
Stein, but to a lesser extent, broke ranks with a Eurocentric and masculinist model of 
linear development.  To suggest that early childhoo experiences have a significant 
impact on adult life—or more generally that growth involves working through an unruly 
erotic life that is never completely amenable to any supposedly all-encompassing 
program of cultural conventions—destabilizes what has been the predominant model of 
progress in the West.  But having broken the line, Fr ud wanted to close the circle: the 
idiosyncratic beginnings he uncovers (e.g., “The Oedipus Complex,” “penis envy,” 
“infantile sexuality” in general, etc.) are taken to be universal, and therefore completely 
determinative of present life in general.  The future is, in effect, foreclosed in order to 
prevent any chance accidents other than those he takes as foundational, and therefore 
falsely universalizes, from interfering with the smooth execution of his 
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metapsychological master narrative or destabilizing the purported timelessness of the 
“unconscious” that functions as both the beginning a d the end of his narration.  In this 
sense, his work is two-dimensional.  Stein, by contrast, adds an extra dimension, traces a 
circularity that continuously returns only to diverg  from itself and thus has temporal 
thickness. 
 She does so, in part, by challenging Freud’s corralling of desire within the confines of 
a heterosexist pornography and thereby opening an embrace of an erotic life that is 
irreducible to sexuality, that rather includes the sexual as a subset of itself.  Stein 
foregrounds a more generalized notion of desire as motivated by “unexpressed or 
unrecognized feeling,” suggests a posing of the erotic in a way that shows it to be, as the 
poet Audre Lorde writes, “not a question only of what we do; it is a question of how 
acutely and fully we can feel in the doing.”  Our deepest cravings, according to this view, 
issue from singularity and are freighted with the supreme difficulty of its expression and 
the trickiness of its recognition.  The upshot is an erotic life that, as Lorde has it, is not 
“relegated to the bedroom alone” but rather can be enacted in addition through “dancing, 
building a bookcase, writing a poem, examining an idea”—any activity, in short, that 
draws out the curiosity, interest, enthusiasm, thirs  for experience, being moved that more 
than anything characterizes the dynamic quality of our lives from the very beginning but 
which is often stymied by sedimented conventionalities, static expectations.  The 
emphasis here is on a renewed sense of enaction suffused with affective intensity, which 
upsets habitual patterns and thereby makes room for unexpected (and always partial, 
incomplete, at times awkward) resonances between, in the words of critic Brad Bucknell, 
“parallel interiorities.”9  This is exactly what is entailed in the relationship between reader 
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and writer choreographed by a literature designed to effect the staggered enaction of 
affective resonance.  As Bucknell argues for the modernist project at large, and as I will 
demonstrate in regard to the particular case of Stein’s improvisational lyricism, this 
literary endeavor drew its primary motivation from and sought to emulate the example of 
music.  This emulation amounted to more than a simple attempt at imitation through a 
superficially “rhythmic” and “melodious” language.  What is at stake, rather, is a strange 
sonority effected through disruptions of syntactic and semantic conventions that serve 
less to imitate musicality than to approximate or simulate effects that are activated 
between musicians and their listeners.  Stein thus so nded a potential that hiphop lyricists 
would actualize.  What she gestures towards, they take hold of with both hands and shape 
into ever more intricate shapes.  What they accomplish is more tangible, the result of 
sound technology that has been developed subsequent to Stein’s passing.  But hiphop 
lyricism remains inspired and enriched by her exemplification of ecstatic word-play. 
 With the intervention of the aesthetic wrinkle that Stein makes, then, the break resists 
what Freud presents as an insurmountable force of foreclosure and replicates itself 
beyond the foreseeable horizon.  His unitary circle becomes, for her, a helix that is 
always already doubled. “The broken circle demands a new analytic (way of listening to 
the music),” Fred Moten writes vis-à-vis black radical aesthetics, embodied most 
emblematically—in my mind—by the jazz pianist, composer, bandleader, and poet Cecil 
Taylor.  The same could be said apropos Stein.  The two share a sense of queerness—that 
is, singularity, a resistance to and wrestling with convention.  They have in common a 
manner of feeling that is also a modus operandi.  Certain aspects of psychoanalysis can 
be adapted to explore the intricacies of this working method.  Involved in this vital 
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adaptation is a reversal of the standard approach.  Rather than applying theory to art to 
make sense of it, art is applied to theory to complicate it down to its most central 
presuppositions.  Thus, as Moten writes, “lingering in the psychoanalytic break is crucial 
in the interest of a certain set of complexities that cannot be overlooked but must be 
traced back to this origin precisely in the interest of destabilizing its originarity and 
originarity in general.”10 
 Loitering here, then, is something of a ruse, a mens for enhancing the incisiveness of 
cutting against the grain of Freudian foreclosure.  One cuts back to the break, and in 
doing so underscores the fact that it was there to begin with, before Freud laid claim to it.  
The misdirection involved in this maneuver—a syncopated choreography of leaning back 
and darting forward—is part of a strategy to rescue that which Freud simultaneously 
relies upon and disavows.  The aim here is, borrowing James Snead’s phrasing of the 
stylistics of black culture, “to confront accident and rupture not by covering them over, 
but by making room for them inside the system itself.” 11  In preparation for tracing this 
approach to the issue of repetition, I want to consider the complex process of 
psychodynamic fabrication that Freud limns as the common denominator of memory, 
dream, imagination, and literary fiction.  Doing so will instigate an approach to “The 
Umbrella Incident” that in turn will resound Freud’s initial figuration and thereby open a 
fruitful space for engaging in a rethinking of repetition—as insistence, as the break that 
instigates improvisational lyricism, the cut out of which an enactive model of literature 
emerges. 
 The passage—or passages—that comprise/s “The Umbrella Incident”—a scene in 
which a small child is burdened, ignored, and abandone  to her own only partially 
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developed devices of expression and wellbeing—occur in the pivotal “Martha Hersland” 
section of The Making of Americans.  It occupies the heart of the chapter—arising first 
roughly in the middle, and resurfacing (prefaced each time with the refrain “As I was 
saying . . .”) three times over the span of ten pages.  Critical consensus has it that the 
titular character of this part of the novel functions as Stein’s alter ego (as does, I would 
argue, David Hersland later in the book; but the dual identification belies no 
contradiction—not only because of the multifaceted nature of selfhood, but also because 
each character acts for Stein as an echo of herself at a distinctly different time of her life).  
Consequently, although presented by Stein as a moment in Martha’s childhood, it is 
assumed that the basic outlines of “The Umbrella Incident” are drawn from Stein’s own 
past.  Involved in the composition of this tableau-in-motion, then, is not only literary 
fiction-making, but also the activity of remembering.  Simultaneously employing these 
two faculties, in turn, involves a speculative adventure that skirts the fine line between 
imagining and dreaming.  Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) has been a 
favorite resource of literary scholars, most notably for its recognition of the significance 
of the seemingly irrelevant and for its elegant charting of the work of figuration along the 
intersecting axes of displacement and condensation.  I propose that a pair of less heralded 
essays, pieces of smaller stature on memory formation (“Screen Memories” [1899]) and 
the life of the imagination (“The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” [1908]) are equally 
useful for students of Stein.  Chronologically and thematically, these pieces bookend 
Freud’s opus on the fabrication of dreams, in effect orming a resonant chamber in which 
its echoes can resound and amplify themselves.  Together, then, they function as a 
resource for gauging the multilayered texture of a composite fiction like “The Umbrella 
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Incident,” assist in discerning and following the complex interweaving of its mobile 
strata. 
 “The Umbrella Incident” has, as it were, four facets: (1) dramatic event; (2) primal 
scene; (3) screen memory; (4) artistic reenactment.  While these aspects are clearly 
distinguishable, presenting them serially is somewhat misleading, given that their relation 
to one another is nonlinear.  They are entangled, enfolded into one another in a recursive 
circuitry that is simultaneously self-referential and self-divergent.  I will treat them 
sequentially here, but only after cautioning that te value of doing so is purely heuristic.  
In order to complicate the sequence, they are arranged in nonchronological order, 
forming what could be thought of as a temporal ricochet.  The momentum of a 
remembered present carries us deeper into that present’s past, which in turn flings us 
back beyond the original starting point, demarking later memories that echo back upon 
the presumed origin and traveling further into the contemporaneous act of remembrance 
itself. 
 Facing the first facet, what strikes us about “The Umbrella Incident” is that it is by far 
the most dramatic of the event-like episodes that periodically punctuate what is for the 
most part an odd amalgamation of straightforward exposition and abstract wordplay, with 
the latter eventually overwhelming the former—in part because the drama encapsulated 
in “The Umbrella Incident” is eventually able to play itself out through the writing of The 
Making of Americans itself.  The passage moves us, and becomes increasingly moving as 
we repeatedly read its repetitive recounting, despit  the fact that on the surface it seems to 
be an occasion of small consequence that stands out merely by virtue of the fact that it is 
a relatively lively moment in an otherwise humdrum existence.  This superficial 
 135 
impression of banality is reinforced, first, by Stein’s tendency to deprecate Martha 
Hersland and, second, by her stated belief that the telling of this “little story” is a 
distraction from what she takes to be (at the time sh  wrote this section) the main purpose 
of her novel: the narrative of family progress that expands into an encyclopedic character 
typology.  And yet she feels compelled to tell it, and to tell it again and again.  The 
simultaneous attraction and revulsion on Stein’s part h s to do, in large part, with the fact 
that “The Umbrella Incident” not only crystallizes a number of interconnected concerns 
from her past but is also invested with the ongoing problems Stein struggled with, and to 
a certain extent resolved, during the course of writing The Making of Americans.  These 
issues of, on the one hand, personal development and, on the other, artistic achievement 
are intricately intertwined.  Stein relates “The Umbrella Incident” in a series of four 
rehearsals: 
[1] 
This one, and the one I am now beginning describing is Martha Hersland 
and this is a little story of the acting in her and of her being in her very 
young living, this one was a very little one then and she was running and 
she was in the street and it was a muddy one and she had an umbrella that 
she was dragging and she was crying.  “I will throw the umbrella in the 
mud,” she was saying, she was very little then, she was just beginning her 
schooling, “I will throw the umbrella in the mud” she said and no one was 
near her and she was dragging the umbrella and bitterness possessed her, 
“I will throw the umbrella in the mud” she was saying and nobody heard 
her, the others had run ahead to get home and they had left her, “I will 
throw the umbrella in the mud,” and there was desperate anger in her ; “I 
have throwed the umbrella in the mud” burst from her, she had thrown the 
umbrella in the mud and that was the end of it all in her.  She had thrown 
the umbrella in the mud and no one heard her as it burst from her, ‘I have 
throwed the umbrella in the mud,’ it was the end of all that to her. 
[2] 
As I was saying Martha was throwing the umbrella in the mud with angry 
feeling as she was telling and nobody was hearing. 
[3] 
As I was saying Martha Hersland when she was a little one a very little 
one and the others were running ahead and she had the umbrella for one of 
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them and she was struggling to catch up to the rest of them and they were 
disappearing and she was being filled fuller always with angry feeling and 
resentment and desperation and she was crying out, “I will throw the 
umbrella in the mud,” and nobody was hearing and she was repeating 
again and again and then in a moment of triumphing she did throw the 
umbrella in the mud and then she went on crying and saying, “I did throw 
the umbrella in the mud,” this is a description of an action that many very 
different kinds of children could have been doing when they were left 
behind struggling, Martha Hersland did this and she was a little girl then 
and slowly now there will come to be a complete description of the nature 
in her that this I have been just describing does not now help very much to 
be understanding. 
[4] 
As I was saying she went to school with the children n ar them, the for the 
Hersland children, poorer children near them.  As I was saying when the 
Hersland family moved to the ten acre place Martha was already old 
enough to begin her schooling.  As I was saying then when she was a very 
little one and she was coming home with them, they w nt faster than she 
could then, they left her then and she was running with the umbrella one 
of them had left with her after saying she would carry it for her and she 
was saying I will throw the umbrella in the mud and then she was crying, I 
have thrown the umbrella in the mud, and then later sh  got home and the 
umbrella was not with her but one of the other ones one of those what had 
left her went back that day later and got it for he.12 
 
 The first of these passages is clearly the primary account: the others put the event 
itself at arm’s reach through summary, commentary, nd details missed in the immediacy 
of the initial run-through.  The account starts with a third-person perspective but soon 
morphs into the simulation of a real-time, immersive account of what happened from the 
point of view of the young Martha herself.  Here we have in The Making of Americans 
the odd blending of the voices of narrator and character that DeKoven argues 
distinguishes “Melanctha.”  This vocal layering is one tactic Stein used to elicit the 
embodied responsivity of the reader, to instigate the reenactment of literature.  As 
DeKoven describes the effect: “We feel as if we are living through an experience rather 
than reading about it; we come away with a feeling of deep familiarity with or rootedness 
in the dimensions of the situation unextended to a c herent intellectual grasp of them.”13 
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 A story told in this way refuses to grant the reader the additional distance generated 
when a scene is recollected rather than reenacted.  The three variations that follow, 
however, engage exactly in the work of recollection, elaborating on the original account, 
but in a way that places Stein (and her reader) at a further remove from the event that is 
being narrated.  She evidences here a deep ambivalence, a fluctuation between situational 
embeddedness and detached observation that runs throughout The Making of Americans.  
If, by the end of the “Martha Hersland” chapter shehas displayed a marked leaning 
towards the latter, by the time she began writing the next section on “Alfred Hersland and 
Julia Dehning” she seems to swing back towards the former, but in a way that shifts the 
moment of immediacy from a remembered event to the acts of writing and reading 
themselves. 
 Stein’s ability to blend her own point of view with hat of Melanctha Herbert is an act 
of imagination growing out of her own experiences of er tic “wandering” and 
“wisdom”—and the struggle with convention this exploration of singularity entailed—
during her emotionally tumultuous undergraduate years and her even more turbulent 
affair with May Bookstaver—made all the more poignant by coinciding with the 
unraveling of her career at the Johns Hopkins Medical S hool and her decision to relocate 
to Europe to pursue a literary life.  The means by which she manifests her empathy for 
Martha Hersland, while no less fictional, is more a m tter of memory than of 
imagination, insofar as it involves looping back to embrace (albeit momentarily, 
ambivalently, and partially) a former self rather than projecting oneself into a potential 
alter ego.  Stein’s mixed feelings about Martha, much like her ambiguous stance towards 
Melanctha, should be taken as an indication that her involvement with this material runs 
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at a depth that involves an ineradicable intimacy but also entails a reflective distance.  
This distancing, however, is exactly what sets the stage for an approach, or return—a 
reenactment via fiction.  Or, more precisely, a second-order fiction, a literary fiction, 
since memory itself—with or without the intervention f a concerted effort of artistic 
crafting that aims to reenact rather than merely recoll ct—is endowed with an inherent 
fictionality of its own.  As Freud states the issue, since memories do not “arise 
simultaneously with the experiences they relate to and as a direct consequence of the 
effect these produce” they “show us the first years of our lives not as they were, but as 
they appeared to us at later periods, when the memori s were aroused.”  “At these times 
of arousal the memories of childhood did not emerge, as one is accustomed to saying,” he 
goes on to explain, “but were formed.”14 
 The formation of memory can be considered to occur when an affectively intense 
experience in the present resonates with an experienc  of a similar quality from the past.  
This affective resonance between past and present selves—like that between one person 
and another—is always partial, incomplete, and disorienting, being hard to pin down and 
locate definitively.  As Stein puts it, “to be feeling ourselves to be as children is like the 
state between when we are asleep and when we are just waking, it is never really there to 
us as present to our feeling.”  Putting the matter in these terms suggests that “The 
Umbrella Incident” partakes of dream as much as memory—or that the two are both 
products of the same dynamic process of figuration. 
 Imagination, too, plays a role in this literary crafting of fiction, as evidenced by the 
close of the incident’s fourth rehearsal.  The sequence of aspects can be perceived folding 
back upon itself here.  For, as it turns out, artistic reenactment is a precondition for 
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staging the dramatic event.  But there are two sides to artistic reenactment: the work of 
dramatizing the event and the reliving of it through the process of writing and reception 
itself.  It is the latter that will be considered under the heading of artistic reenactment 
below, even though reference to the former is unavoidable.  The immediacy that Stein’s 
reenactive literature generates is achieved via mediation.  It is a literary effect.  The 
dramatic event is realer than reality, more moving than the original occurrence.  This is 
due to the fact that while in the latter, as Freud writes, “the subject was then in the middle 
of the scene, paying attention not to himself, but to the world outside himself,” in the 
former self and world, interiority and exteriority, are simultaneously grasped in their 
dynamic interaction and interweaving.15 
 There is another reason why the immediacy of “The Umbrella Incident” in its first 
run-through is necessarily accessed through the mediation of literature: it was only 
through the composition of the second-order fiction of Martha’s life that Stein was able to 
grapple with the first-order fiction of her own childhood memory.  Approaching this 
material, Stein admits, gives her “a horrid losing-self sense.”  The simultaneous banality 
and crucial significance of this event—and her inablity to “just get over it,” as evidenced 
by her returning to it again and again—makes Stein lose her composure, throws into 
question the standing she seeks to secure for herself by writing a monumental piece of 
literature, “The Great American Novel.”  But there is something even more fundamental 
going on here, something that is endogenous to the very mechanics of accounting for 
oneself across time.  “That is really the trouble with an autobiography you do not of 
course you do not really believe yourself why should you,” Stein would come to diagnose 
the problem later in Everybody’s Autobiography, “you know so well so very well that it is 
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not yourself, it could not be yourself because you cannot remember right and if you do 
not remember right it does not sound right and of course of course it does not sound right 
because it is not right.”  What is interesting here is that the imperfection of memory is 
registered as a matter of sounding, as a resonance marred by interference.  Even more 
stunning is what Stein concludes on the basis of memory’s ineradicable artifactuality: 
“You are of course never yourself.”  Insofar as it involves telling stories that—like any 
narrative—span a temporal breadth traversed via a recursive, divergently circular 
trajectory that generates odd and disorienting echoing effects when one strains to hear 
what travels through it, it is not only past (or future) selves but selfhood itself that is 
“never really there to us as present to our feeling.”16 
 This is perhaps why Stein will come to argue—drawing on the fluid, multiple 
“Consciousness of Self” that James illustrates in Pri ciples, as it continuously makes and 
remakes itself during the duration traversed by the “Stream of Thought”—that the 
attempt to convey affectively intense experience through writing entails the composition 
of a “prolonged” or “continuous present,” in which there is no such thing as “identity.”  
There is, in other words, no easily identifiable label under which everything that goes into 
making a self can cohere as a unity and thereby serve as the basis for an understanding—
of self and other—that is somehow something other tan a complex and messy process of 
feeling, an undertaking that continually overthrows itself.  A sincere embrace of the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity requires a repeatedly renewed effort to 
sustain the recognition of its endogenous plurality.  This inborn turbulence of selfhood 
and the comprehension it enables can be the cause of much confusion.  It is also the 
source, however, of whatever genuine empathy, whether towards oneself or other people, 
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that we are able to achieve.  As Stein would come to phrase the issue in Narration, even 
given the knowledge that “one is never really feeling what any other one is really 
feeling,” two (or more) can approximate one—can achieve an admittedly partial, 
incomplete, affective resonance—because “one is always two.”17  This calm acceptance 
of disjuncture, however, comes a quarter century after the completion of The Making of 
Americans.  And during the writing of the first half of that novel (up to the end of the 
“Martha Hersland” section), Stein’s feelings towards the dynamic instability of selfhood 
and comprehension were far less tranquil.  At that time she was overwhelmed as much as 
invigorated by affectively intense experience, had only begun to make inroads on the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity, and had yet to be convinced that 
empathetic connection was possible to any degree whatsoever. 
 In these circumstances the untenability of identity seemed less like liberation than 
dispossession.  As Priscilla Wald suggests, during much of The Making of Americans the 
disruption of conventional patterns that affective int nsity effects by sounding the 
endogenous plurality of singularity to its furthest reaches amounts to “an 
incomprehensibility symbolically tantamount to nonexistence.”  “The fear of self-loss 
corresponds, in this work,” Wald writes, “to the fear of not being comprehended or 
comprehensible: the estrangement of a terrain that is more than alien, that simply makes 
no sense.”18  Not being understood, then, is the cousin (once removed) of death.  Going 
unheard, one might as well be dead.  Or, perhaps, it is the other way around.  Perhaps 
knowledge of the fact that one’s life was the consequence of a rather grim game of 
chance makes one’s existence hard to hear, hard to understand, isolated, estranged.  What 
this amounts to is a figurative death—a bad dream one only partially wakes up from—
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that is worse than the literal variety, in that it must intensely felt over a long period of 
time.  This feeling of mortality is hard to put into words, and thereby begin counteracting, 
in exact proportion to its intensity.  This is the core issue that Stein struggled with from 
the beginning of her life, that she wrestled with and partially resolved during the course 
of composing The Making of Americans, and that continued to haunt her even after the 
completion of this monumental novel.  Given how heavy these matters weighed on Stein, 
what is possibly most impressive about this work is that she managed to embrace the 
incomprehensible as its own remedy.  By risking incoherence, risking a further 
intensification of the isolation of her tenuous existence, she demonstrated that the 
breaking of convention, the misuse of found materials, can serve as the means of 
conveying affectively intense experience, infusing language with music, as well as the 
source of its difficulty.  That is, she discovered and put into practice improvisational 
lyricism.  A key step was made towards this artistic accomplishment in the crafting of 
“The Umbrella Incident” as dramatic event.  Here thinterior dissonance of alienation is 
put to constructive use.  Through the dual fictionalization of herself as Martha and as 
semi-omniscient narrator, Stein was able to simultaneously occupy the positions of both 
actor and observer and in doing so managed to perambul te a dangerous territory, circle 
around an issue that was too painful to address more directly. 
 What “The Umbrella Incident” portrays is an affectively intense experience broaching 
the existential problematic of expressing singularity.  At first, this seems rather obvious: 
this is what literally happens.  But, then, it must be remembered that there is nothing 
literal about what is going on here.  Not only is the dramatic event figurative through and 
through, but the primal scene and screen memory on which it is based and the artistic 
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reenactment which it gives rise to are themselves complex processes of figuration.  This 
would be true even if the four facets could be disentangled.  But, in reality (which itself is 
far from literal), they cannot.  Which is what makes unpacking any one of them such a 
painstaking process: they demand to be explicated simultaneously, but thinking them 
through generates an artificial degree of seriality.  Getting to the heart of the matter 
necessarily involves peeling through layers of significance that have accrued around it, 
whether because of the nature of the material, or the unavoidable limits of method.  We 
get at what “exactly happened” by paying close attention to the convoluted way Stein 
presents these actions, examining her composition in fi e detail in order to tell a 
compelling story in such a way that it evokes a web of interconnected stories that 
exemplify the same basic pattern.  Stein’s method of story-telling dramatizes the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity, the difficulty of conveying affectively 
intense experience in a way that is easily understandable. 
 Stein’s  metastory solicits readers’ embodied responsivity through techniques that 
make them feel like the story is theirs as well.  Stein’s writing engages readers in such a 
way that they come to occupy not necessarily the same but the same sort of position vis-
à-vis the dramatic event that she does: that of participant observer.  Reading becomes a 
way of reenacting the experience that motivated the writ r to write, that Stein herself 
reenacted in the very process of writing itself.  Literature (the recursive circuitry of 
reading/writing), then, functions for Stein as, in the words of Richard Cándida Smith, “a 
score that the reader plays using his or her body as an instrument.”19  The aim is the 
staggered enaction of affective resonance, the partial nd incomplete conveyance of 
affectively intense experience, and the means is infu i g language with music.  There is 
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an inherent musicality to the dramatic event—and, consequently, the artistic 
reenactment—that serves as a clue to the mystery of what exactly makes the memory it 
draws upon musical.  Turning back, then, to the initial rehearsal of “The Umbrella 
Incident,” we notice that it opens with an incantatory prelude that all of a sudden slides 
into a register more reminiscent of an operatic aria o  even a Beethoven sonata, 
composed of a quick concatenation of nearly isomorphic, but slightly off-kilter 
prepositional phrases: “and she was running and she was in the street and it was a muddy 
one and she had an umbrella that she was dragging and she was crying.”  We as readers 
are placed in media res.  The balance and subtle internal variation of this passage places 
us right with the child, Martha.  But in the background of our awareness, and upon 
repeated readings, questions arise. 
 We empathize with her distress: she is small, trying to catch up, moving across a 
messy terrain, carrying an unwieldy load.  But, where has she come from? what is she 
trying to catch up to? why is she carrying an umbrella?  The muddiness of the road 
suggests that it has been raining, so the inclusion of the umbrella is hardly a non sequitor.  
But should not someone other than a child this young be carrying it?  Perhaps it was 
given to Martha in case it starts raining again, but would she even know or be able to 
operate it in that eventuality?  It is only with the subsequent rehearsals that these details 
are filled in: Martha is on her way home with a group of older children, one of whom 
owns the umbrella in question and asked her to carry it.  So, already handicapped by 
shorter legs, Martha’s attempt to keep up is made even more difficult by an additional 
burden someone has unthoughtfully pawned off on her. Maybe Martha agreed to carry 
the umbrella because being asked to do so seemed like a gesture of inclusion.  But in 
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practice, it turns out to be merely another way of leaving her behind.  Martha may be 
small, but she is sharp.  As the troubling facts of the situation quickly become apparent to 
her, she issues the protest that serves as the predominant motif threading its way through 
these interwoven passages.  It is repeated and varied, but no matter what it remains 
unheard.  Not being heard only intensifies her frustration with being left behind: 
“bitterness possessed her . . . there was desperate anger in her . . . she was being filled 
fuller always with angry feeling and resentment anddesperation.”  This ramping up of 
affective intensity sets the stage for the expressiv  act that temporarily resolves this 
dramatic event, if not the metastory, the complex process of figuration of which it forms 
merely one component.  In fact, to the degree that i  is evocative of the other aspects of 
“The Umbrella Incident,” the resolution offered here is made compelling only as long as 
it is simultaneously thrown into question. 
 Returning once again to the first rehearsal, we need to pay close attention 
simultaneously to: (1) Martha’s action; (2) Martha’s utterance; and (3) how Stein phrases 
both action and utterance in a way that highlights t eir inextricability.  Action and 
utterance move together, interlock, like dance partners, tracing out the steps through 
which a wave of feeling passes.  “I will throw the umbrella in the mud.”  Stein first 
introduces this insistent phase directly after the sentence that moves from incantatory 
prelude to a musical pacing of the scene, drawing the reader in, placing us in Martha’s 
shoes.  She repeats it four times, each time adding an additional circumstantial detail as a 
sort of tag line, highlighting her vulnerability, her isolation, her frustration, her lack of 
recognition.  With each repetition, tension builds.  The effect is not to wear a rut, but to 
build momentum.  There seems to be something slightly different being evoked with each 
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instance of the motif, until it and the action it accompanies are brought to a crisis, a need 
for dramatic change.  Stein marks this crucial moment with a typographic stroke, 
interrupting the stream of writing with a semicolon.  This is a very rare instance of Stein 
using this punctuation: usually she sticks to periods and commas, and as she got older she 
worked to wean herself progressively from the latter.  Not only does it come out of 
nowhere, so far as the precedent set in the preceding pages would have seemed to 
indicate, but its syntax is slightly off.  The semicolon is preceded as well as followed by a 
space.  The reader is jarred: it becomes not clear, but powerfully registered that 
something has happened here.  Only later do we realize this disjunctive typography 
coincides with the crest leading up to the climax of the event: Martha finally—“in a 
moment of triumph,” the third rehearsal adds—throws the umbrella in the mud.  The 
action and its punctuation is the crest, not the climax.  It is the cut that instigates the 
break, an operation that differentiates and in doing so joins.  For the climax comes, the 
break is made, by running a vital variation on the motif: “I have throwed the umbrella in 
the mud.”  The slight syntactic departure of the extraspaced semicolon serves as a pivot 
around which a more dramatic grammatical disruption revolves, the linguistic equivalent 
of throwing the umbrella in the mud. 
 The intertwined concatenation of action, utterance, and its second-order phrasing is 
how Martha/Stein expresses herself, evoking the affective intensity of her experience in 
this moment and in general, and in so doing embodying s ngularity and its endogenous 
plurality in a way that resonates.  Martha/Stein is making an implement that has been 
foisted upon her, an unwieldy medium, useful for her purposes by misusing it, dragging it 
through the mud, marring it with an ungrammatical construction.  Consider: “have 
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throwed.”  More than anything it sounds.  These are not words but a musical phrase, or at 
the very least a musical phrasing of words.  It is more dramatic than the regularized 
versions Stein offers in subsequent rehearsals: “did throw”; “have thrown.”  Its sonority 
makes felt her smallness, her struggle, her exuberanc  t the belated issuing of her 
expression, the enactment of her singularity.  But this moment of triumph is noticed only 
by the writer who relives it and the reader who responds, viscerally, to it.  Martha does 
manage to leave her mark, but her fellow actors remain as unresponsive as always.  Stein 
implies that, at least at this moment, the climaxing of dissident action into divergent 
utterance is enough for Martha: “it was the end of all that to her.” 
 Indeed, the character of Martha that develops as the chapter progresses bears little 
resemblance to this willful, emotional child.  The adult Martha is complacent, subdued, 
as if she has accepted a life the precondition of which is being ignored.  Martha, in other 
words, becomes something less than herself.  Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Stein 
gives up on Martha, abandons her, files her away in her family history and 
characterological survey—an abandonment indicative of her ambivalence towards her 
own past and present, her own uncertainties regarding her literary endeavor, her own fear 
that it had no future, that it would fail to elicit a response other than rejection.  Much 
better, the fate of Martha seems to imply, would be to just remain ignored.  Nevertheless, 
Stein cannot help but keep hold of “The Umbrella Incident.”  It was hers to begin with, it 
is what she reenacts—relives—through the writing and reception of The Making of 
Americans itself.  Martha may or may not have been content with the dramatic action 
backed by the emphatic utterance, but what is certain is that Stein herself remains 
dissatisfied with the fact that “no one heard her as it burst from her.” 
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 This is why, a page after closing the initial run-through of Martha’s moment of crisis, 
Stein once again interrupts her attempt to achieve “a complete description of the nature in 
her” to return to “the acting in her of her being,” even though the latter supposedly “does 
not now help very much to be understanding” the former.  Regardless, she cannot help 
but offer a second rehearsal in the form of a condensed summary that enumerates the 
action, the affect, the utterance, but ends on the not of still going unheard.  She feels 
compelled to rehearse the event two more times, adding at the end of the last an 
imaginative revision, an as-yet-unfulfilled hope fictionally actualized in the past.  One of 
the older children, readers are told, retrieves the umbrella.  This is suggestive of closure, 
but upon scrutiny it can be felt to miss the mark.  The umbrella is retrieved, but there is 
no suggestion that it was returned to Martha, much less returned with an understanding of 
what the action meant to her or a belated audition of the echoing of her utterance. 
 Stein herself stubbornly strives for more, needs to even more powerfully convey 
affectively intense experience and be greeted with resonance—even given how partial, 
imperfect, incomplete this responsivity will always be.  Even after she is done reenacting 
“The Umbrella Incident” as dramatic event, the existential problematic of expressing 
singularity of which it is indicative sticks with her.  The seed of improvisational lyricism 
it contains is recursively planted into her own aesth tic practice, blossoms into her model 
of literature as the staggered enaction of affectiv resonance.  All of this is to say that 
“have throwed” continues to resound throughout the entirely of The Making of 
Americans.  Its echoes can be felt in the unpunctuated repetition—“a very little one a 
very little one”—with which the third rehearsal begins.  They can be felt in the lack of 
quotation marks in the fourth and inconclusive run-through.  More importantly, they can 
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be heard to amplify as Stein’s writing becomes increasingly musical, eventuating in what 
she calls the “Beethovian passages” of its latter sections, the “rhapsody” with which it 
ends. When explicating how she went about writing in The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas, Stein writes that often she would “set a sentence for herself as a sort of tuning 
fork and metronome and then write to that time and tu e.”20  While composing The 
Making of Americans in the wake of “The Umbrella Incident,” “I have throwed the 
umbrella in the mud” was that sentence.  It is the theme Stein riffs on; the key in which 
her composition is written; the punctuated, cut, variegated motif she sounds as her time 
signature; the break she chops, flips, and loops in her recursive self-sampling. 
 
Scene/Screen: The Mud of Memory 
They ask me to tell why an author like myself can become popular.  It is 
very easy everybody keeps saying and writing what anybody feels that 
they are understanding and so they get tired of that, anybody can get tired 
of anything everybody can get tired of something and so they do not know 
it but they get tired of feeling they are understanding and so they take 
pleasure in having something that they feel they ar not understanding.  I 
understand you undertake to overthrow my undertaking. . . . That is all 
understanding is you know it is all in the feeling. . . . My writing is clear 
as mud, but mud settles and clear streams run on and disappear, perhaps 
that is the reason but really there is no reason except that the earth is round 
and that no one knows the limits of the universe that is the whole thing 
about men and women that is interesting. 
 
 Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s 
Autobiography 
 
 The character of Martha Hersland on its own hardly offers an adequate likeness of 
Stein.  A fuller account of Stein’s self-portraiture in The Making of Americans must 
include a consideration of how she invests herself in Martha’s younger brother David as 
well.  Nevertheless, the critical and somewhat anomal us wrinkle in Martha’s 
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characterization that “The Umbrella Incident” amounts to does serve to capture a 
particular moment in Stein’s life.  By the same token, details of Stein’s own biography 
when “she was just beginning her schooling” serve to augment Martha’s fictionalized 
experience.  When she was seven, Stein’s family relocated from urban Europe to the still 
semi-rural East Oakland (“Gossols” in the novel).  A clue to the source of Martha’s 
grammatical peculiarities is given by the fact that the young Stein was not exactly a 
native English speaker: although it was the language she first learned to read and write, 
the linguistic surround in which her first six years were enveloped, and thus the idiom 
from which she drew her earliest utterances, consisted as much of French and German as 
of the language Stein would eventually come to claim s her own.  Like the Herslands, 
the Steins lived “not in the part of Gossols where the other rich people mostly were 
living,” but rather in “an old place left over from the days when Gossols was just 
beginning.”21  While enjoying a privileged life on their ten-acre estate, the Stein children 
also lived amongst and attended public school with a peer group that for the most part 
were less fortunate than themselves, a class differenc  that—in addition to the age gap—
could account for Martha’s sense of estrangement from her schoolmates.  But while these 
surface biographical details serve to flesh out the young Martha’s situation to a certain 
extent, they do not quite account for the odd poignancy with which “The Umbrella 
Incident” is saturated.  Something to the effect of what occurs in the dramatic event may 
have happened to Stein, it may be based on an actual memory that she embellished to 
encapsulate this time in her life.  But what makes “The Umbrella Incident” uncannily 
gripping is the way in which it surreptitiously draws on the periods immediately 
preceding and following Stein’s primary school years.  This is where the aspects of 
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primal scene and screen memory come in, which it turns out are parallel surfaces 
enclosing and providing the means of activating a resonant chamber. 
 These terms are drawn from the Freudian corpus, and in this body of work they are 
intimately intertwined.  While I will consider them sequentially, we must always remain 
attentive to the constant sliding back and forth that akes place between the two, the near 
elision of scene/screen, the paradoxical blurring of the lines between source and echo.  
Although Freud does not coin the phrase “primal scene” until his celebrated “From the 
History of an Infantile Neurosis” (aka “The Case of the ‘Wolf Man’”)—written in 1914 
but not published until 1918 because of the interruption of World War I (in the interim he 
had made a passing reference to it a year earlier in his Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis)—he had referred to the phenomenon in the less heralded “Screen 
Memories,” published fifteen years prior.  Freud in fact begins and ends this piece 
pondering the prototype of what would come to be the primal scene, touching upon the 
titular notion only three-quarters of the way through the manuscript, and then only 
briefly.  Screen memories, it seems, cannot be considered apart from primal scenes, and 
are in a sense supplementary to them.  But this supplementarity does not make them any 
less meaningful.  To the contrary, it is through their action alone that primal scenes can 
be accessed.  Necessary though it is, however, this mechanism is off-putting as well, at 
least for someone engaged in the sort of analysis that Freud (and I) are attempting to 
perform.  Generating the motivation for launching this endeavor would be impossible 
without a strong conviction that “our earliest child ood experiences have left indelible 
traces on our inner selves.”  But immediately upon trying to unearth these traces they 
seem to amount to “either nothing at all or a relatively small number of isolated 
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recollections, often of questionable or perplexing significance.”22 Seemingly 
disconnected and confusing artifacts at best.  More likely trivia, if not junk.  Like, for 
example, the throwing of an umbrella in the mud. 
 Freud strives to rescue this psychic debris from the figurative dump.  He argues that 
“those impressions that have the most powerful effect on our whole future need not leave 
a memory image behind.”  Or rather, their force is so strong that leaving their stamp 
directly would crush rather than leave a legible imprint.  Consequently, “instead of the 
memory image that was justified by the original exprience, we are presented with 
another, which is to some extent associatively displaced from it.”23  The banal intervenes 
to cushion the blow, to register in a roundabout way th t which cannot be directly 
apprehended.  But, how to identify and explicate this relation between “memory image” 
and primal scene?  For Freud, this is where the analyst intervenes, filling the gaps left by 
these displacements and uncovering condensations throug  his masterful interpretation, 
to which patients must completely submit in order to overcome their resistance to 
remembering the most significant moments of their early lives and thereby become cured 
of their neuroses.  I want to phrase the issue diffrently, however, in a way that evades 
the unquestioned license of the external authority, that leaves room for a fruitful self-
analysis through reenactment, that flips “resistance” into complexity and “symptoms” into 
problematics.  Part of doing so involves questioning Freud’s almost automatic 
pathologizing of this sort of psychic entwining, his evasion of the possibility that it is 
something all healthy individuals work through (a fact that undermines to a certain extent 
the idea of an authority that can be “external” to the symptoms it diagnoses).  Another 
part entails subverting Freud’s ocularcentrism. 
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 According to his formulation, memory is a matter of what can be imaged, pictured in 
clear, straight, static lines.  No credence is granted to the possibility of a memory that 
sounds, that is fuzzy, distorted, vibratory, but which nevertheless is powerfully affecting, 
available for audition—a “musical memory” that Stein locates in the “in between” of her 
cup, a resonant chamber that is yet another self-portrait.  (For is not the resonant chamber 
exactly what resides within and emanates from the “gr at pyramidal Buddha” that the 
sculptor Jo Davidson—and the critic Edmund Wilson after him—uses to figure the 
bearing Stein assumes when engaged in the activity of writing?)  Along related lines, we 
need to consider an issue Stein herself was deeply interested in: the potential of 
synesthetic interaction between seeing and hearing, choreographed by touch into a dance 
of sight and sound that issues as sculpture—or, enactive literature.  Doing so entails 
questioning Freud’s metaphor of the “screen.”  Through this revisionary query the 
alternative figure of the tympan/i/um is arrived at: a device that both marks the entrance 
of and enfolds the resonant chamber and in so doing acts as a means of facilitating the 
exteriorization of interiority, intervenes as a cushion in the potentially painful and 
unavoidably difficult transition between memory and writing, sight and sound. 
 Here we have a clue to the synesthetic impulse inhrent to the artistic methods Stein 
would develop as an adult: because it is so easily evoked by words on a page, sound 
threatens the sanctity of printed language; but while being thus sonorously infused makes 
reading and writing more dangerous, it also makes it more interesting and powerful.  
Sound frightened Stein, but it also fascinated her, and she longed to become able to 
handle it.  While not the medium she worked within, she longed to make it into a 
resource for unsettling and remaking—infusing—that medium.  And this aspect of her 
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mature writing arose out of her childhood reading.  “I loved to read in spite of the fact 
that often when thus engaged there came suddenly into my consciousness a fear of 
something unknown, intangible, that seemed to be everywhere,” Stein confesses in an 
autobiographical theme written while she was an undergraduate at Radcliffe.  It would 
not be until over forty years later that she would specify the source of this enveloping 
anxiety, explicitly touching upon her primal scene i  Everybody’s Autobiography while 
remembering a moment soon after her family relocated to Oakland, the period of her life 
“The Umbrella Incident” draws upon and elaborates.  “When I was eight I was surprised 
to know that in the Old Testament there was nothing about a future life or eternity,” she 
writes.  “I read it to see and there was nothing there.”24 
 How this indication of an abrupt end made Stein feel is suggested by a detail about 
Martha Hersland that she uses to punctuate her recounting of “The Umbrella Incident.”  
“When she was a very little one sometime she wanted ot to be existing,” Stein writes.  “I 
wish I had died when I was a little baby and had not any feeling, I would not then have to 
be always suffering, I would not then now have to think of being frightened by dying, I 
wish I had been dead when I was a very little one and was not knowing anything.”  The 
lack of quotation marks here is another way in which Stein blurs the line between 
narrator and character (and thereby draws the reade in), suggesting that she is speaking 
as much for herself (and us) as she is for Martha.  From very early in her life, then, 
Stein/Martha seems to have been endowed with a troubling knowledge that elicited in her 
a strong and persistent sense of angst, which could predispose her to be sensitive to 
something like being left behind to carry someone els ’s umbrella through a muddy 
street.  And at first glance, it appears as if thisintimation of mortality comes via a written 
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source, and not just any book but a book that is (especially for someone who comes from 
a Jewish background) the canonical authority.  But if we listen closer to Stein as she 
moves closer to the primal scene in Everybody’s Autobiography, we hear that she was 
primed to perform this reading by a previous audition, an accidental eavesdropping upon 
whispers behind her back.  “Then there was the fear of dying, anything living knows 
about that,” she writes, “and when that happens anyone can think if I had died before 
there was anything but there is no thinking that one was never born until you accidentally 
hear that there were to be five children and if twolittle ones had not died there would be 
no Gertrude Stein, of course not.”25  A scrap of devastating trivia separates what “anyone 
can think” from what will always remain somewhat unhought even by those who lived 
through it, and as such will keep arising to be reenacted, worked through. 
 So, Stein—according to her own account—would not have been born if two potential 
siblings had not died in infancy.  This early knowledge of the contingency of her 
existence imbued Stein with the need to justify it, to express herself in a way that was 
both true to her experience and considered valuable by others.  She was driven to 
manifest her singularity, make it partially communicable, and thereby stimulate and 
resonate with other singularities, evoking the plurality out of which they all emerge.  This 
would be the project of her life’s work, a crucial step of which she would make while 
writing The Making of Americans and falling in love with Alice Toklas, an intimacy that 
was made possible by Toklas’s reading (and transcribing, if not to say rewriting) of 
Stein’s work.  Before she could reach this joint threshold of artistic achievement and 
personal development, however, she would struggle long and hard to build her repertoire 
of expression, become capable of not only having but sharing affectively intense 
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experience.  As a child, her attempts to make herself heard were frustrating.  Given the 
lack of recognition, however, Stein salvaged even unsuccessful acts of expression by 
falling back on the pleasure it gave her.  This tensio  between frustration and elation is at 
the heart of “The Umbrella Incident.”  No one hears Martha cry, no one sees her throw 
the umbrella, but the action gives her a certain satisfaction nevertheless.  If nothing else, 
she left a mark that registered what she felt, which someone could possibly come back to 
and recognize for what it is.  This, however, remained for the most part a hypothetical 
occurrence.  For the time being, struggling with her early internalization of mortality and 
the need to make something special of her life that i  stimulated was for the most part 
overwhelming, which caused Stein to turn inward.  This was not all bad: there was joy as 
well as angst.   Her experiences of affective intensity ran the gamut of valence.  As a 
college student, Stein claimed to “have lived in my short life all the intensest pains and 
pleasures that human nature is capable of experiencing.”26 
 Biding her time, she focused on finding the means of expressing herself: through 
reading but also, I would argue, through the piano lessons she took and the theater 
(especially opera) she attended, while living in Oakland.  Even more important, she 
worked on cultivating the self-sustaining and other-empathizing richness of imagination 
that is perhaps the most crucial ingredient of what would come to be her métier: literary 
fiction.  “My mind from childhood was one which constantly fed on itself,” Stein 
explains.  “I would seize every possible excuse to be alone so that I might dream, might 
lose myself in intense emotions by the side of which all else paled into insignificance.”  
Her valorization of introversion, while genuine, also functions as a way of compensating 
for the perturbation of the primal scene, the instigation of her need to be understood as 
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well as the potentially crippling complication of that desire.  Also, the note of isolation 
she strikes is somewhat curious given the fact that the premature awareness of birth being 
inextricably intertwined with death was something she in fact shared from the outset.  
For, as she has herself insist in Everybody’s Autobiography, “two died in babyhood or 
else I would not have come nor my brother just two years older.”  Stein and her brother 
Leo were close, nearly inseparable, but, she adds “we never talked about this after we had 
heard of it that they never intended to have more than five children it made us feel 
funny.”27  Although Stein portrays this silence as a mutual agreement, I would speculate 
that it was Leo who, as the elder sibling, issued the injunction against a joint revisitation 
of what they overheard of their parents’ reproductive plans, and how their near 
nonexistence made them feel.  While it would be characteristic of Leo to interpret 
adjectives like “funny” as derogatives, Stein herself had a boundless curiosity for all 
things queer that would eventually win out over her L o-like squeamishness. 
 This could explain Leo’s extremely negative reaction to Stein’s writing.  Likewise, 
the failure to acknowledge this shared experience could account for why the two had a 
falling out and parted ways in 1910.  (It should be noted, however, that this break also 
coincided with the increasing importance of Toklas in Stein’s life.)  This lack of 
connection, even (or, perhaps, especially) with those t  whom one is supposed to be 
closest, surfaces in The Making of Americans shortly after the fourth rehearsal of “The 
Umbrella Incident.”  “No one knew very much what Martha was feeling about anything 
when she was in her young living,” Stein writes. 
She was not ever telling very much of her feeling then to any one, and 
never to any one in the family living.  Not any of the Hersland family ever 
were telling each other very much about what feeling they had in them.  
Martha was really not telling any one very much in er young living the 
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feeling she had in her about anything and then in a way too it was not in 
her ready for telling.  It had not form in her, feeling in her, there was really 
then no way for her to tell any one anything about her feeling. 
 
Stein/Martha’s isolation as a child has to do not only with the fact that the “ordinary 
middle class existence” that provides the bearings for “a decent family progress” 
carefully evades “vital singularity.”  It is not just a matter of not having acquired 
adequate means of expression.  Rather, in the end, what is at the heart of Stein/Martha’s 
introversion is that the early stages of the maturation process traced by the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity involves for the most part the internal processing of 
affective intensity.  It is this endogenous dynamic that sets the stage for any 
externalization of affectively intense experience that may occur.  Shortly after the 
passage quoted above, there occurs an abbreviated sequel to “The Umbrella Incident” 
that broaches this next phase of development.  Martha witnesses something that brings 
her to the brink of attempting to navigate the tricky interchange between interior and 
exterior.  A somewhat older Martha, perhaps a preteen Martha, is engaging in some 
Melancthaesque wandering after wisdom “in another part of town from that in which the 
Herslands were living” and comes across a singularly evocative scene: “a man hitting a 
woman with an umbrella.”28 
 The reappearance of the umbrella in this way is telling.  We are back in the arena of 
“The Umbrella Incident”—that is, “in the street,” a potentially messy public 
thoroughfare.  The assumed burden—the abandonment or at least misuse of which has 
amounted to an expressive act—is returned, but it re urns with a vengeance that threatens 
to violently countermand not only the sort of expression Stein was interested in making 
but the very private life that would motivate such an expression.  The umbrella is now 
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coded as an upstanding male implement, used to fend off and punish the effrontery of 
female need.  (The sequel is recounted twice, and the second instance implies that the 
assaulted woman is either soliciting or panhandling: the man strikes her “to rid himself of 
her and of the asking in her.”)  Witnessing this haa profound effect on Martha, an effect 
that Stein suggests echoes and continues the momentu  of “The Umbrella Incident.”  In 
short, Stein writes, “it gave her direction to getting for herself a university education.”29  
Her reasons for wanting to do so go beyond gaining enough socioeconomic leverage to 
avoid ever being put in the position of the beaten woman.  Rather, pursuing higher 
education is a means for turning the burden into a resource, claiming the implement as 
her own and (as the phrasing of Martha’s aspiration and the linguistic liberties taken in 
Stein’s college themes suggest) doing so in a way th t flings mud in the eye of patriarchal 
authority, remaking it as a means for expressing exactly what it was previously meant to 
beat down: female desire, queerness, affective intensity, singularity.  After this promising 
prelude, however, Stein tells the story of Martha’s college days by interpellating her into 
an already prewritten script (the story “Fernhurst,” completed before she began The 
Making of Americans, and based on an actual incident that happened to an acquaintance 
of Stein’s at Bryn Mawr) in which chasing her ambitions leads only to being the 
subservient, silent wife of a man who, despite being full of promise and claiming to be a 
champion of women’s rights, cheats on her, leaves her for the other woman, and dies a 
premature death. 
 It may be that Stein is attempting to tell a cautionary tale here, a reminder of the 
difficulties even a privileged and talented woman fces in seeking to break convention.  
This impression is strengthened when we consider the conditions under which Stein was 
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writing this section of The Making of Americans.  Martha Hersland’s chapter comes to an 
abortive end, because identifying with her places strict and powerful limits on how far 
Stein can travel upon the path towards exteriorizing her interiority, leaves her vulnerable 
to attacks that demean the possibility that her writing could be received well.  In order to 
move beyond the stage of early childhood in a way th t evades the fate of Martha, Stein 
needed to invest in an alternate alter ego.  This is exactly what happens when she once 
again takes up the issues dropped in this chapter in he David Hersland section.  And she 
does so by explicitly invoking the primal scene.  Stein delays this confrontation by 
making Martha the eldest of the Hersland children.  It is David who is the youngest and 
who, consequently, has to work through—rather than indirectly evoke—the premature 
knowledge of mortality that haunts “The Umbrella Incident” and the simultaneously 
troubled and rewarding expression it dramatizes.  “As I was saying he was a younger 
one,” Stein writes towards the beginning of the David Hersland chapter, 
he came to be living after Martha and after Alfred Hersland had each of 
them been sometime living.  Mr. Hersland had always intended to have 
three children and as I was saying there had been two and these two had 
not gone on being living and so David Hersland came to be living and 
sometime later in some way he heard this thing when he was still quite a 
young one and he had it in him then to be certain that being living is a 
very queer thing, he being one being living and yet it was only because 
two others had not been ones going on being living.  It was to him then 
that he was certain then that being living was a queer thing.  As I said of 
him in a way he was needing it that every moment he was one being one 
being living by realising then that he was one needing then being one 
being living.  He certainly was one for sometime goin  on being living.  
He went on for some time being one going on being living.  As I was 
saying he could have it in him to be feeling that it was a very queer thing 
to be one being living.  He was one that could be realising very much and 
very often that he was needing being one being living.  He was one 
needing to be understanding every minute in being living what meaning 
there was to him in his needing to be to him one being being living.  He 
certainly then could have it in him to be going on being living.  He 
 161 
certainly could have it in him to feel it to be a queer thing to be one being 
living.30 
 
 Prior to the content, what one first notices about this passage is the style—that is to 
say, style and content are here inseparable.  One can hear Stein refining her method of 
insistence: the repetitions are more intricate and varied, the phrasing imbued with an 
amplified sonority when compared to the passages from the Martha Hersland chapter.  
This artistic advance coincides with a leap of personal growth.  In the shift from Martha 
to David, Stein is able to face her early awareness of death head-on and in doing so 
realize that when one embraces the queerness that this knowledge entails it becomes an 
affirmation of life, an avowal of the craving for affectively intense experience.  Able to 
act towards the enrichment of his desires, David’s consciousness is endowed with the 
endogenous dynamic of internal processing that Martha s rived for yet fell short of.  
David is given the leeway to make an effort to understand his complex feelings, 
continuously suss out the dense meaning of affectiv intensity.  This is the work that sets 
the stage for expression and resonance.  Singularity has reached the next stage in its 
development, the next twist in its existential problematicity.  If Martha serves to portray 
the experience of the young Stein, the introduction of David allows her to move towards 
a reenactment of her adolescence and early adulthood.  In this way, inhabiting the latter 
character gives her additional purchase on the issus crystallized in the dramatic event 
portrayed earlier in the novel.  This passage from the David Hersland chapter, then, can 
be used to mark the shift to the next aspect of “The Umbrella Incident”: from primal 
scene to screen memory.  This is hardly the end of the road: the fourth facet of artistic 
reenactment remains to be realized, and this is something David fails to do.  He dies 
young, before his efforts at feelingful contemplation ssue into a lasting work of art.  This 
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last step is something that Stein could not achieve by proxy: she would have to make this 
move under her own guise.  This is exactly what begins to happen, I would argue, 
through the writing of The Making of Americans, an activity that includes as an integral 
component the registration of its reception. 
 Screen memories are, according to Freud, fabricated “like works of fiction.”  The 
primal scene—insofar as it is accessible—is also a figural fabrication.  The mechanism of 
its activation is replicated by screen memories, only in inverted form.  Whereas in the 
former a memory is suffused with the shadow of earli r experiences, in the latter the very 
same memory is imbued with “thoughts and impressions from a later period.”31  The 
screen, then, is always already double-sided, filtering material that comes simultaneously 
from both directions.  Through this dynamic interweaving of before and after, screen 
loops back into scene, tracing the boundary of a spacious interiority, a resonant chamber.  
The result is the composite figuration of the ympan/i/um.  Unfolding this enfolded 
formulation extracts three elements: tympani, tympanum, tympan.  A kettle drum (which, 
it should be noted, is shaped quite like a cup); a sculpture in relief that marks the entrance 
to a resonant chamber; the cushioning fabric that facilitates the transmission from 
printing plate to sheets of print.  Each strike on the drum, each knock on the door, each 
typographic impression constitutes an expressive act th t bounces back and forth, 
generating a knotted network.  As evidenced by the epigraph that opens this chapter, 
Stein would explicitly foreground this “musical memory”—so touching that it feels 
sculptural—in Tender Buttons.  She would embrace and occupy this reverberating room 
in early portraits like “Ada” and “Orta or One Danci g,” in later poems like “Susie 
Asado” and “Preciosilla,” and especially in her opera Four Saints in Three Acts.  But she 
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first began realizing the possibility of the resonant chamber in the David Hersland section 
of The Making of Americans.   But as with any, this “first” is immediately thrown into 
question.  It comes in to being only because the chapter that it occupies resounds strains 
first heard in Stein’s earliest literary efforts, undertaken when she was skirting the border 
between adolescence and adulthood.  In these early pieces, we are offered a clue as to the 
source of the musicality that Stein would use to break and remake the conventions of 
writing and endow the medium with an increased capaity for conveying affectively 
intense experience. 
 Included in the “Radcliffe Manuscripts,” the collection of themes Stein wrote during 
her sophomore year at college, is a series of interconnected fictions, stories that are more 
deeply autobiographical than anything else she wrote due to the fact that the time of their 
composition was nearly contemporaneous with the expriences they sought to revisit and 
literarily elaborate.  Before David, before Martha, before Melanctha—before, even, the 
self-parody that is the character Adele in Q.E.D.—Stein invested herself in a fictional 
counterpart named Hortense Sänger.  This assemblage of fragmentary fictions serves to 
supplement the David Hersland chapter of The Making of Americans, further fleshing out 
the screen—or, I should say, t mpan/i/um—memory facet of “The Umbrella Incident.”  
They allow us to hear in greater detail how the primal scene and the childhood memories 
it impinges upon are resounded and refracted by later experiences, resoundings and 
refractions that bounce back and come to be echoed in the space of memory that precede 
them, amplifying both the internal activity and exteriorizing emanations of this resonant 
chamber.  In particular, the story of Hortense Sänger serves to sound what Stein would 
refer to as “the dark and dreadful days of adolescence, in which predominated the fear of 
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death, not so much of death as of dissolution.”32  Here we have an instance of insistence 
and sonority that registers a more mature engagement with the primal scene.  Having 
made it through the challenges of childhood, and having developed a rich interior life (for 
the most part through the solitary activity of reading, but also through learning the piano 
and playing duets with her older siblings Michael and Bertha), the adolescent Stein is 
able to accept the ventuality of death but still sits uneasy with the thought of it as an 
ongoing process that is initiated at the moment of birth.  In an important sense, the failure 
to come to terms with dissolution functions as a hindrance to further maturation.  
Specifically, it serves to aggravate the difficulty of developing a fertile interior into a 
compelling and evocative exteriorization.  The Sänger material registers Stein’s growing 
frustration with this state of affairs and suggests how the experiencing of theater—and 
particularly musical theater (mainly Wagnerian opera but also symphonic 
performances)—inspired the means for remedying this situation. 
 We have already head from Hortense.  It is from her perspective that the theme I cited 
above in my discussion of the primal scene is narrated.  This piece (titled “In the Red 
Deeps” after a chapter in George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss—note how Stein flips the 
phrase, inverts it from referring to occupying a location in the exterior world to 
intimating the inhabitation of interiority) portrays the introversion, intensity of feeling, 
and imaginative activity of Stein’s early years.  Just as Hortense here serves as a 
surrogate through which Stein can process her childhoo , in a subsequent theme she will 
serve as the means of ruminating upon the passage into adolescence.  This latter essay 
includes a passage that summarizes the former, thus instantiating the connection between 
the two: “Circumstances had forced Hortense Sänger to live much alone.  For many years 
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this had suited her completely.  With her intense and imaginative temperament, books 
and her own visions had been sufficient company.”  This summary, however, turns out to 
serve merely as a prelude to an alteration of circumstances that immediately follows upon 
it.  “She had now come to a period in her life when she could no longer content herself 
with her own nature,” Stein announces.  “She fairly l ved in her favorite library.  She was 
motherless and so at liberty to come and go at her own pleasure.  Now the time had come 
when her old well-beloved companions began to pall.”33  The penultimate sentence here 
drops a clue as to the “later impressions” that resound the primal scene and in doing so 
instigate an echoing back and forth that constitutes “The Umbrella Incident” as 
tympan/i/um.  For, if Stein felt isolated as a child, her loneli ss only increased when she 
entered her teenage years.  Death informs both moments of solitude: whereas in the 
former it impinges in the guise of an illicitly acquired knowledge of her own mortality, in 
the latter it is the fact that Stein’s adolescence coincided with the protracted illness and 
death of one of her parents that is crucial.  Stein’s mother, Milly, was diagnosed with 
cancer in 1885 and finally passed away three years later, when her youngest daughter was 
fourteen.  Stein implies that being “motherless” entails a new sense of freedom, but we 
also have to ask ourselves why she felt the need “to come and go,” why she found 
pleasure in being away from home.  At root here, as in “The Umbrella Incident,” is a 
failure to establish intimacy and an inability to express the frustration and fear this 
situation generates in a manner more articulate than t rowing an umbrella in the mud. 
 As Linda Wagner-Martin documents, with the passing of Milly the Stein household 
lost the nurturing presence that held it together.  With only an excessively stern and 
erratic father left presiding, the Stein family devolved into chaos, leaving the children to 
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fend for themselves.  (This, as hard as it was, may have turned out to be for the best, 
however, in that it prepared them for life after their father’s death, a mere three years 
after their mother’s.)  Even before her passing, Milly was consumed with her cancer and 
had little energy or attention left over to perform the vital caretaking role that she did 
prior to her illness.  And while the individual members of the Stein family were all 
disturbed by Milly’s declining condition, they were not predisposed to talk about how the 
looming threat of death affected them.  Thus, as Wagner-Martin notes, at this time of 
crisis Stein “was shut off from both comfort and information.”  And this dual 
inaccessibility was made more acute insofar as she was deeply worried “not only about 
her mother’s condition but about her own changing body.”34  For Milly’s passing 
coincided with Stein’s passage into adolescence, with all the complications this 
maturation process entails—in particular growing complexity of embodiment and the 
erotic.  Bereft of her main source of nurture and advice about these matters, Stein’s sense 
of not belonging to her family increased.  Even the rich interior life that she had managed 
to carve out in the midst of her estranged household “began to pall.”  She would have to 
find another location where she could cultivate her capacity for affective intensity.  But 
this was not all.  In addition, her developing literary imagination began to be drawn 
towards supplemental sources of inspiration.  Regist ring her discontent “with her own 
nature” and seeking an external environment that would resonate with her interior state, 
Stein sought out experiences that would push her to her limits, that felt as dangerous as 
exciting, that were strange and potentially uncomfortable, that she would at times 
disavow while simultaneously continuing to draw on them. 
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 After her mother’s death, Stein—like Hortense—“fairly lived in her favorite library.”  
This occupation brought her closer to the brink of encountering the means through which 
she would allay her isolation.  This discovery is dramatized in “In the Library,” the most 
developed of Stein’s college essays.  She begins with a vivid description of its locale: “It 
was an ideal library for a literary browser; Out of the noise and bustle of the city yet 
within easy reach.  The books were all in one vast room with high ceilings and great 
windows that let in a flood of sunshine.”35  The library is spacious and illuminated, a 
greenhouse encouraging the cultivation of fertile minds.  The roominess, however, also 
serves as a constant reminder of what remains at itmargins, calling its occupants out.  
While the library is not in the midst of “noise and bustle,” it is within its vicinity.  
“Sometimes the strains of Chopin’s funeral march would reach the ears of the quiet 
readers,” Stein writes.36  The external world intrudes upon the library via the medium of 
music, but in so intruding brings attention to the fact that it too can be a resource for 
enriching interior life.  The particular piece Stein calls upon in crafting Hortense’s story 
is significant.  What Hortense overhears is the minor-keyed “march” that begins and ends 
the third movement of Chopin’s Piano Sonata No. 2.  The composition (which Stein was 
likely familiar with, being a practiced piano player) also includes, however, an interlude 
in D flat major that periodically steps in to take the place of the dominant theme in B flat 
minor, an uplifting interruption that models the affective dynamic of coming to terms 
with the paradoxical interweaving of life and death.  Drawing on this new, musical 
material as an enhancement of reading involves leaving one’s comfort zone.  But at the 
same time it elicits a powerful longing, leading Stein further along the path of 
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exteriorizing her interiority, crafting a way of writing that engages initiates the staggered 
enactment of affective resonance. 
 Striving towards this achievement, however, would involve weathering a welter of 
growing pains, the beginnings of which Stein figuratively documents in the story of 
Hortense Sänger.  “One day as the last long sad notes of the march died on the air,” Stein 
writes by way of introducing the heroine of “In the Library” vis-à-vis its musical 
intrusion, “a young girl who had been listening inte tly, threw down her book with an 
impatient gesture, and dropped her face on the arm of the leathern couch.”  The familiar 
face of the printed page pales in comparison with the passing strains of this resounding.  
Chopin’s sonata cuts through the silence of the library, generating the break that 
unleashes Stein/Hortense’s dissatisfaction about the compromise she has struck, trading 
affective resonance for an elaborate and guarded int rior.  Interiority at its highest pitch—
that is, affectively intense experience—cannot, it turns out, be reached without the 
intimate, if imperfect, connections this music promises to facilitate.  Hortense attempts to 
return to her reading, “to catch the broken thread” of her book, but to no avail.  The break 
has been made and, tired of the placidity of the prosthetic womb of a literature held at a 
remove, “a wild impatience possessed her.”  Having passed out of childhood and into 
adolescence, Hortense is gripped by a desire to stand on her own two feet and begin 
exploring the further reaches of the outside world.  “She was a dark-skinned girl in the 
full sensuous development of budding woman-hood,” Stein declares. 
Her whole passionate nature had been deeply stirred by those few 
melancholy strains and with the sun light heating her blood, she could not 
endure to rest longer.  “Books, books,” she muttered, “is there no end to it.  
Nothing but myself to feed my own eager nature.  Nothing given me but 
musty books.”  She paused, her eyes glowing, and her fists nervously 
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clenched.  She was not an impotent child, but a strong vigorous girl, with a 
full nature and a fertile brain that must be occupied, or burst its bounds.37 
 
Stein has herself cutting a Melancthaesque figure.  What may first stand out is that 
Hortense, like the protagonist for whom she serves as a prototype, is endowed with a 
complexion that racializes her.  More importantly, hough, for Stein this coloring is the 
mark of “sensuous development”—that is, the transition from a capacity for affective 
intensity (the erotic in general) to an exploration of sexuality (a particular aspect of the 
erotic). 
 The very thing that serves as the source of the library’s illumination is what now gets 
Hortense’s heart rate up.  Her literary surroundings having come to feel stale and 
claustrophobic, she is impelled to leave for the fresh air of the big, wide world—to 
wander after wisdom.  Stein’s conflation of darkness (that is to say, blackness) with 
sensuality is questionable, and will be endlessly questioned.  But she discovers and in 
effect argues that inhabiting a body full of passion (having “a full nature” that is acutely 
animated and stirs at the slightest touch, or even promise of touch) is not contrary to, but 
rather a corollary of having “a fertile brain.”  Where does Stein/Hortense’s passionate 
peregrination lead her?  In “In the Library,” following the suggestions of her Romantic 
inspiration, Stein has her protagonist and alter ego l ave the library in order to climb, in 
the face of a mighty wind and a steep incline, a high promontory overlooking the ocean.  
There she is able to experience a moment in which te sublimity of the natural world 
mixes with the satisfied sense of exertion resulting from her physical effort.  The barriers 
securing her isolation are temporarily breached and Hortense experiences a connection 
between her internal condition and her external enviro ment.  In short, she has undergone 
catharsis.  Despite communing with nature, however, socially she is still alone, even 
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more so than she was within her household or in the library.  While catching her breath, 
Hortense in effect enjoys a brief respite from her trying everyday routine.  But after 
taking in “great gulps of ocean air,” she is left wi h the anticlimax of “muttering her 
satisfaction to herself.”38  The report of this affectively intense experience is muffled, and 
therefore unheard by anyone other than Hortense herself.  Having reached a dead end, she 
returns home only to, it is to be assumed, repeat the same cycle again the next day, and 
the next, and so on, ad infinitum.  Some source of divergence must be introduced into this 
circuitry in order for Stein/Hortense to make headwy in her engagement with the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity. 
 Unlike her fictional counterpart, Stein herself was able to integrate such an 
extracurricular activity into her educational program.  For after her mother’s death Stein 
spent much of her time across the Bay away from her family, not only visiting the 
Mercantile and Mechanics Library but also frequenting San Francisco’s vibrant Theater 
District.  The dual shock of Milly’s passing and her own passage into the perilous phase 
of puberty, and the bundle of unruly desires it amplifies and/or redirects, brought Stein’s 
childhood to an abrupt end.  She was for a time at a loss, dissatisfied with the resources 
she had managed to acquire thus far but unsure where else to turn for inspiration and 
guidance, until all of a sudden what she was looking for was standing right there before 
her, as if by accident.  But it was the sort of accidental occurrence that unexpectedly 
enabled a greater degree of resolution, a spontaneous variation on which to base 
concerted efforts of improvisation.  “Then the next thing I knew was adolescence and 
going to the theater all the time,” Stein explained apropos this fortuitous happenstance 
during her 1934-1935 lecture tour of the United States in the wake of the sensation that 
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was The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, “a great deal alone, and all of it making an 
outside inside existence for me, not so real as books, which were all inside me, but so real 
that it the theater made me real outside of me which up to that time I never had been in 
my emotion.”39  The theater, like the library, is an enclosed space,  resonant chamber.  
But it facilitates the same sort of excitement and satisfaction Stein had Hortense 
experience via her vigorous hike to the shore by virtue of the fact that, when compared to 
its strictly literary counterpart, it resounds with a heightened degree of resonance.  Music, 
which for the library is an external perturbation, is in the theater an integral and at times 
primary component.  Also, while Stein attended these performances alone, it was an 
environment that encouraged a sense of shared partici tion (partial, imperfect, and 
incomplete as it may inevitably be) amongst audience members and between the audience 
and the actors. 
 At the theater—particularly when it was an opera or symphony orchestra that she 
was attending—Stein was able to see and hear before her very eyes and ears something 
that not only aroused the same sort of feelings she exp rienced while reading, but gave 
them an external form.  Rather than the wonders of the natural world, what Stein feels 
connected to is the expressive acts of other people.  Consequently, she is granted an 
important clue about how to craft the exteriorization of her interiority, begins to realize 
the possibility of “an outside inside existence”—not as real as internal life itself (because 
of the inevitable partiality, imperfection, incompleteness of the transposition) but still 
real nevertheless because it is moving and thus can be f lt.  To be clear, however, Stein 
was not completely won over to musical theater.  Literature would remain her métier, the 
medium through which she would work to express her singularity, the means she would 
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use to choreograph the staggered enaction of affective resonance.  But in pursuing her 
literary endeavors, trying to achieve via her own creative activity what she had witnessed 
through that of others, she would draw on the resources of and seek to simulate the 
effects produced by theatrical performance.  In particular, she would work to infuse her 
writing with the musicality that suffused the theater, its capacity for exteriorizing the 
interiority of affectively intense experience and thus facilitating a more mature 
engagement with the existential problematic of exprssing singularity.  This is especially 
true of the works that followed upon the heels of the completion of The Making of 
Americans and her definitive coupling with Toklas, and even more particularly in Tender 
Buttons.  It was with this motley compendium of prose poetry that Stein felt she truly 
began simulating the effect of musical theater by “mixing the outside with the inside.”40  
The composition of The Making of Americans was for the most part an introverted and 
isolating endeavor, although in the later sections (at a point roughly coinciding with 
Stein’s getting to know Toklas and sharing her writing with her) the reader can discern a 
certain opening outward that is registered by the writing becoming increasingly infused 
with musicality.  Tender Buttons took this fortuitous development in Stein’s aesthetic 
practice and pushed it further, drawing upon it as the seed out of which not only technical 
methods but a full-blown artistic methodology blooms. 
 With Tender Buttons (whose title undeniably connotes the affective, erotic, 
sensuality, sexuality and thereby bears the mark of Stein’s growing intimacy with 
Toklas), Stein began “describing the inside as seen from the outside.”  This flipping of 
realistic conventions creates a divergence that veers not away from reality but rather 
closer to it.  As one of Stein’s many post-World War I colytes reports her saying: “I 
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reproduce things exactly as they are and that is all there is to it.  The outer world becomes 
the inner world and the inner world becomes the outr, and the outward is no longer 
outward but inward and the inward is no longer inward but outward.”  Oriented towards 
the enfolding of interiority and exteriority that defines reality, description (or, 
reproduction) here is neither the direct transcription of interior life that she attempted in 
The Making of Americans nor the conventional imaging (i.e., representation) of external 
objects.  Rather, Stein draws upon particular featur s of her domestic environment as 
epicenters of affectively intense experience.  The writing, then, does not so much portray 
the “subjects” of the prose poetic “portraits,” but ra her serves as a score that elicits the 
embodied responsivity of the reader and thereby enabl s him or her to reenact an echo 
(which necessarily includes a degree of noise or inte ference) of the interior state elicited 
in the writer by these found objects.  Literature develops this capacity when infused with 
a musicality that manifests not merely in the melodiousness of the language but in the 
disruption of conventional syntactic and semantic patterns, making cuts that effect a 
shattering of representational conventions and the subsequent collaging, assemblage of 
the fragmentary imagery that results from these breaks.  The comparison with cubist 
painting and sculpture is obvious, and has been noted frequently in the secondary 
literature on Stein.  But what often goes overlooked is that, as Stein came to understand 
it, this movement in the plastic arts—especially as it moved from cubism proper towards 
dada and surrealism—itself had a musical inspiration or model.  What is also interesting 
is that the authority Stein draws upon in making this claim is not Pablo Picasso but 
another friend, the lesser-known but equally interesting Francis Picabia.  According to 
Picabia, Stein writes, “a line should have the vibration of a musical sound.”41  And she 
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extrapolates upon this principle, making it applicable not only to strokes of paint and 
planes of bronze but also lines of print. 
 It is this notion of Picabia’s that Stein claims lies behind Marcel Duchamp’s infamous 
Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2 (1912), the painting that made a splash at the 
legendary Armory Show in New York City around the same time Stein was composing 
(while luxuriating in the domestic bliss of the household she and Toklas had recently 
established together) the pieces that would come to b  collected in Tender Buttons.  Stein 
does, however, issue an important caution regarding “the vibrant line”: “it is not yet 
created and if it were it would not exist by itself, it would be dependent upon the emotion 
of the object which compels the vibration.”  At no m ment can the creation of the vibrant 
line, musicalized plasticity or typography, be located definitively in the past tense.  It is 
virtual, a simulation that depends for its realization on a process of activation that spans a 
temporal breadth that never ceases to potentially stretch into the future.  What activates 
the vibrant line is the affective state of an entity that, while endowed with singularity, is 
inherently multiple.   The “object” in question fills itself out, at the very least, in 
quadruplicate.  It is the creator, the thing that arouses the aff ctively intense experience, 
the creation that this experience motivates, and the audience members as they reenact 
(approximately) this experience by “playing off” the creation.  Affective intensity, then, 
while it may be partially localized within a singular interiority, is ultimately a distributed, 
pluralized phenomenon that necessitates a passage through exteriority and thereby a 
partial, imperfect, and incomplete resonance across parallel interiorities.  Thus, we can 
observe in the work of Picabia, Duchamp, and Stein a phenomenon Moten limns in the 
performances of the contemporary philosopher and coceptual artist Adrian Piper: 
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“Sound gives back the visuality that ocularcentrism had repressed.”   The dramatic 
infusion of musicality ruptures representationalist conventions, frustrating the casual 
observer but eliciting in the receptive audience an enactive mode of seeing, one that is 
registered as a visceral, embodied immersion rather than a distanced surveillance, what 
Mark Hansen has called apropos new media art “haptic vision.”42 
 There are times, however, when, in the interest of championing this enhanced 
visuality, Stein downplays the role dramatic musicality plays in this synesthetic 
achievement.  She does so for two reasons.  On the one hand, Stein denies the influence 
of musical theater because she becomes increasingly invested in what Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe call “the literary absolute”: the idea that modern literature 
is utterly autonomous and in so being absolutely novel.  As Humberto Maturana and 
Francisco Varela have shown, however, the maintenance of autonomy depends upon 
participating in a consensual domain.  This entails drawing on found materials.  It is the 
latter that, through improvisation, serve as the source of novelty.  On the other hand, 
Stein never gave up hope that perfect communion could be accomplished.  Literary 
novelty, then, was meant to secure both absolute autonomy and a complete agreement 
that evades the messy process of consensus-building.  “I have destroyed sentences and 
rhythms and literary overtones and all the rest of that nonsense, to get to the very core of 
this problem of the communication of the intuition,” another of the many young white 
men who apprenticed themselves to Stein during the 1920s quotes her as claiming.  “If 
the communication is perfect, the words have life, and that is all there is to writing.”43  
According to the terms Stein would go on to enunciate in The Geographical History of 
America—literature channels interiority (the “human mind”) in such a way that the 
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passage through exteriority (“human nature”) is made unnecessary.  Contrary to what 
Stein claims, however, this would make affectively intense experience inaccessible and 
thereby deactivate the animation of the vibrant line, leading to writing that is lifeless.  
Luckily, Stein is perhaps the most masterful oversimpl fiers of Stein, and this is a 
signature case.  Her dismissals of influence almost never actually entailed ceasing to 
draw upon that which she disavowed.  Her self-commentary here serves to obscure rather 
than illuminate what she was actually achieving.  Her enactive model of literature 
actually, as Wagner-Martin notes, “erased the line between (literary) play and (staged) 
event” and was therefore inherently synesthetic, involving hearing and touch as well as 
sight.44 
 Stein’s defensive posturing served to mischaracterize not only what was going on in 
her own work, but also her enjoyment of the creative activity of others.  It shifts attention 
away from the vital interplay that existed between creation and reception in her aesthetic 
engagements.  For example, Stein downplays her attachment to theater in the past in 
order to deflect any suspicion that she drew inspiration from it in the present.  “She says 
it goes too fast,” she has the narrator report in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, “the 
mixture of eye and ear bothers her and her emotion never keeps pace.”  But it was exactly 
its troublesome invigoration that resonated with Stein’s internal state as an adolescent and 
drew her to drama in the first place.  It was the syncopated choreography between 
audience and actors—facilitated by the touching, moving synesthetic infusion of the 
visual with the aural—that served as the model for the staggered enaction of affective 
resonance she would later attempt to effect through literature.  Indeed, this interest in and 
craving for musical theater was something that outlasted Stein’s adolescence.  It also 
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characterized her college years and in fact is a not ble element that accompanied—if not 
enabled—her entry into adulthood and beginnings as a self-assured writer.  As Wagner-
Martin notes, in the years following Toklas’s taking up residence with her, Stein “faced 
life with a new assertiveness.”  This reinvigoration, a more mature revisitation of the 
desires that made Stein’s adolescence so turbulent, was facilitated by the fact that she and 
her new companion “attended concerts, plays, and films”—enjoying a program that 
included the Paris debut of Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring, Strauss’s opera Elektra, as well as 
the ballet Parade, a collaborative effort by her acquaintances Erik Satie, Jean Cocteau, 
and Picasso.45  Perhaps most important were their attendance of prformances by the 
Spanish singer Preciosilla and the innovator of modern ance, their friend Isadora 
Duncan—both of whom (along with Toklas) are subjects of portraits Stein wrote as she 
was warming up to tackle the pieces included in Te der Buttons. 
 In addition, according to Toklas it was Stein’s vocality—a voicing imbued with an 
inherent musicality—that, more than anything, accounted for her ability to draw her 
interlocutor’s “complete attention.”  When Stein spoke one heard singularity expressed in 
a way that underscored its endogenous plurality.  “It was unlike anyone else’s voice—
deep, full, velvety like a great contralto’s, like two voices,” Toklas writes.  Stein’s own 
voicing, then, manifests the same sort of marginal self-syncopation that she found to be 
distinctive of musical theater.  And presumably it was her ability to infuse this vocality 
into her writing that attracted Toklas and later read rs.  Toklas’s casting Stein as an opera 
singer indexes their mutual love of music.  Amongst their most precious possessions was 
a state-of-the-art phonograph, and the sound of recrds playing was pretty much a 
constant companion while they were at home.  Toklas, like Stein, was an experienced 
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pianist—in fact she earned a BA in Music from the University of Washington.  A shared 
musical acumen drew the two together and served as a re ource for their literary 
experimentation.  During her college years it was Stein’s proficiency as a musician and 
enthusiasm for music in general that was her major sou ce of joy and camaraderie.  While 
at Radcliffe, Stein attended the musical theater quite frequently with classmates.  As 
Wagner-Martin documents, she “played themes on the piano for her friends beforehand, 
because she did not want them to miss key motifs.”  These impromptu recitals of hers and 
her enhanced appreciation of musical performance distinguished Stein for her peers.  
“What set her apart from all the others was her personal quality,” the anonymous authors 
of an obituary published in the Radcliffe alumni magazine upon Stein’s death wrote.  
“Knowing her intimately enhanced every interest onehad.  To attend a symphony concert 
or opera with her was to gain new enjoyment from it.”46 
 This contagious excitement incited by musicality left traces in Stein’s school work.  
In the margins of “In the Library” she wrote: “I would like to have rewritten the whole 
theme but the German opera threw me back in my work.”  This statement could be taken 
in both a literal and figurative manner.  Literally, because she was spending so much time 
brushing up on her Wagner, she did not have time to do her theme “properly.”  
Figuratively, however, Stein’s wording here strikes a much less self-critical note and 
serves more as an explanation than as an excuse.  The inspiration of music is what led 
Stein to return to the theme again (“threw me back in my work” could be understood in 
this sense, rather than merely as an admission of procrastination), but it is this musical 
resounding that prevented her from moving forward, to getting it rewritten along more 
conventionally appropriate lines.  Stein wanted to simulate the effects music had on her 
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and her friends in writing, but had yet to find a wy to do so in a wholly satisfying 
manner.  Thus, even upon a second consideration, it seemed most true to her intentions to 
leave the theme only partially complete, leaving room for further developments that 
would only come with time.  Stein begins charting the course of this artistic growth 
through her portrayal of the “wild impatience” Hortense exhibits in the library and in the 
wandering after worldly wisdom that this emotional turmoil motivates.  “One could not 
live on books,” she has her alter ego insist at the end of the theme, 
she felt that she must have some human sympathy.  Her passionate 
yearnings made her fear for the endurance of her own reason.  Vague fears 
began to crowd on her.  Her longings and desires had become morbid.  
She felt that she must have an outlet.  Some change must come into her 
life, or she would no longer be able to struggle with the wild moods that 
now so often possessed her.47 
 
Lured out into the open by strains of music Hortense allows her capacity for affective 
intensity to stir up “wild moods” that Stein herself xperienced as well.   She was 
disturbed by these “passionate yearnings” at the same time that they gave her pleasure. 
 In this story music means more than itself, narrowly defined.  Insofar as it acted as a 
facilitator of affective resonance, it also broaches the issue of sexuality.  Although Stein 
remained ambivalent about touching upon the erotic, there is evidence that her 
enthusiasm was appreciated by her fellow female students.  It is this that lies behind the 
claim made by the unnamed authors of Stein’s Radcliffe Quarterly obituary that “her 
unconventionality” was in large part what made her “a good companion with a genuine 
warmth of interest in those about her.”48  This approval was voiced only when it was too 
late, however, and even then not in an easily attributable form.  After graduation, most 
likely unaware of the impression she had made on her Radcliffe peers, Stein would 
continue to struggle with the issue of how to navigte the ambivalent—one moment 
 180 
encouraging, the next moment alienating—reception of her attempts to elicit affective 
resonance.  This protracted labor would come to a head with her complicated relationship 
with May Bookstaver, famously recounted in Q.E.D. and reworked not only in 
“Melanctha” but also in “Redfern.”  In these works, processing her memories of the affair 
served Stein as a means for resounding the dramatic action of “The Umbrella Incident,” 
bouncing back off the primal scene this childhood remembrance encapsulates, and in so 
doing reinfusing the present with the past in a wayth t set the stage for a future that 
included, as a key component, the artistic reenactment that the process of writing The 
Making of Americans entailed.  During the course of this protracted ant times 
disenchanting labor Stein managed to remake literature once again into a way of coming 
to terms with painful disappointment and actualizing her potential for affective 
resonance.  It was the introduction of Toklas’s presence—especially the effects of her 
enthusiastic reception of Stein’s writing and eventual involvement in the very process of 
its composition—that facilitated this transposition and gave Stein a renewed hope and an 
unrivaled degree of joy, a less encumbered exercise of curiosity and desire. 
 
Reenactment: Repetition—or, Insistence 
The uncanny that we find in fiction—in creative writing, imaginative 
literature—actually deserves to be considered separately.  It is above all 
much richer than what we know from experience; it embraces the whole of 
this and something else besides, something that is wanting in real life. . . . 
Towards real experience we generally adopt a uniformly passive attitude 
and succumb to the influence of our material environment.  To the writer, 
however, we are infinitely tractable; by the moods he induces and the 
expectations he arouses in us he can direct our feelings away from one 
consequence and towards another, and he can often produce very different 
effects from the same material.  All this has been known for a long time 
and has no doubt been studied in depth by experts in aesthetics.  We were 
led into this field of inquiry without any real intention because we yielded 
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to the temptation to explain why certain instances of the uncanny 
conflicted with our thesis regarding its origin. 
 
 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny” 
 Thus far in this chapter we have considered how Stein works to infuse a theatrical 
musicality into her writing, transforming repetition into insistence and thereby facilitating 
a processing (in the sense detailed in the Introduction vis-à-vis hiphop sampling) of “The 
Umbrella Incident.”  Through the interweaving of meory and the making of literary 
fiction she works through the “originary” emergence of the existential problematic of 
expressing singularity, both as a locatable moment in her childhood and as it travels, 
continues to resound, generating echoes with the affectively intense experiences of her 
early adulthood.  Through these efforts to trace the outlines of the vibrant line, Stein 
installed and inhabited a multidimensional spacetim of visceral, immersive imagination.  
In this section we will explore how Stein’s dwelling within this resonant chamber 
enabled Stein to perform a reenactment of a past event that also functioned as a means to 
dramatize her present struggle.  Through this aesthetic experimentation Stein crafted an 
ensemble of resources that she drew upon to weather the nduring tensions of her 
personal development and artistic ambitions.  The upshot was her model of literature as 
the staggered enaction of affective resonance, of which her relationship with Toklas 
provided the prototype.  As we will see in the next chapter, Du Bois picks up on this 
project of improvisational lyricism that runs from James through Stein, working to 
broadcast it to a broader audience, in doing so broaching the question of the ethical and 
political efficacy of an affective, enactive, embodied aesthetics.   In order to begin 
surveying these maneuvers, another brief consideraton of Stein’s break with Freud is 
called for, which in turn involves some further fleshing out of James’s alternative 
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approach to the psychodynamics, upon which she drewto blueprint a relationship 
between engaged reader and creative writer that deprts from the adversarial interaction 
between critic and literature operative in scholarship informed by classical 
psychoanalysis.  It is this seed of revitalized sociality, this spark of affective resonance, 
that Du Bois cultivates into his ethics of attunement and draws on to inflame his politics 
of dispossession. 
 Approximately twenty years after completing The Making of Americans, Stein would 
rephrase the dynamic process of “musical memory” that begins to be sounded in that 
novel in terms of the sonorized—and thereby immersive, embodied, haptic, enactive, 
postrepresentational—visuality she pioneered in Te der Buttons.  In the process, the 
tympan/i/um—the entrance to the resonant chamber, the resonant ch mber itself, and the 
internal fabric of spacetime that entering and occupying the resonant chamber generates, 
through which one can process difficult material, create responses to blows that would 
otherwise trigger mere reactions—takes on the guise of a more familiar, but no less
hybrid and enduringly strange, device.  It is significant that she executes this maneuver 
by imagining herself into the perspective—narrating he life—of Toklas, who by that 
time had become Stein’s trusted partner in both life and art.  The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas is structured in such a way that spacetime multiply enfolds itself.  It begins with 
a short chapter on Toklas’s life before coming to Paris, followed by a chapter on her 
arrival in Paris, which abruptly breaks off to fillthe reader in on Stein’s life, this time 
working in reverse.  The third chapter covers Stein’s time in Paris prior to meeting Toklas 
in 1907, and the fourth is concerned with her life in America prior to her expatriation.  
Only with the fifth chapter (of seven) does Stein/Toklas take up what she/they had broken 
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off in the second.  “But to return to the beginning of my life in Paris,” Stein has Toklas 
say, drawing one digression to a close before momentarily charting yet another elliptical 
path, “it was like a kaleidoscope slowly turning.”  With this moving, gripping metaphor 
Stein/Toklas not only characterizes this phase of her life but the structure of this work of 
literature itself.  By facilitating this dual characterization the gradual—but no less 
momentous—turning of the kaleidoscope that this pasage evokes serves to distill, as 
Wendy Steiner argues, “the treatment of experience in the autobiography.” “The reader is 
constantly returned to events in such a way as to superimpose the present onto the past, to 
destroy linear temporality,” she explains. “At the same time, any single event is at the 
center of a constantly shifting set of accompanying events or associations, like a 
kaleidoscopic image.  The pattern keeps changing, and virtually anything can be 
incorporated into the design.”49 
 The kaleidoscope, in short, is an agent of the vibrant—that is, curving, spiraling, 
tracing a broken circularity that delays any premature closure—line.  It is one form this 
recursive figure takes as it simultaneously refracts conventions and superimposes the 
resultant fragments, improvising the unforeseen by infusing writing with musicality, 
reenacting literature, sculpting a postrepresentation l, enactive (and affective) model of 
the interweaving of its creation and reception.  DeKoven elaborates upon Steiner’s initial 
tracing of this dynamic, in particular arguing that Stein’s work—especially when scored 
(emphasizing the cuts that make breaks, divergent acts that make possible articulations 
that join at the same time that they distinguish) by Virgil Thomson’s music, as it was in 
the operatic production of Four Saints in Three Acts—generates an immersive, mixed-
media environment that “shifts continually, like a k leidoscope turning, from fragment to 
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unresolved fragment, mode to mode.”  By way of furthe  fleshing out what we could call 
the installational upshot of Stein’s literary reenaction, DeKoven writes: 
Not only the number of simultaneous images, but their very irreducibility, 
their unresolvedness, gives rise to a sudden sense of an infinite, limitlessly 
rich, filled, and open mental, imaginative world, in which we can wander 
at will without pressure or obstruction: a maze in its complexity, density, 
and multiplicity of choices, but the opposite of a m ze in that there are no 
wrong turns, no blind alleys, no single correct path, no necessity of 
forward movement toward exit, no necessity of exit at all. 
 
Immersing oneself in the complex, synesthetic system of imagery that comprises this 
aesthetic dimension, one becomes aware that—in the words of Varela, Evan Thompson, 
and Eleanor Rosch—art, like cognition in general, “is not the representation of a pregiven 
world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis 
of a history of the variety of actions that a being i  the world performs.”  In terms more 
specifically geared towards the case at hand, as Harriet Chessman argues, putting an 
additional spin on the line of thought instigated by Steiner and furthered by DeKoven, 
Stein’s literary fictions “ask for the active and intimate presence of a reader,” elicit “a 
responsiveness on the reader’s part which is both bdily and imaginative”—that is to say, 
affective.  “Rather than taking place from a distanced point utside the play of voices, a 
stance which would assume the possibility of mastery over the writing,” Chessman 
writes, “reading becomes understood as a lively participation.”50 
 To read Stein’s writing, then, at least according to the second wave feminist scholars 
whose readings are the most compelling and evocative, is to have one’s embodied 
responsivity engaged, to be immersed in a mixed-media nvironment (a sculpted 
habitation, a virtual architecture) that is simultaneously a welter of images and a collage 
of sound (that is, as Chessman would have it, a “ply of voices”) whose carefully 
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choreographed movements lead one on a journey throug  affective intensity that 
simulates the experiences undergone by the writer that motivated the creation of literary 
fiction in the first place.  On first glance, the psychodynamic process of figural 
fabrication that Freud limns as the common denominator of memory, dream, imagination, 
and literary fiction bears an uncanny resemblance to the kaleidoscopic spacetime enacted 
through the reading of Stein’s writing.  But upon review, this seems to be the case if we 
overlook the fact that for Freud the figuration that takes place within the patient’s 
psyche—and through the interaction of patient and analyst—can be properly scrutinized 
only from the vantage of the analyst himself, and thereby disciplined according to the 
dictates of psychoanalytic technique.  For Freud ultimately insists upon coming at the 
therapeutic process from “a distanced point outside the play of voices.”  Doing so 
requires him to take issue with the “treatment of experience” necessitated in the 
performance of an autobiography.  In short, Freud—except during those rarinstances 
where he admits to have indulged in genuine responsivity—engages in a knee-jerk 
reactivity and thereby refuses to be the sort of reader Stein’s work asks for, insofar as his 
claim to authority involves asserting “mastery over the writing.”  According to the 
psychoanalytic program thus prescribed, an enactive li erature (the simultaneous product 
and source of an embodied imagination and its dream of affective resonance) such as 
Stein practiced would have to be approached as an externally diagnosed symptom rather 
than an endogenously meaningful expression.  Taken on its own terms, it would “resist” 
the masterful interpretation Freud takes to be the analyst’s duty and privilege.  To avoid 
any such “resistance” (which is the index of c mplexity rather than “repression,” given 
that a strictly Freudian interpretation of the psychoanalytic encounter proves to be an 
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oversimplification rather than an elucidation), memory is separated out from the 
figurative complex of which it partakes, remade into something accessible only via the 
external authority of the analyst, placed at arm’s length as it were and in so being 
subjected to a retrenched and unreformed representationalism that demands linearity and 
ocularcentrism. 
 This impasse between Freud and Stein was foreshadowed by a similar parting of 
ways that occurred in the wake of the one and only meeting between the former and 
James.  In September 1909, a month after Three Lives was published, Freud delivered a 
series of five lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.  As Saul 
Rosenzweig documents, when he found out that James would be making the short trip 
from Cambridge to attend the fourth talk he “decided that the topic of dreams would be 
particularly appropriate.”  This was an abrupt change in plans, since he had previously 
come to the conclusion that to devote a portion of his first—and what would turn out to 
be his last—visit to the United States expounding upon this subject matter would be, in 
his own words, “almost scandalous.”  Somehow James’s presence made “a thorough 
consideration of the interpretation of dreams” consistent with rather than contrary to 
“practical goals.”  Faced with this interlocutor, Feud felt inspired to relax somewhat his 
tight grasp of “scientific” scruples.  This limited loosening of inhibitions, however, 
proved to be insufficient.  The presentation of this material did leave quite an impression 
on James, just not of the kind that Freud most likely hoped for.  “I strongly suspect Freud, 
with his dream-theory, of being a regular halluciné,” James admitted afterwards.  “I 
confess that he made on me personally the impression of a man obsessed by fixed ideas,” 
he added for good measure.51 
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 Freud began his talk on dreams by admitting that he had oversimplified 
psychodynamics in his previous lecture on therapeutic technique in order to manufacture 
assent to his predetermined notions, which was bound to rub James the wrong way.  He 
was probably even more annoyed when Freud immediately went on to confess his 
continued adherence to the “prejudice” that led himto open on this false note: “a strong 
belief in the rigorous determination of mental processes.”  In the case at hand, this meant 
that the puzzling content of dreams were without exception determined by and thus could 
be made sense of through the exposure of certain “immoral longings” left over from “the 
early years of childhood.”  Patients, Freud argues, are incapable of effecting this 
“disclosure of what is the hidden life of the mind” on their own and therefore require the 
expert assistance of the analyst to unearth the meaning of their dreams.  While he may 
have been willing to grant that dreams were sometimes derived in the way Freud believed 
them to be, James would have rejected the claim that they always were.  Even in cases 
where dreams could be considered to be motivated by long-held and deep-seated desires, 
James would have questioned the way Freud automatically classified these “longings” as 
“immoral.”  Further, he would have been predisposed to isagree with the implication 
that the imposition of external authority was a necessity.  Freud seems to believe that for 
some unexplained and seemingly magical reason analysts themselves are the only people 
capable of interpreting their own dreams.  James would have been inclined to grant 
unassisted self-analysis on the part of those untrained in or suspicious of psychoanalysis a 
greater degree of efficacy.  Freud’s method may be applicable to his own dreams, but that 
did not necessarily mean it necessarily applied to those of others.  James implied as much 
when he confessed that he could “make nothing in my own case of his dream theories.”52 
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 Despite all these reservations, James came away from F eud’s lecture believing that 
his approach would eventually “throw light on human nature.”  In order to do so, 
however, it would be inevitable that psychoanalysts “push their ideas to the utmost 
limits,” thereby challenging unexamined assumptions a d making Freud’s rigid 
framework wore flexible.  What Freud offered was a “dream-theory” not only in that it 
spelled out an approach to the interpretation of dreams, but that it was itself dreamlike.  It 
could be useful as long as it did not take itself too seriously and was willing to 
continuously question itself and allow creative liberties.  It was when it was invested with 
“scientific” certitude—framed as a “fixed idea”—that it attained the status of a 
hallucination, a defense mechanism against the inevitability of uncertainty and 
amorphousness, especially in the case of the matter at hand.  Claiming to have gained a 
“great advantage” by virtue of having “clung to a prejudice,” Freud turned 
psychoanalysis into the type of symptom it supposedly diagnosed and alleviated.  This 
can be heard in the frustration over having been led into unfamiliar territory by the 
necessity of accounting for evidence contrary to his expectations that he voices in the 
epigraph that heads this section.  Writing back from the realm of “imaginative literature” 
that would give Freud such fits in “The Uncanny,” James threw the Freudian protocol for 
decoding dreamlife into question.  In doing so, he was in fact challenging the most 
fundamental aspect of Freud’s work.  “The interpretation of dreams is, in fact,” Freud 
argued “the via regia to the knowledge of the unconscious—the most secure fo ndation 
of psychoanalysis and the field in which every worker must acquire his convictions and 
gain his education.”53  James not only took issue with the notion that psychoanalysts were 
the only ones capable of traversing this privileged route, but threw doubt upon the 
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supposed necessity of following it at all.  He question the very existence of the 
destination it was thought to lead towards, and thereby pulled the ground out from under 
the “knowledge” Freud’s itinerary claimed to yield.  James found the endeavor Freud 
outlined interesting and shared a fascination with the territory he was attempting to cover.  
He merely sought to encourage a broader approach by mapping a different route. 
 To this end, a couple months after his encounter with Freud he began writing a piece 
in which he recounted a series of dreams a few years rlier, outlining his own approach 
to working through this type of material, one that opened out into the “extramarginal” 
rather than sought to keep everything contained within the “unconscious.”  The result was 
“A Suggestion about Mysticism,” one of the last essays James published before his 
death.54  Stein picked up on the alternative approach to psychic activity hinted at by her 
mentor, resounding it to shatter the Freudian mirror, using certain fragments as found 
material with which to improvise unforeseen options.  Stein, then, sonicizes Freud’s 
vision, breaks his circle by insisting upon a certain cut: the impossibility of complete 
satisfaction, bound up inextricably with a persistence that tolerates hardship, in fact revels 
in it.  To become absorbed by the sort of mixed-media nvironment an enactive literature 
installs entails partaking in a circuitous wandering that Stein and responsive readers 
approach with untrammeled curiosity and joy.  For Freud, however, this improvisational 
exploration evokes trepidation and anxiety in addition o a concerted interest, insofar as it 
constitutes both what blocks external diagnosis as well as what is reigned-in in order to 
carry out psychoanalytic interpretation.  For Stein, the spacetime of embodied 
imagination, of affective daydream, that the creation of literary fiction generates is a 
place to inhabit.  For Freud, it is a nice place to visit, but he would not want to live there.  
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He remains fundamentally ambivalent.  He wants to believe that it is after all just a maze, 
and his primary aim is to pass through as fast as pos ible.  Yet moments arise when he is 
unable to completely disown that he is tempted to linger.  Traveling the maze-that-is-not-
a-maze that DeKoven charts, however, inevitably involves covering the same territory 
repeatedly.  Is such repetition functional?  That is to say, does it make a difference?  For 
Stein the answer is an i sistent “yes”; for Freud, a defensively stated “no” that at imes 
wavers into a simultaneously fascinated and fearful “maybe.”  Freud takes these instances 
of repetition to be automatic reactions (consequences of a compulsion) that are 
meaningless unless made subject to the interpretive resources that the analyst, as external 
authority, can bring to bear.  Stein, however, in her own insistent practice shows that 
recurrent enaction can indeed be a matter of ch ice, a self-conscious attempt at 
expression suffused with inherent significance. 
 This is the difference between repetition and insistence, which—as Stein suggests—is 
also the difference between “thinking clearly and confusion.”55  It is important to note 
that Stein’s phrasing of this analogy reverses the expected valuation of the latter pair.  As 
she states it, repetition is to thinking clearly as insistence is to confusion.  By valorizing 
insistence over the alternative, then, she is in effect registering a protest against the false 
clarity of a linear, ocularcentric, distanced, representationalist approach like Freud’s.  
Stein encourages an appreciation of the complexity, vibrance, even muddiness of the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity, soliciting a response that remains open 
to the unexpected developments that can arise throug  the recursive, synesthetic, 
immersive, enactive dynamic of affectively intense experience.  By imposing 
predetermined notions with underexamined assumptions upon the autonomous dynamic 
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of experience, Freud in effect eludes the possibility that the “acting out” and “working 
through” of repetition can be a self-conscious performance rather than a “compulsion.”  
That is, the enactive recurrence that is insistence can be therapeutic in and of itself, can 
not only signal that something is awry but also provide the means of addressing this 
wrong.  Further, this course could be successfully pursued without the guidance provided 
by the external authority of the canonical analyst.  What Freud prescribes as occurring 
only within the confines of a process of countertransference the analyst elicits and 
institutes, can also take place in what D.W. Winnicott alls the “potential space” of 
“transitional phenomena,” in which the enactions of the patient take precedence over any 
given interpretation thereof.  While this latter occurrence is perhaps not possible in all 
instances, it was in Stein’s case.  The dual leap in personal development and artistic 
achievement that the completion of The Making of Americans constituted in effect takes 
psychoanalysis out of the office and into the world, altering its therapeutic topography.  
The orientation shifts from uncovering something that exists beneath experience 
altogether to following experience as it unfolds beyond itself, manifesting an internal 
difference that enables it to simultaneously become th r than itself and remain the same.  
In other words, the example of Stein’s enactive litera ure encourages a shift from the 
Freudian “unconscious” to the Jamesian “extramarginl.”  The modernism of her 
aesthetic practice shows the former to be dated and insists upon the enduring relevance of 
the latter.  Stein, in short, beats Freud at his own game by showing that his rules do not 
necessarily hold.  In doing so, she embodies the “creative writer”—“the strange 
personality” that Freud approaches with both fascinatio  and contempt.  He both admires 
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and takes offence at her ability “to arouse in us emotions of which we might not even 
have thought ourselves capable.”56 
 Through her artistry, the creator of literary fiction in effect psychoanalyses the 
psychoanalyst, thereby exemplifying the uncanny (that which is both familiar and 
frightening, something that was to remain hidden but nevertheless wriggles its way to the 
surface) and effecting a radical return of the repressed.  She undermines the authority of 
the analyst, revealing the target of repression to be distinctly different from what Freud 
took it to be.  Rather than a phallocentric infantile sexuality, we are confronted with a 
polymorphous autoeroticism (auto not necessarily in the sense of self-directed, but rather 
in terms of a fundamental autonomy as regards programs of conventionalization such as 
that instituted by “basic concepts” such as “the Oedipus complex,” “penis envy,” “the 
pleasure principle,” and ultimately “the death drive”).  Stein reveals that, as Tomkins 
would later argue contra Freud, it is affects rather an drives that are “the primary 
motivating sources” of human behavior.  Coming from this refracted perspective, we can 
ascertain that it is his subordination of affect to drive that leads to his definition of 
pleasure as the minimization—if not elimination—of excitation.  The later, in turn, led 
not only to the seeming inevitability of the death drive but, more to the point, the 
assumption that the affective life of human beings is dominated by fear and anxiety.  
Rather—as Winnicott, Tomkins, and Ernest Schachtel argue and Stein demonstrates—
affectivity is primarily an issue of interest, excitement, curiosity, a creative impulse that 
manifests not only as a thirst for experience (especially that which is affectively 
intense—or, quite simply, exciting) but also an active engagement with life that crosses 
the distinction between fiction and reality.57  This is evidenced in the play of children, 
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which—as Winnicott argues—unfolds into and is carried on in the artistic achievements 
of adults and cultural activity in general.  By demonstrating the continuity of this 
dynamic process of development, Stein counters Freud’s positioning of the death drive as 
ultimate explanatory principle, replacing it with James’s notion of “the will to live.”  In 
making the move from repetition to insistence, then, she also reorients the evaluation of 
the quality of life from Freud’s economic scale of pleasure and pain to an aesthetic metric 
of liveliness and dullness. 
 All this should be kept in mind as we return to “The Umbrella Incident,” turning 
towards its fourth facet.  For, while Freud’s “The Creative Writer and Daydreaming” 
provides an entry into the comprehension of this final aspect of our focal figuration, the 
artistic reenactment that Stein performs via The Making of Americans encourages a 
revision of Freud’s take on the creation of literary fiction (and the operation of the 
psychodynamic of fabrication in general) that throws into question some of his most 
crucial—and unexamined—assumptions.  In order to ge a sense for the full breadth of 
this revisioning, it needs to be emphasized that the enaction of recurr nce Stein manages 
to accomplish through the exercise and honing of her aesthetic practice is irreducible to 
the fictional recounting of a dramatic event.  This cl mactic phase of “The Umbrella 
Incident” does return us to this originary happening a d the resonating chamber of 
memories with which it surrounds itself, but it manages to do so not so much to the 
degree that Stein images this surround sound of past occurrences (which she in fact does, 
through the musicalized modality of vision that is he “vibrant line”) but rather insofar as 
she, as Freud writes, “acts it out” and in doing so demonstrates that “working through” 
this “acting out” is itself a “way of remembering.”58  Without this crucial performative 
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component, the throwing of an umbrella in the mud would remain a minor incident in the 
fictional life of Martha Hersland.  The fact that it is based upon an occurrence in Stein’s 
own life would be more difficult to discern.  By reenacting rather than merely recounting 
this dramatic event, Stein makes evident the extent to which the past and present are 
enfolded and foregrounds the navigation of this enfolding as the route towards future 
development, achievement, and satisfaction.  “The Umbrella Incident” is saved from 
being reduced to a happenstance confined to a previous period in the life of Stein or her 
fictional alter egos.  Rather, it is shown to be th encapsulation and means of 
broadcasting an existential problematic—that of expr ssing singularity—that she 
continued to live through as she worked up to and began the composition of her long 
novel—that, in fact, was a persistent element active within and motivating her artistic 
endeavors throughout the course of her career.  In this sense, The Making of Americans 
(and, indeed, the entire body of work that would follow in its wake) could be heard—
with the rather extreme stylistic liberties it took with conventional language use—as a 
means for Stein to throw the figurative umbrella into the proverbial mud over and over 
again until somebody (and then, a steadily increasing audience of similarly attuned 
somebodies) was willing to wade through the muck and retrieve what Stein threw away, 
recognizing the throwing for the expressive act and elicitation of resonance that it was 
and at long last making a genuine response in return to excited and enactive exclamations 
like “I have throwed the umbrella in the mud.” 
 Addressing an audience he defines as his fellow “laymen,” Freud suggests that the 
most favorable means for gaining “some initial enlightenment in the matter of literary 
creation” would be to “discover in ourselves, or the likes of us, an activity that was in 
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some way akin to creative writing.”  As the title of his essay implies, the discovery that 
enables one to confront the problem (which he would characterize in “The Uncanny” as a 
matter of betrayal and trickery) posed—for “laymen” and “psychoanalysts” alike—by the 
creator of literary fiction is the phenomenon of “day reaming.”  Such “fantasizing” can 
clue the average reader into how literary fictions manage to undermine the “uniformly 
passive attitude” towards “our material environment” that Freud considers the norm, how 
they insist that “real experience” is in fact—insofar as affect impinges upon (indeed, 
constitutes) it—“infinitely tractable.”  Since Freud is unable to own up to the active 
engagement with life and the world in which it unfolds/with which it is enfolded that 
creative writing enacts and elicits, he interprets thi enaction and elicitation as a form of 
manipulation.  The extra degree of agency that this blurring of the boundary between 
reality and fiction effects is assumed, by him, not to be the possession of readers (their 
capacity for embodied responsivity and affective resonance) but rather a mysterious 
power by which writers possess (in both a supernatural and proprietary sense) their 
auditors.  (This is an assumption that Stein and Toklas prove to be faulty.)  This being the 
case, Freud utilizes the connection he discerns between the creation of literary fiction and 
the fabrication of everyday fantasies as a means of (in his eyes) demystifying the (for 
him) ultimately inexplicable and unmanageable force of aesthetic engagement.  Thus, 
although he claims to be “by no means unaware that very many imaginative writings are 
far removed from the model of the naïve daydream,” he nevertheless “cannot suppress 
the suspicion that even the most extreme deviations fr m this model could be linked to it 
by an unbroken series of transitions.”59 
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 Freud is in effect closing the circle, reining in deviance, divergence, difference—a 
maneuver that I wish to contest.  The point I want to insist on in doing so is not that there 
is a discontinuity between fantasy (the casual exercis  of imagination) and artistic 
creation (although, in the movement from one to the ot r, a certain threshold is crossed).  
Rather, the upshot of my insistence is that daydreaming itself is never “naïve”; it is 
endowed with an internal break insofar as it (as much as creative writing) cannot help but 
to cross the distinction between fiction and reality.  The circularity that Freud brings to 
closure is inevitably broken, divergent.  This plays out not only in terms of the relation 
between “real experience” and affective intensity, but also as regards the interpolation of 
past, present, and future that he argues takes place through the psychodynamic of 
daydreaming (and, therefore, creative writing).  Asit turns out, we will want to follow 
Stein by approaching the former as well as the lattr via the model, not of “the naïve 
daydream,” but rather of enactive literature itself.  Through the operation of fantasy, 
Freud argues, “past, present and future are strung ogether on the thread of one desire that 
unites all three.”  A daydream is triggered when a person registers “a current impression, 
an occasion in the present that has succeeded in arousing one of his major desires.”  (In 
Stein’s case, this would be the longing to be heard, to communicate the meaningfulness 
of affectively intense experience, to approximate an expression of singularity by 
instigating the staggered enaction of affective resonance.)  This registration of a present 
situation then “harks back to the memory of an earli r experience, usually belonging to 
his childhood, in which the desire was fulfilled.”  Finally, based upon this 
superimposition of present and past, the imaginatio “invents a situation, lodged in the 
future, that represents the fulfillment of this desir .”  Thus, in short, “a person’s desire 
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uses an occasion in the present in order to construct a vision of the future modeled on the 
past.”  Further, Freud argues, the process of creative writing is in essence isomorphic 
with this psychodynamic of daydreaming: “A potent exp rience in the present awakens in 
the writer the memory of an earlier experience, usually belonging to his childhood; from 
there proceeds the desire that finds its fulfillment in the literary work.”60  (Again, in 
Stein’s case, an affectively intense experience—across the gamut of valence—resounds 
with a similarly freighted happening in her past, and memory and present moment 
together motivate the creation of the literary fiction that is The Making of Americans.) 
 At first glance, the path Freud charts here bears a resemblance to the enfolding of 
kaleidoscopic, resounding spacetime that Stein navigates.  As we apply scrutiny to his 
position and explore hers in more detail, however, w  discover subtle—yet crucial—
differences.  The first thing to note is that, in Freud’s account, the “literary work” initially 
seems to occupy a strange spatiotemporal location.  Insofar as it is, unlike most 
daydreams, actualized it could be considered contemporaneous with the “current 
impression.”  And yet it is also somehow irreducibly “lodged in the future,” an always 
ongoing and unfinished work.  Creative writing could be said, then, to activate the futural 
aspect of the present.  Freud smoothes over the tension entailed in this activation by 
claiming that the “vision” that literary fiction carries out is strictly “modeled on the past,” 
insofar as the memory involved in this process is considered to involve the complete 
satisfaction of desire that is lacking in the present and is to be sought again in the future.  
To this extent the tendency of Freud’s phrasing is fundamentally regressive.  For Stein, 
however, the memory conjured (throwing the umbrella in the mud and scoring one’s 
action with an effusive and unconventional exclamation) registers both satisfaction and 
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frustration.  The present she occupies is similarly mbivalent, suffused with both promise 
and difficulty, sounding a precarious and precipitous encouragement.  It can be 
considered to be comprised of: the inspiration of music; Stein’s failure to connect with 
Bookstaver; the mixed relief and trepidation of expatriation; the invigorating and 
challenging influence of postimpressionism’s musicalized visuality; her measured 
success in Three Lives at infusing literature with music and manifesting the “vibrant line” 
in writing; her increasing disaffection from her brother Leo, connected with his 
denigration of her literary endeavors; her growing affinity with Toklas, having much to 
do with her embrace of those self-same artistic efforts.  The future, finally, is merely a 
more developed phase of the dilemma that wends its way from the past through the 
present.  It would involve a fuller satisfaction of her enduring desire, but it would also 
leave room for further improvement.   
 Further, Freud frames the “fulfillment of desire” that he believes creative writing 
manifests as achieved by means of a plot that incorporates to some degree a fantastic 
element.  This way of approaching the issue founders when confronted with a novel like 
The Making of Americans, given that it contains little of what would usually be 
considered “fantastical” (although its style does have a certain hypnotic, even 
hallucinatory effect) and even lacks a proper plot, c mprising rather a fabricated complex 
of interwoven stories (which tell of Stein and her projects as much as they do of her 
characters).  This foundering suggests that a writer lik  Stein not so much “represents” 
the affective motivation (and aim) of her aesthetic practice, but rather enacts it.  Thus, 
returning our focus to “The Umbrella Incident,” we can say that its artistic reenactment 
takes place not so much through Stein’s narration of what happens to her fictional alter 
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egos but rather through the process of writing and gauging the reception of The Making 
of Americans itself.  The reporting of this artistic yearning, struggle, discouragement, and 
eventual partial fulfillment is sprinkled throughout the novel, in fact comprises one of its 
interweaving storylines.  Indeed, it could be considered the metathread that holds all the 
rest together, in a mutually supportive but nevertheless tense amalgam.  The opening act 
of this self-reflexive drama, this recursive performativity, occurs well before the 
recounting of the dramatic event of “The Umbrella Incident” in the Martha Hersland 
chapter.  It comes early on in the first, untitled section of the novel, after a break in the 
text following Stein’s portrayal of the incipient sensibility of Julia Dehning (yet another 
alter ego), the encouragement and disapproval of her father, her courting and impending 
marriage to Alfred Hersland.  It sounds at first like an anachronistic harking back to the 
sort of reader address that could be found in novels prior to modernism, but almost 
immediately it takes on a distinctly modernist twist.  “Bear it in your mind my reader,” 
Stein writes 
but truly I never feel it that there ever can be for me any such creature, no 
it is this scribbled and dirty and lined paper that is really to be to me 
always my receiver,—but anyhow reader, bear it in your mind—will there 
be for me ever any such a creature,—what I have said always to you, that 
this that I write down a little each day here on my scraps of paper for you 
is not just an ordinary kind of novel with a plot and conversations to 
amuse you.61 
 
 By announcing the xtraordinariness of her novel, indicating that by this point 
thoroughly conventionalized entertainment is not the reaction she is looking for (as could 
be gathered by the garbled grammar of this passage itself), Stein in effect casts herself in 
the role that Julia had been playing in the pages leading to this break and the passage that 
follows it: a modernized young woman attempting to ventilate and revitalize an old order 
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through what Stein has Henry Dehning, Julia’s father, call “the artistic kind of new 
improvement.”62  The response Stein is seeking to elicit is a liberated, unconventional 
amusement, one that foregrounds its origin in the autonomous (and therefore precarious, 
precipitous) affect of bemusement.  She fears, however, that this is too much to ask.  In 
order to smooth over the disjuncture effected by her aesthetic choices, Stein samples not 
only an outmoded form of address (realism and naturalism had already thrown into 
question the advisability of gesturing towards a “Dear Reader” with such obviousness) 
but marks it with a soon-to-be archaic punctuation: “,—”.  But she cannot help but to flip 
what she samples.  Her address to the reader is chopped by her dawning awareness that it 
lacks guarantee, making the cut that sets the stagefor h r model of literature as the 
staggered enaction of affective resonance.  In doing so, she portrays the relationship 
between her desire to be heard and the uncertainty of its fulfillment as a break, a 
distinction that joins what it distinguishes.  This break is looped, pivoting around an 
instance of the modernized, independent em dash: “bear it in your mind—will there be 
for me ever any such a creature.”  Stein worries, however, that the repetition that this 
spiraling phrasing—this improvisational lyricism—involves will be too off-putting, a 
poor substitute for “a plot and conversations.”  In this early moment, Stein is in effect 
reliving the denouement of Martha’s throwing of theumbrella.  She has made her point, 
but doing so involves muddying the means of expression.  Rather than writing clear and 
flowing prose, Stein feels herself to be scribbling a collage of soiled scraps.  And she has 
the intimation that the somebody who would retrieve these tossed-off lines, return them 
to her, genuinely respond rather than automatically react with distaste is an as yet 
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unprecedented and perhaps impossible personage, at least as far as she is concerned.  
(Haunting the scene here is Bookstaver’s rejection, Leo’s disapproval.) 
 Faced by this dispiriting proposition and yet caring for and in a strange way confident 
about her artistic undertaking, Stein is in search of a way to keep working without 
exhausting her morale.  She discovers and enunciates such a strategy on the first page of 
the Martha Hersland chapter.  “I am writing for myself and strangers,” Stein declares.  
“This is the only way that I can do it. . . . I write for myself and strangers.  No one who 
knows me can like it. . . . I love it and I write it. . . . I want readers so strangers must do 
it.”  Lacking encouragement from her acquaintances yet needing motivation to continue 
with her writing, Stein stubbornly hangs on to the hope that somewhere out there is 
somebody who would value her efforts, love what she lov s—in point of fact love not 
only what she loves, but love what she cannot completely bring herself to love: herself.  
The rather desperate tack Stein takes here keeps her afloat for a while, but soon enough 
she realizes it is but a temporary measure.  The notion that somebody can appreciate 
one’s work while still remaining a stranger—and therefore remaining unable, among 
other things, to give positive feedback—is ultimately, Stein eventually acknowledges, an 
instance of “complete disillusionment.”  As long as one’s audience remains anonymous 
and/or hypothetical, writing is only a means of sel- atisfaction.  Writing merely for 
oneself for too long, she realizes, prematurely “makes an old man or an old woman of 
you.”63  In order to avoid this crippling world-weariness, Stein comes to understand, it is 
necessary to undergo the experience of a having a stranger become an acquaintance, a 
close friend, a lover.  This is what happened—both a dawning understanding and the 
initiation of fulfilling what is then understood—when Toklas entered and insinuated 
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herself into her life and art.  Finally, someone picked up the umbrella, admired it mud 
and all, and not only returned it but asked that it be hrown again—again and again, the 
impact of umbrella with mud generating ever changing, ever new patterns. 
 Stein and Toklas met in the middle of the writing of The Making of Americans.  And 
a crucial moment in their deepening intimacy was when Stein shared her writing with 
Toklas, who greeted it with enthusiasm.  Like the initial stage of the artistic reenactment 
of “The Umbrella Incident,” this later phase is referenced directly in the novel.  “It is a 
very strange feeling,” Stein writes, laboring the point, 
when one is loving a clock that is to every one of your class of living an 
ugly and a foolish one and one really likes such a t ing and likes it very 
much and liking it is a serious thing, or one likes a colored handkerchief 
that is very gay and every one of your kind of living thinks it a very ugly 
or foolish thing and thinks you like it because it is a funny thing to like it 
and you like it with a serious feeling, or you like eating something and 
liking it is a childish thing to every one or you like something that is a 
dirty thing and no one can really like that thing or y u write a book and 
while you write it you are ashamed for every one must think you are a 
silly or a crazy one and yet you write it and you are shamed, you know 
you will be laughed at or pitied by every one and you have a queer feeling 
and you are not very certain and you go on writing.  Then someone says 
yes to it, to something you are liking, or doing or making and then never 
again can you have completely such a feeling of being afraid and ashamed 
that you had when you were writing or liking the thing and not any one 
had said yes about the thing.64 
 
This registering of a mutual recognition and cherishing of queerness—of singularity—is 
perhaps the most touching passage in The Making of Americans.  It is the novel’s climax.  
Eventually, Toklas not only read but transcribed Stein’s work.  Establishing the routine 
that would endure until the end of Stein’s life, Stein would write her novel in the evening, 
Toklas would type it up the following morning, and they would spend the afternoon 
talking about the section that had just been completed as well as what was to come next.  
It was this working relationship between Stein and Toklas that would serve as the 
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prototype of the enactive model of literature that Stein (and Toklas!) would work to 
refine and find an ever-wider audience for from Tender Buttons on—achieving their 
greatest success around 1935, with the popularity of The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas, Stein’s lecture tour in the United States (documented in Lectures in America), 
and the stage production of Four Saints in Three Acts.  This heyday is, in effect, 
retroactively foreshadowed in What Is Remembered—the actual autobiography Toklas 
wrote nearly twenty years after Stein’s death, and t a time when the first wave of her 
revival was in full swing—as she reminisces about her first meetings with the woman 
who would soon come to be her partner in life and art. 
 “It was Gertrude Stein who held my complete attention,” Toklas writes of her first 
days in Paris, “as she did for all the many years I knew her until her death, and all these 
empty ones since then.”  More than anything, what drew her in and filled up her life (to 
the point that this mesmerizing effulgence survives the passing of its source) was Stein’s 
sound, her vocal stylings, a laughing punctuated with talking that is ever verging upon 
singing.  “It was unlike anyone else’s voice—deep, full, velvety like a great contralto’s, 
like two voices,” Toklas marvels.  Presumably, it was to the degree that it echoed this 
deep vocality—a timbre, a voicing that evidenced the endogenous plurality of singularity 
and thereby crossed conventional distinctions, cutting across divisions that were 
simultaneously ones of range and gender—that Toklas also found Stein’s sonorized 
writing eminently absorbing.  “It was very exciting,” she writes about her first forays into 
the draft of The Making of Americans, “more exciting than anything else had ever been.  
Even, I said to her laughing, more exciting than Picasso’s pictures promise to be.”  It is 
the laughter that runs through these two moments in their firstdays together, and the 
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attitude of bemused wonder that it emblematizes that more than anything characterizes 
the relationship between Stein and Toklas.  By helping her bring this attitude to the fore, 
making it the keynote of her life, Toklas helped Stein further refine her understanding of 
what exactly it was she wanted to accomplish through her aesthetic practice.  (As Stein 
would tell a group of college students during her U.S. lecture tour, “the business of an 
artist is to be exciting.”)  In doing so, Toklas placed her in a favorable position vis-à-vis 
her closest male peer and rival (a positioning that assumably was generalizable: Stein is 
to Joyce, Proust, Eliot as she is to Picasso; perhas it is Picabia and Duchamp who come 
closest to matching her accomplishments).  For, according to Toklas, Stein accomplishes 
what Picasso only promises to.  But this is only part of the reason that, as Wagner-Martin 
notes, Stein, under the influence of Toklas, “became more confident about both her vision 
and her writing”—and, in general, “faced life with a new assertiveness.”  Perhaps an even 
more significant factor in this regard was that Toklas enabled Stein to reinvigorate her 
interest in and appreciation of music and musical thea er.  Together they “attended 
concerts, plays, and films; listened to music on their phonograph.”  The last activity, in 
particular, “filled many hours”—formed the constant background against which “the 
steady tranquility” that Stein’s “writing began to reflect” emerged.65  The needle making 
its way along the spiraling groove can in fact be considered a movement analogous to 
Stein’s artistic maneuvers. 
 Stein and Toklas’s shared background in playing the piano facilitated the transition 
from longhand to typescript—infusing the latter as well as the former with musicality—
and thereby set the stage for the broadcasting of their enactive model of literature.  It was, 
Toklas implies, her expertise with one keyboard that enabled her virtuosity at another.  “I 
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commenced to teach myself to become an efficient typist,” she writes of her initial 
attempts at transcribing The Making of Americans, “and gradually achieved a 
professional accuracy and speed.  I got a Gertrude Stein technique, like playing Bach.”  It 
was her training as a pianist, Toklas suggests, that en bled her to transcribe the 
“Beethovian passages” that make up the latter sections of Stein’s novel, the “rhapsody” 
with which it ends.  The professionalism she evidenced in performing this office is that of 
a fellow artist, rather than a mere functionary.  For, as Toklas goes on to note, because of 
her fluency with Steinian prose “writing business letters proved difficult.”  She would 
have to engage someone else to execute such perfuncto y tasks.  In large part what made 
Stein’s musicalized manuscripts difficult to process—what made the processing of them 
like transposing a musical score into an audible performance, and therefore only partially 
commensurable with engaging in conventionalized langu ge use—was the way they ran 
ever more intricate variations on interweaving themes, manifesting complex patterns of 
repetition, and the sonorized (unconventional) gramm r, the improvisational lyricism 
they involved.  Stein herself was well aware of this.  For, at the beginning of the Martha 
Hersland chapter, immediately after stating the fact that no one she knows can stand her 
writing, declaring the consequent need to write for only herself and strangers (for the 
time being at least), Stein identifies the reason for her going (as yet) unheard as her desire 
to pursue “the loving of repetition” until that purs it itself became an exemplar of “the 
loving repetition.”  That is, motivated by Stein’s yearning (against all odds) to be heard, 
repetition is transposed from an object of desire into a modality of longing in its own 
right.  “Loving repeating is one way of being,” Stein writes on the section’s third page.  
“This is now a description of such feeling.”  This portrayal of affective existence goes on 
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for nearly a hundred pages before it leads into—quite naturally—the repeated recounting 
of “The Umbrella Incident” as dramatic event.  The desire for/through repetition leads 
from here into the resounding of the tympan/i/um—the kaleidoscopic spacetime—of 
remembering, which in turn motivates artistic reenactment.  Stein’s artistic rendering of 
her own affectively intense experience would finally resonate with Toklas, initiating an 
affectionately recurrent interplay between the two hat instantiates the prototype of an 
enactive model of literature.  In this way, the dogged assertion that—against all odds—
repetition can not only be loved but also can be a me ns of loving gives rise to the “full 
sound telling” that is insistence.66 
 Phrases of repetitive vocality, such as that practiced by Stein, are endowed with an 
irrepressible tendency towards internal variation, but picking up on this requires an 
attunement responsive to the musicality of these utterances.  While they could each be 
said to, in every instance, sound the same general pitch or tone, each sounding remains 
open to a wide range of alterations manifested via timbre, through voicing.  This is the 
phenomenon that motivates and is amplified through repetition-as-choice, what Stein 
calls insistence.  She works to infuse her writing with this sort of musical (affective) 
variety not by having multitudes of fancy or extravagant terminology pile up on top of 
themselves, but rather through the careful choice of a limited palette of relatively 
common wordings that are worked over again and again, insistently.  In other words, as 
Stein puts it in The Making of Americans, although she has a hard time “using a word I 
have not yet been using,” this limitation is more than made up for by the fact that she 
enjoys and easily utilizes “a word that can have many ways of feeling in it”—that is 
capable of a certain affective d nsity conducive to the conveyance of affective intensity.  
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“I like it that different ways of emphasizing can make very different meanings,” Stein 
concludes.  And it is this faculty of loving repetition as a self-conscious choice, as a 
carefully crafted means of expression that leads it to surpass itself into insistence.  As she 
would put it in one of her Lectures in America: 
once started expressing this thing, expressing any thi g there can be no 
repetition because the essence of that expression is nsistence, and if you 
insist you must use emphasis and if you use emphasis it i  not possible 
while anybody is alive that they should use exactly the same emphasis. 
 
The insistence upon expression that grips and animates living bodies seeks to sound 
singularity in all its plurality, voice (emphasize) the draw towards and results of exploring 
affectively intense experience, running the gamut of valence, exercising and broadcasting 
liveliness.  “That is what makes life that the insistence is different, no matter how often 
you tell the same story if there is anything alive in the telling the emphasis is different,” 
Stein writes.  “This is what William James calls the Will to Live.  If not nobody would 
live.”67 
 The Jamesian notion of the will to live, then, was—in addition to Toklas’s 
enthusiastic reception—another factor that influenced Stein’s notion that “the business of 
the artist is to be exciting.”  “By exciting,” she adds, “I mean it really does something to 
you really inside you.”  Excitement, then, is the registration of the reality of aesthetic 
engagement.  The hope is that what it elicits will eventually be affective resonance, but in 
order to even aim towards this goal Stein had to risk provoking resistance, annoyance, 
rejection.  Her writing, insofar as it sought to channel affective intensity, and was 
consequently infused with music, was unavoidably difficult.  And it manifested a quite 
particular difficulty: the breaking of representationalist conventions, the fabrication of an 
alternative, enactive model of literature.  The most c nspicuous effect of this transitional 
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phenomenon is loving repetition—that is, insistence.  And the most obvious indication 
that this provocation is effective—that resistance will eventually phase into acceptance—
is that the only way the dismissal of Stein’s work can manifest is as an echo of that which 
it seeks to dismiss, as a sort of c unterrepetition that is, unavoidably, insistent: becoming 
more and more different until it goes beyond itself, and annoyance becomes enjoyment.  
Thus, Stein’s writing gets under the skin of her reluctant audience, even though they do 
not at first know it.  When awareness surfaces, however, they will be pleasantly 
surprised.  “You know that is what happens over and over again,” Stein says in one of her 
own talks to students, “the statement made that it is ugly—the statement made against me 
for the last twenty years.  And they are quite right, because it is ugly.  But the essence of 
that ugliness is the thing which will make it beautiful.”  That is, Stein’s work breaks 
conventions, but in such a way that makes use of them in the process, remakes them by 
making them more accommodating of singularity.  This is the work of improvisational 
lyricism.  As Stein summarized her artistic methodology: “one must realize what there is 
inside in one and then in some way it comes into words and the more exactly the words 
fit the emotion the more beautiful the words.”  Thus, aesthetics—insofar as it 
encompasses an enactive model of literature—remains the theorization of beauty, but it 
also becomes the practice of exteriorizing interiority, infusing music into writing, 
channeling affectively intense experience and eliciting affective resonance.  In this way, 
Stein was able to achieve what she called “exactitude,” one consequence of which was 
“the destruction of associational emotion.”68  This should be understood not as the dulling 
of emotion but rather of its liberation from the associations that have been imposed on it 
by programs of conventionalization—making spacetime for singularity by foregrounding 
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affect’s fundamental autonomy vis-à-vis any predetermined pattern of socialization.  As 
we will see, this is exactly what Du Bois aims towards as well, as he parodies 
sentimentality in order to sound the degree to which sympathy has been complicated by 
racism and craft an enactive literary project of improvisational lyricism that engages the 
promise and danger involved in generating affective resonance across the color-line.  
Once again, we will be concerned with the tricky and fascinating navigation of the break. 
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Method of Error: 
Du Bois and the Aesthetics of Illegitimacy 
 
 
God knows I am sorely puzzled.  I am firmly convinced that my own best 
development is now one and the same with the best development of the 
world and here I am willing to sacrifice.  That sacrifi e is working for the 
multiplication of Youth X Beauty and now comes the question how.  The 
general proposition of working for the world’s good becomes too soon 
sickly sentimentality.  I therefore take the work that the Unknown lay in 
my hands and work for the rise of the Negro people, taking for granted 
that their best development means the best developmnt of the world. 
 
 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Celebrating 
His Twenty-Fifth Birthday” 
 
The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of aberrations of 
affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be 
extricated. . . . I believe that the individual should tend to take on the 
universality inherent in the human condition. 
 
 Frantz Fanon, Black Skins, White 
Masks 
 
 In a recent essay collection devoted to W.E.B. Du Bois, Alys Eve Weinbaum levels a 
perennial complaint: his work is “uncomfortably sentimental.”  Confronted with Du 
Bois’s writing, there is undeniably something that makes readers uneasy.  But an as yet 
unprecedented pitch of investigation needs to be struck before we can decide whether this 
discomfort has to do with his uncritical adoption of sentimentality; or whether, rather, it 
is a consequence of the way in which he breaks its conventions.  One of the things 
contemporary critics find hard to swallow about theradition of sentimentality is its 
maudlin moralism.  James—of whom Du Bois was, by his own admission, “a devoted 
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follower”—takes such ineffectual apologetics head-on when, in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, he paradoxically secularizes its religious foundation, replacing an 
adherence to dogma with a capacity for affectively intense experience.1  In doing so, he 
transforms orthodox morality into a thoroughly modernized ethics, timely and tangible by 
virtue of being an outgrowth of aesthetics, embodied through an art of improvisational 
lyricism that infuses language with music as a means of wrestling with the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity. 
 Du Bois joined Stein in not only following James’s example but further elaborating it 
into an enactive model of literature capable of facilit ting an always partial, but no less 
crucial, affective resonance.  He outpaced her by expanding the staggered enaction of 
affective resonance into an ongoing process of attunement.  He broadcasts her efforts, 
surpasses her achievement, but his goals were consiste t with her intentions.  He works to 
instantiate the broader potential of the prototypical relationship between Stein and Toklas 
traced in the last chapter, to amplify it into a dynamic that takes place between a rapidly 
proliferating body of artists and a multitudinous audience.  In the process, the definition 
of what constitutes art becomes broader and the distinction between sender and receiver 
becomes more elastic.  Du Bois picks up from Stein, pushing even further a Jamesian 
aesthetic according to which “the ighest ethical life—however few may be called to bear 
its burdens—consists at all times in the breaking of rules which have grown too narrow 
for the actual case.”2  That such a break occurs through Du Bois’s engagement with 
sentimentality may be somewhat difficult to grasp because he is constantly following its 
winding way one second and departing from the charted path the next.  What Du Bois 
offers is neither a simple acceptance nor an offhand dismissal of the sentimental.  He 
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enacts a parody of sentimentality.  This modality is pointedly self-reflexive and critical, 
but not wholly derogatory. 
 What Du Bois does with the sentimental is analogous t  what, as Schloss shows, 
hiphop producers do when they sample “corny records.”  Such an artistic maneuver is not 
a straight-up dis.  It is the acknowledgement that “some records may have sincerely 
valuable elements, regardless of their overall corniness” and that “making a good hip-hop 
beat out of a corny record shows one’s skills.”3  Using the terminology introduced in the 
Introduction, Du Bois flips sentimentality, an artistic program that includes chopping and 
looping as subroutines.  What Du Bois values about sen imentality is its foregrounding of 
the life of feeling.  Its corniness entails the reduction of affect to overconventionalized 
“sentiment.”  Du Bois’s aesthetics of illegitimacy breaks this restrictive “social” ordering 
of the life of feeling, flipping it into the feeling of life, reopening it to what we can call 
either autonomous affect or affect of autonomy: in short, singularity as a capacity for and 
cultivation of affectively intense experience. 
 Du Bois’s parody remains attached to the life of feeling/feeling of life but cuts ties 
with the static identities and behaviors that the regime of “sentiment” prescribes, putting 
motion back into emotionality, giving affective intensity spacetime to unfold into the 
condition of, as Brian Massumi writes, “being outside of oneself, at the very point at 
which one is most intimately and unshareably in contact with oneself and one’s vitality.”  
Through his engagement with sentimentality Du Bois began to articulate his notions of 
“double-consciousness” and “artificial sensitivity”—integral components of how he 
charted affectively intense experience and the exist ntial problematic of singularity.  The 
modality of parodic embodiment Du Bois pursued has for the most part gone unnoted in 
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the extant scholarship, although a stray gesture in its general direction can be found here 
and there.  For example, Michele Elam and Paul Taylor elucidate an undeniably tangible 
eroticism in Du Bois’s work.  This risky engagement was so integral to his project that he 
insisted on elaborating it at length despite the fact that doing so involved “violating 
customary societal proscriptions” and thereby “courting the risk of excess and moral 
error.”  It may be that rather than being “disturbingly normative”—as Weinbaum would 
have it—Du Bois disturbs the Victorian norms through which conventional wisdom 
frames him.4  Quite possibly, it is not Du Bois but rather his critics who remain attached 
to sentimental morality—as implicit norm and/or conve ient straw man. 
 The history of Dark Princess’s reception—Du Bois’s “favorite book”—suggests that 
this is in fact the case.  To the extent that its eroticism is acknowledged at all, it is found 
to be distasteful.  Contemporary commentators merely follow in the footsteps of 
“sympathetic critics” (my emphasis) who, upon the novel’s initial publication, wrote 
reviews that sought, as Claudia Tate writes, “to efface the novel’s eroticism and to recast 
the work in the more favorable light of racial propaganda.”  What such commentators, 
then and now, overlook is that Du Bois’s “Criteria of Negro Art” (1926) makes it 
abundantly clear that he considered “eroticism” and“racial propaganda” to be 
inextricable.  As Elam and Taylor argue, mobilization of the erotic, while far from 
unproblematic, is fundamentally “a development in ethical expression.”  It ultimately 
boils down to the following illegitimate claim: “Aesthetic pleasure here is not an aside 
but an end in itself.”5 
 Just as James shook up the “antique bric-a-brac museums” of philosophers whom 
“new conditions have rendered obsolete”; just as Stein refused the “escape into imitative 
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emotionalism” and labored to effect “the destruction of associational emotion in poetry 
and prose”; Du Bois broke sentimental conventions by parodying sentimentality in order 
to instantiate an alternative to its overconventionalization.6  Their efforts are united by a 
goal that is most fully developed in Du Bois: to effect the reemergence of autonomous 
affect/affect of autonomy as the catalyst of a sociality that precedes and exceeds any 
given institutionalization of “society.”  By misusing found materials in order to achieve 
the unforeseen, Du Bois sounds the opening measures of an ongoing process of 
attunement that works to manifest the plurality that is endogenous to singularity.  The 
fact that he does so by parodying sentimentality can be truly appreciated only through the 
realization that the “sentimental” encompasses not o ly the domestic fictions that 
populated the nineteenth-century American literary marketplace and the eighteenth-
century British novels of sensibility that influenced them, but also the moral philosophy 
upon which both were founded. 
 It is the last that can be said to truly epitomize sentimentality.  Of particular 
importance in this regard is the plotting of sympathy at work in Adam Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and the “impartial spectator” that is its protagonist.  Du Bois aimed his 
parodic arsenal at this target.  His lampooning of the sentimentality that dominated the 
mainstream culture of his own time was collateral damage.  Though employing 
indirection, Du Bois hits the sentimental at its heart.  Smith’s theorizing had far-reaching 
practical effects.  The “sympathy” he worked to institute formed the connective tissue of 
the “social” order being put in place at the time.  It thereby acts as the medium through 
which the sentimental weaves its way through the work of one of the primary architects 
of new world governmentality: Thomas Jefferson.  And it is through the Jeffersonian 
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connection that Du Bois accessed Smith.  This traffic is hard to trace because it travels 
via the “veil”—a trope fundamental to the work of both Founding Father and Seventh 
Son.  Du Bois’s pointed reference back to Smith can be followed only through an 
uncredited citation of Jefferson’s fugitive figure.  This is a consequence of the necessity 
of taking what he has been given to go places he isnot upposed to go. 
 As Du Bois surreptitiously sounds it, sentimental sympathy is heard to rest on an 
unexamined assumption of normativity that inaugurates  process of racialization.  
Racism takes its place among the most archetypal of “sentiments.”  While this remains 
implicit in Smith, it becomes explicit in Jefferson.  The somewhat paradoxical 
consequence is that his work is simultaneously more eg giously racist and capable of a 
greater degree of self-critical reflexivity.  He, like Du Bois, engages the promises of 
sympathy only as they are betrayed.  He makes clearfrom the outset that his project “to 
form a more perfect Union” can only be embarked upon after declaring that conditions 
have made it “necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have 
connected them with another.”7  He remains fundamentally attached to the regime of 
sentimental sympathy, figuring independence from the British empire as a process akin to 
mitosis.  Du Bois, on the other hand, aims for an altogether more intricate mutation: an 
attunement before and beyond sympathy. 
 Du Bois takes on canonical moral philosophy and its practical effects through the 
oblique means of literary figuration.  Illegitimacy is a matter of aesthetics intervening in 
spheres that have traditionally been considered off-limits.  Du Bois infiltrates and 
arranges a series of small explosions that destabilize the foundations of representational 
discourse, instantiating the alternative offered by an enactive model of literature.  He 
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writes a language modulated through the infusion of a musicality encoding affectively 
intense experience in order to bridge an occulted priority that has been buried under 
sedimented convention.  Recourse to code is both a mechanism for coping with the pain 
caused by the way racism interferes with affective resonance and a means of protecting 
the potential pleasure of hacking through such “security” measures.  This move is 
particularly prevalent in Du Bois’s sampling of the spirituals.  In Souls, the “sorrow 
songs” function both as a resource for improvisational lyricism and as a line of attack in 
his parody of sentimentality. 
 At the end of the nineteenth century the spirituals were a major target of sentimental 
sympathy.  Du Bois rescued them from being passive obj cts of sympathy, transforming 
them into active conduits of attunement.  He worked to reimmerse them in the 
atmosphere of the “ring shout” and “camp meetings” in which they were initially 
generated, musicalized and kinaesthetic spacetimes populated by immersed participant 
observers.  Of course, access to any “originary” performative context can only be 
partially reenacted, not wholly recovered.  As Alexander Weheliye has argued, Du Bois’s 
treatment of the spirituals in Souls, especially the way he “mixes” them with other 
disparate materials, foreshadows the techniques of contemporary hiphop DJs.8  By 
tapping their experiences with contemporary sound technologies, twenty-first century 
readers can cultivate the embodied responsivity necessary for triggering and engaging the 
enactive potential of Du Bois’s literature and reenact the ambiance of the “ring shout” 
and “camp meetings.”  What results is the sounding of a world of human differences 
liberated from the “color-line.”  In the globality hat Du Bois opens, racialty does not so 
much disappear as disperse.  Qualities conventionally labeled as “white” or “black” are 
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recoded in such a way that they can be singularly embodied by people who, according to 
the dictates of racism, should be incapable of doing so. 
 The remainder of this chapter provides a detailed account of Du Bois’s intervention 
upon American modernism.  It begins with a consideration of the role sympathetic 
sentimentality played in the betrayal of Reconstruction’s promise and the re-
entrenchment of racist conventions that was “Redemption.”  In The Souls of Black Folk, 
Du Bois aimed to draw attention to this deficiency of the postbellum “social” order and 
sought to remedy it by putting a pedagogy of liberation into play that would make room 
for emancipated blackness to edify those who misunderstand and/or seek to cause harm 
to African Americans.  He set the stage for this performance through his own example, 
crafting and circulating extensively writing infused with a parodic musicality.  Du Bois 
launched a program of enactive literature choreographing moments of affective resonance 
into a broader pattern of attunement.  In doing so he embodied an aesthetics of 
illegitimacy.  Through the practice of artistic exprimentation Du Bois made a break with 
the overconventionalized, improvising a spacetime in which autonomous affect/affect of 
autonomy could live and breathe.  With these overtur s he encouraged his audience to 
embrace dispossession: a political commitment to let go of the notion of “inherent” 
properties and embrace the alternatives offered by an ongoing process of mutual 
borrowings across multiple lines and on global propo tions.  In Souls and its sequel, 
Darkwater, Du Bois sounded a world reopened to a widespread engagement with the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity, receptive to the capacity for and 
cultivation of affectively intense experience.  In this he was inspired by the creators of the 
spirituals, and in turn influenced the work of contemporary hiphop musicians. 
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Bespoke Goods 
 “Reconstruction is a failure, then?” asked Mr. Withington. 
 “Reconstruction is not a failure, although the whole South will tell you 
so, and the North is being persuaded to so believe[,]’ r plied Will. 
 “All of which goes to show that race is stronger than law,’ broke in the 
Southerner. 
 “Rather that barbarism is superior to civilization.” 
 “What about the crime of rape?” asked Mr. Withington. 
 “In nine cases out of ten,’ replied Lewis, ‘you will find that the Negro 
is guiltless of this awful crime.  It is brought forward to alienate the 
sympathy of all decent men from us.  It is a crime that strikes the home 
ties, and as such is the most deadly weapon that has yet been used against 
us.  We invite investigation in this direction, and you will then find that it 
is not a characteristic of the black man, although it is of the white man of 
the South. 
 “You cannot prove your assertions!” exclaimed the Southerner, white 
with passion. 
 
 Pauline Hopkins, Contending 
Forces 
 
 What Du Bois aims for is a reconsideration of what s come to be known as “the 
Universal,” a project of reclamation that involves its transformation into an open source, 
an active agent of its own change.  This is what Fanon indexes as “the universality 
inherent in the human condition” (my emphasis) and what Du Bois calls the “general 
proposition of working for the world’s good.”  To “take on” this challenge, those 
individuals placed among the “darker peoples of the world” must work through the 
“aberrations of affect” within which they are enmesh d—foremost of which is the 
supposition that affect is aberrant.  As Fanon suggests, the “Negro”—the potential “black 
man”—“is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must be extricated.”  In order to 
enact this unearthing, it is necessary to confront the ruling principle of this cosmological 
enclosure: sentimental sympathy.  It is not that sen imentality causes the “general 
proposition of working for the world’s good” to be “too soon sickly.”  Rather, this 
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adjectival phrase, if Du Bois’s grammar is correctly parsed, is applied to the sentimental 
itself.  There is something about sympathy that is valuable.  Whenever this fugitive 
component surfaces, however, it is swiftly infected by the normative machinations of the 
regime.  In order to counteract this defensive maneuver it is necessary to bide one’s time, 
taking a series of detours that circumscribe sentimentality and in doing so go beyond it.  
In order to get to the attunement made possible by the liberation of autonomous 
affect/affect of autonomy, it is necessary to gain a certain familiarity and facility with 
sympathetic sentimentality.  Similarly, activating the revamped philanthropy that is 
universality necessitates developing a new understanding of selfhood and racialized 
difference.  Both of these tasks are part of the cryptic “sacrifice”—“working for the 
multiplication of Youth X Beauty,” striving to let go of standards that risk lulling their 
adherents into an odd sort of premature decrepitude—Du Bois vows to make.  It is a 
matter of chance rather than destiny, being “the work that the Unknown lay in my hands” 
before becoming a chosen profession.  It is by virtue of understanding choice as the 
offspring of necessary chance that “my own best development” and “the rise of the Negro 
people” become synonymous with one another and together are made “one and the same 
with the best development of the world.”9 
 It is through this circuitous process that the novelty of youth will illegitimize existing 
standards of beauty (including the “goods” of sentimental moralism).  Among Du Bois’s 
contemporaries, Pauline Hopkins offers a singularly interesting foil, putting these 
innovative maneuvers of his into relief.  She was a student of his social theory and his 
follower on matters of politics, but also served as an important influence when Du Bois 
turned to the writing of fiction.  Her novel Contending Forces provides a thumbnail 
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sketch of the context in which Du Bois wrote the essay  collected in Souls.  One of the 
insights made available by her rediscovery is that t ough sentimentality is conventionally 
considered the province of women, the generative space of sympathy at its center is a 
bastion of homosociality dominated by men.  Bringing Hopkins to the foreground opens 
up a thematization of Du Bois’s own discomfort with the homosocial, which manifests as 
antisexism and illegitimacy.   The latter can be limned by contrasting Du Bois with the 
two African American protagonists who speak in the passage at the top of this section.  
All three contest the charge that Reconstruction was a failure.  The tack Du Bois 
ultimately took, however, could be said to flip that of his fictional counterparts.  While 
Will Smith and Arthur Lewis take a sentence and merely evise the proper noun that 
functions as its subject, Du Bois enacts an improvisationally lyrical alteration of its 
syntax that makes it say something completely other from the meaning originally 
intended. 
 To argue that “barbarism is superior to civilization” is only to hold a mirror up to the 
claim that “race is stronger than law.”  It merely p aces the key terms of the central 
proposition of “the philosophy of lynching” in inverse order, rather than turning this 
conceit inside out, as Du Bois seeks to do.  If, for the Southern Senator, the threat of rape 
“strikes the home ties,” for Smith and Lewis the false accusations that cover up its 
inverse actuality do so as well.  Enabling this conflict is the fact that a certain “decent 
domesticity” can be conceived of as a property, the possession of which must be fought 
over exactly because it is already assumed to emblematize shared values.  At the heart of 
the issue here seems to be the question of who the rig tful heirs of the “Anglo-Saxon” 
tradition of sympathetic sentimentalism is: “Southerners” or “Negroes.”  According to the 
 223 
terms of the debate it can only be one or the other.  It is only by virtue of buying into 
these firmly established ground rules that Smith is licensed to provide the proof the 
Senator denies and propose “using the methods of the South” to “create sentiment for the 
race and against its detractors.”  But for Du Bois sentimentality, as constrained by 
“decent domesticity,” is always already its own violation.  The phrase “to alienate the 
sympathy of all decent men” would mean something completely different coming out of 
his mouth.  And this has everything to do with the fact that he has a more critical 
understanding of “decency.”  This is why he proposes that, although they, like all 
Americans, are “reared and trained under the individualistic philosophy of the 
Declaration of Independence and the laisser-faire philosophy of Adam Smith,” “Negroes” 
embody something other than “a servile imitation of Anglo-Saxon culture.”10  Du Bois 
uses sympathetic sentimentality as a means to recover that which it claims to be by 
bringing its obsolescence to the surface.  He does s  by embracing the errant aesthetic 
method of illegitimacy.  Illegitimacy is all about being prematurely turned out of house 
and home without any “rightful” inheritance.  It is about making do with found materials 
that one may or may not be authorized to access, utilizing them in a way that breaks 
conventions in order to broach the unforeseen.  Its upshot is the experimental, the 
musical, the affective, the embodied. 
 An itinerary of this project can be drawn up by tracing one of the central threads of 
Souls—the issue of higher education—that comes most markedly to the fore in the essay 
“Of the Training of Black Men.”  Here Du Bois thematizes a question that hangs over 
Contending Forces but which neither its protagonists nor its author explicitly ask.  In 
doing so, he brings us back to the query with which Hopkins’s scene begins: the non-
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failure of Reconstruction.  He offers the response Smith and Lewis are prevented from 
making to its fullest.  Du Bois bears witness to the fact that freedmen (and women) and 
their sons (and daughters) did not fall short of their own accord.  Rather, they were 
betrayed.  The “education” Du Bois proposes would work to depart from this unfortunate 
situation.  It is still (at least initially) of the “sentimental” variety.  By showing how 
something so central to the moralism of normative sentimentality as sympathy can be 
made to depart from the restrictions of “decent domesticity,” however, Du Bois gestures 
towards a modernized ethics of attunement that emerges through the aesthetics of 
illegitimacy and in turn gives rise to a politics of dispossession.  It is only by intervening 
upon sentimental sympathy, he suggests, that we can go beyond it.  Du Bois takes this 
tack along two convergent lines.  First, by foregrounding a topic such as higher 
education—rather than, say, marriage, normative gender roles, and “sexual propriety”—
he troubles the split between “public” and “private” that “domesticity” both posits and 
exploits.11  Second, he shatters the presumptions of “decency” by uncovering its constant 
and repeated self-violations.  Du Bois is aided on b th these fronts by the fact that 
whereas the argumentation of Contending Forces eeks to minimize or gloss over 
racialized differences while simultaneously and unavoidably acknowledging their 
ubiquity, he embraces the contemporary institutional zation of these variations exactly in 
order to overturn it.  Du Bois takes the proposition of racial binarism at face value, only 
to demonstrate that although it is a key component of dominant “socialization” it is in the 
end ineffective as a means of comprehension.  It is simply not the way variety, through its 
generative naturing, manifests.  Du Bois makes use of this insight to develop a new 
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method of instantiating and processing differentiation, one that is decidedly nonracist 
without rejecting the significance of raciality altogether. 
 “Of the Training of Black Men” opens by tracing the outlines of the “Negro” mind as 
poised precariously at the intersection of “three str ams of thinking.”  Perhaps the 
strongest current feeding into this reservoir is the notion that “the multiplying of human 
wants in culture-lands calls for the world-wide coöperation of men in satisfying them,” 
which in turn entails “pulling the ends of earth nearer.”  This is what we could call the 
“vision of empire.”  Its would-be “new human unity” violates itself from its inception due 
to being unavoidably coupled with an economics of scarcity.12  Though the satisfaction of 
imperial desires may involve “all men, black, yellow, and white,” the proliferating 
“wants” that drive this industry are properties of only one segment of this mixed 
population.  This new world ordering is only euphemistically achieved through 
“coöperation.”  The imperial reach of falsely universalized “culture-lands” depends upon 
the forced labor of those who serve but who are not served by it.  It is as if “the 
Universal” were a scarce resource, generated by the many but reserved for the few.  And 
it is racism that both enables this rampant exploitati n and downplays exactly how 
fundamental it is to this particular instantiation f the adjective “world-wide.” 
 As Du Bois writes, “behind this thought lurks the afterthought of force and 
dominion.”  This lurking is performed by the second major current he identifies: “the 
sincere and passionate belief that somewhere between m n and cattle, God created a 
tertium quid, and called it a Negro,—a clownish, simple creature, at times even lovable 
within its limitations, but straightly foreordained to walk within the Veil.”  Generating 
credence in this “sentiment” is the notion that being marked by racialization makes one 
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sub- or non-human and prevents mutual understanding.  As if “the Veil” were the 
“waste” and/or “surplus” of “the Universal,” the by-product of its false scarcity.  This is 
how sympathetic sentimentality disfigures embodiment and affective intensity.  The 
“Negro” bears this portion of the fruit of their labor.  There is something that marks 
“him” as “other,” at the same time that the call to recognize “him” as one’s fellow cannot 
be completely silenced.  Consequently, “he” is the target of a patronizing, paternalistic 
affectation.  Thus gently mastered, “that third anddarker thought,—the thought of the 
things themselves” is positioned at the limit of sympathy, exactly where the first two 
currents intersect.  Things that can think: something like the photographic negative of 
people whose status as men rests on their perpetuation of inhuman practices.  Thus is the 
“Negro” constituted as a self-conscious being, irresistibly desiring equal access to 
“Liberty, Freedom, Opportunity,” but also unable to realize this longing as anything other 
than a “mad impulse.”  “So here we stand,” Du Bois writes, “among thoughts of human 
unity, even through conquest and slavery; the inferiority of black men, even if forced by 
fraud; a shriek in the night for freedom of men who t emselves are not sure of their right 
to demand it.”  Du Bois goes on to phrase “the problem of training men for life” as a 
matter of turning “Negroes” into “black men” by promulgating belief in the fraudulence 
of racism.13  Such training does not so much resolve “the tangle of thought and 
afterthought” as sound it at a greater depth, reformulating “the Universal” as universality, 
transforming the vision of empire into an anti-imperialist globality, claiming a retooled 
raciality as the means of this reformulation. 
 Du Bois performs an archaeology of the postbellum pedagogy that preceded him.  
The first problem confronted by the pedagogical imperative that Du Bois unfolds and in 
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turn undertakes is the recruitment of a workforce.  At the end of the Civil War the most 
readily available applicant pool was ruled out by the very same thing that could have 
made them the perfect candidates: “the sudden volcanic rupture of nearly all relations 
between black and white” that attended the beginning of Reconstruction.  It could be 
assumed that personal interactions were so poisoned u der the regime of slave “society” 
that such a seismic jolt was necessary for the design of a workable patterning of sociality 
for the postbellum South.  And, in large part, this is true.  Yet, as Du Bois’s contemporary 
Thomas Nelson Page suggests in his eulogy for “The Old-Time Negro” (published a year 
after Souls), there is something worth allowing to jump the gap between ante and post.  
The question is how this leap is to be accomplished: whether it is to be pursued through 
the replication of norms, or rather through their mutation.  Page lobbies for the former. 
“Curiously, whatever the Southerners may think of slavery,” he writes, “there is scarcely 
one who knew the Negro in his old relation who does not speak of him with sympathy 
and think of him with tenderness.”  Further, “not the least part of the bitterness of the 
South over the Negro question as it has existed grows out of resentment at the destruction 
of what was once a relation of warm friendship and tender sympathy.”  While even Du 
Bois finds something regrettable about the loss of “that finer sympathy and love between 
some masters and house servants,” the remedy for this regret will “come to replace”—
rather than merely reinstitute—that presumed understanding.14 
 At the outset a revolution internal to sympathy is necessary, an overturning of both 
the “tenderness” that Page hankers after and the “bitt rness” it gives rise to within an 
altered historical situation that renders it obsolete.  By refining the definition of what 
exactly qualifies as “finer,” “that sympathetic and effective group-training and 
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leadership” that circumstances demand will arise and “The Old-Time Negro” will 
become not only a “New Negro” but potentially a “black man.”  It is not so much “the 
social separation between the races” that prevents (always, by implication, white) 
“Southerners” from being agents of this (re)education, as the fact that their “resentment” 
of any effort to envision bridging the breach of Southern “society” in any way other than 
returning to the stereotypical relationships that exist d under slavery “is so thorough and 
deep.”  Framing of “the Negro question” as nothing other than a “Problem” (with a 
capital P)—one that “Southerners” can lay privileged claim to—effects “the more 
uncompromising drawing of the color-line” that Du Bois argues came to the fore after the 
Civil War, the figuring of racialization as a “frightful chasm . . . across which men pass at 
their peril.”  Involved here is not just segregation as we normally think of it—in terms of 
balkanized residential patterns, separate schools, p litical disenfranchisement, economic 
inequality—but, further and deeper, racism as a barrier to an affective resonance that 
troubles Page’s “warm friendship,” an attunement tha necessitates a reconstruction of the 
“tender sympathy” he wishes to Redeem.  By entertaining a racist nostalgia that would 
seek to recapture “the Negro in his old relation,” Page and his ilk disfigure blackness as a 
simultaneity of feeling’s absence (its irreducibility to overconventionalized “sentiment”) 
and overwhelming presence (its ultimately undeniable embodiment of autonomous 
affect/affect of autonomy).  This juxtaposition of lack and plenitude overloads and 
thereby reveals its secret inhabitation of the most intimate operations of whiteness.  In 
order to continue fending off the recognition that “decent domesticity” depends upon the 
smuggling of certain illicit goods, that interiority is always already miscegenated, agents 
of Redemption act to circumvent Reconstruction by reinstituting a situation in which “life 
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among free Negroes was simply unthinkable, the maddest of experiments.”15  The desire 
to preserve the overconventionalized sympathy of sentim ntal moralism doubles here as a 
project to perpetuate the racist protocols of slave “society.”  To the extent that this 
undertaking was successful, a regime of “peculiar feelings” continued to remain in force 
even after the “institution” through which it was entrenched was nominally abolished.  A 
shadow governmentality is cast, effecting a (mis)conception of the emancipation of 
blackness, framing it as a self-destructive thinking with decidedly morbid consequences. 
 
Criminal Minded 
 “Don’t you think we must educate them?” 
 “No; I think it is a crime.” 
 “Would you leave them in ignorance, a threat to society?” 
 “Yes, until they can be moved.  When I see these young Negro men 
and women coming out of their schools and colleges, w ll dressed, with 
their shallow veneer of an imitation culture, I feel like crying over the 
farce.” 
 “Surely, Mrs. Durham, you believe they are better fitted for life?” 
 “They are not.  They are lifted out of their only possible sphere of 
menial service, and denied any career  It is simply inhuman.  They are led 
to certain slaughter of soul and body at last.  It is a horrible tragedy.” 
 Allan looked at her, smiled, and replied: “I knew you were a bitter and 
brilliant woman but I didn’t think you would go to such lengths even with 
your pet aversion.” 
 “It’s not an aversion, or a prejudice, sir.  It’s a simple fact of history.  
Education increases the power of the human brain to think and the heart to 
suffer.  Sooner or later these educated Negroes feel th  clutch of the iron 
hand of the white man’s unwritten laws on their throats.  They have their 
choice between a suicide’s grave or a prison cell.  And the numbers who 
dare the grave and the prison cell daily increase.  The South is kinder to 
the Negro when he is kept in his place.” 
 
 Thomas Dixon, The Leopard’s 
Spots 
 
 According to Du Bois, southerners, like Mrs. Durham in the epigraph above, adopted 
an intransigent “opposition to Negro education” because such edification unavoidably 
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involves “an element of danger and revolution, of dissatisfaction and discontent.”  
Contrary to Dixon’s claim that such turbulence and the innovative role-playing it 
involves is a mere mockery that only causes unnecessary uffering, it is in fact 
unavoidable and even enjoyable when the experimental is understood as that which 
makes comprehension possible.  Southerners, denying that any unfair discrimination was 
involved in the matter, and with the paternalistic implication that certain restrictions and 
threats of violence were “for their own good,” refused to participate in efforts towards 
liberating the thus far captive capacities of “free N groes” when they did not actively 
frustrate them.  Unable to find adequate teachers amongst their closest neighbors, nascent 
“black men” in the aftermath of the Civil War had to look elsewhere for role models.  
Through the “planting of New England schoolhouses among the white and black of the 
South,” “social settlements” were created in which “the best of the sons of the freedmen 
came in close and sympathetic touch with the best traditions of New England.”  Thus was 
effected a communicability of “sentiment” that set the stage for its expansion and 
eventual eclipse.  This latter development, however, involved a breaking of conventions 
and a changing of the guard that, while it sought to re ain and repurpose that aspect of 
sympathy that was potentially productive, took leave of the broader regime of 
sentimentality insofar as it acknowledged the latter’s inextricability from racism.  For, as 
Emancipation continued to play itself out, (always, by implication, white) “Northerners” 
proved themselves susceptible to the “acute race-sensitiveness” that pervaded the South 
(and, in fact, the Union as a whole).  The “society” they sought to settle, despite its 
positive effects, was fundamentally structured by the isomorphism of two binarisms 
(teacher/student and white/black) that never ceased to demand that their two terms remain 
 231 
utterly distinct.  Consequently, while “Northerners” and their “Negro” charges were 
“sensitive to mutual thought and feeling,” they remained “subtly and silently separate in 
many matters of deeper human intimacy.”16  While it instituted a kinder, gentler 
paternalism, this sentimental education maintained a racialized hierarchy ultimately no 
less intransigent than that of the Old (slave) South. 
 As long as the “actual formal content” of so-called “ mancipatory” courses of study 
remained “doubtlessly old-fashioned,” “the contact of living souls” broached by 
postbellum institutions of learning was unable to exercise its “educational power” to its 
fullest.  Such reticence to innovate curricular activities created a situation in which this 
“gift of New England” to “Negroes” had become “a gift which to-day only their own 
kindred and race can bring to the masses.”  By making blackness a guiding principle of 
pedagogy, sympathy is disarticulated from the overconventionalized “sentiment” of 
racism and transmogrified into something other than itself: a potential for affective 
resonance and multitudinous differentiation liberatd from the logic of binarism.  It 
should be noted that blackness here is not so much a “race” phenomenon that is 
necessarily coded either “black” or “white.”  It has become, however, due to the 
contingencies of history, undeniably racialized—that is, framed as accessible by a 
particular population marked by certain superficial haracteristics.  It is a raciality 
(complementing rather than opposing universality), the pursuit of which elaborates 
spectra of singularity that would otherwise remain no manifest.  Given that they cling to 
conventions that repress affectively intense experience, it is unlikely that “the mass of the 
whites”—whether “Southern” or “Northern”—“can be brought to assume that close 
sympathetic and self-sacrificing leadership of the blacks which their present situation so 
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eloquently demands.”  (It is telling that Du Bois’s grammar here leaves the question of 
exactly which group—“whites” or “blacks”—find themselves in this “situation.”)  The 
“leadership” that is needed, the “social teaching ad example” that is truly called for, 
“must come from the blacks themselves.”  And their pupils will be both “Negroes” and 
(always, by implication, white) “Southerners” and “Northerners.”  Du Bois places 
himself among this cadre of “men who thoroughly comprehend and know modern 
civilization, and can take hold of Negro communities and raise them and train them by 
force of precept and example, deep sympathy, and the inspiration of common blood and 
ideals.”17 
 By staking this claim, however, he does not get off scot-free.  As his continuing usage 
of conventional phrasing (especially “common blood”) in this last passage suggests, he is 
initially not altogether successful at locating “modern civilization” somewhere other than 
at the intersection of sentimentality and racism.  At the outset, his educational efforts 
were “haunted by a New England vision.”  This stubborn kink in his project brings to the 
surface the fact that his aesthetics of illegitimacy is double-edged.  Being black, his 
access to “higher education” is compromised from the get go.  But, at the same time, 
being born and raised in provincial Massachusetts, his assumption of blackness is under 
question.  So, while Du Bois found it necessary to complete a Bachelor’s degree at Fisk 
prior to being accepted for undergraduate study at Harvard, it is also true that his attempts 
to teach in the common schools of rural Tennessee during his summers off from the 
former institution were complicated by that fact that where he expected to see “neat little 
desks and chairs” he was brought into touch with “rough plank benches without backs, 
and at times without legs.”  Du Bois was aided in weathering this rude contact and 
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making this synaesthetic transition by one of his would-be pupils.  This young woman, 
Josie, “had about her a certain fineness,” a qualific t on distinct from the “finer 
sympathy” of the antebellum in that it sought “to make life broader, deeper, and fuller.”  
Her ambition to learn instructed Du Bois that educators need to temper their adherence to 
“technical normal methods” with the capacity to be “ road-minded.”18  Working with 
Josie and her peers Du Bois was forced to make-do with found materials, break 
conventions, and accommodate a certain irregularity.  He was faced with the realization 
that those whom he would train in the ways of “modern civilization” come equipped with 
the very capacity that qualifies him to inspire and lead.  Thus, a certain reciprocity that 
belies the implied hierarchy of binarism is established between “white” and “black,” 
“teacher” and “student.”  Such training as Du Bois would perform constitutes an equal 
exchange and enrichment rather than a one-way transmission of received ideas. 
 Having learned this lesson, he was able to depart from the preconceived notions of 
sympathetic sentimentalism and open the way for an affective resonance that promised to 
give rise to a modernized ethics of attunement.  Du Bois’s connection with his exemplary 
student brought home to him that the difference betwe n him and her people was not so 
much one of ability as an inequality of opportunity to make a shared potential manifest.  
Due to the persistence of this disparity, the limning of the special “gift” that Du Bois 
holds in common with “the mass of the freedmen” (and women) involves coming to 
terms with the ways in which that which initially made it evident is unavoidably placed at 
risk of “sacrifice.”  This is the function performed by Du Bois’s recounting of what he 
learned upon returning to the site of this education l interchange a decade after its 
inception: namely, the manner in which Josie’s ambitions, by broaching unbridled 
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potential, unfortunately served to exemplify not only ability but also its brutal denial.  
Her fate is sealed by the failure to free her endeavors from the “dangerously clear logic of 
the Negro’s position” at the intersection of sentimentality and racism.  While Du Bois is 
able to leave a Southern locale constantly threatend by the re-entrenchment of the 
“society” of slavery, earns a doctorate, and begins h s ascent into the upper reaches of 
academia, Josie—inextricably tied to the region by family allegiance and hampered by 
the hindrances of heterosexism—remains subject to an enduring economy of engineered 
scarcity.  She is forced to prematurely make the shift from education to menial 
employment.  Beset by personal misfortune brought on by the betrayal of Reconstruction, 
she is overworked and dies before her time.  Heeding the tragedy of Josie’s example 
leads Du Bois to suggest that, as much or even morethan he himself, “the masses of the 
Negroes” possess that capability that eludes whites.  For, even without formal training, 
black folk, Du Bois tells his white readers, “see all too clearly the anomalies of their 
position and the moral crookedness of yours” and resolutely bear witness to the evidence 
of these “burning truths.”19 
 The capacity at work here is the “second-sight” of “d uble-consciousness.”  Its 
operations trace out what actually happens when people try or have no choice (due to 
their subordinate status within a given “society”) but to follow out Smith’s prescriptions 
for instituting the “impartial spectator” to the lett r, rather than taking the shortcuts open 
to the overprivileged.  This figure is immediately split down the middle as soon as it is 
brought into existence, born with a constitutive lack t its center that makes plain the fact 
that the best way to approximate impartiality is through the juxtaposition, rather than 
elision, of diverse particularities.  The clarity of this supplementary seeing is “all too” and 
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“dangerous” because it is always already refracted.  It is rent by “a vast veil” cast by the 
ocularcentrism orienting sentimental moralism.  By banning fully embodied responsivity, 
stunted “sympathy” outlaws autonomous affect/affect of autonomy.  The existential 
problematic of expressing singularity is suspended.  The people for whom Du Bois 
speaks are embedded in a bifurcated habitat from which t ey are alienated, but which 
nevertheless would cease to exist without them.  They end up functioning as this 
environment’s estranged exemplars because they are th t population that has been 
(re)located along the bifurcation.  They not only have unique awareness of “the Veil,” 
they also know—in a way others do not—that both side  are occupied.  Consigned to 
inhabit the unknown, their struggles for recognition take the form of an attempt to 
approximate the standards of the “beyond” to which they will never gain true access 
unless this binaristic cosmos is overthrown in the name of a pluralistic universe.  Thus, 
“the Negro” finds himself in “a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but 
only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world.”  In such a situation, a 
“gift” can also be a “curse,” insofar as it is forced to spell out its own “sacrifice.”  The 
efforts of “the Negro” “to husband and use his best powers and his latent genius” in order 
“to escape death and isolation” have been inhibited because their singular capabilities 
“have in the past been strangely wasted, dispersed, or forgotten.”20 
 Ultimately, however, double-consciousness cannot be confined to that which has 
already come to pass.  It is preeminently of the moment, occupying the present in a way 
that nudges it toward a future broader than otherwise imagined.  The “secondness” of this 
seeing always already fills itself out in triplicate, is infused with a musicality that 
muddies the stark lines of ocularcentrism and engages fully embodied responsivity.  With 
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the spirituals as his inspiration, Du Bois illustrates how double-consciousness entails not 
merely an initial difficulty to ascertain oneself and the consequent necessity of relying on 
the reports of others, but also—thirdly—an awareness of the interdependence of these 
two conditions, a realization that leads towards what he will articulate as “artificial 
sensitivity” in Darkwater.  We can understand the emergent third of double-
consciousness to be a recognition that the “anomalies” besetting the positionality of 
blackness and the “moral crookedness” that permeates whiteness are two sides of the 
same coin.  As Du Bois implicates it, “second-sight” is imbued with connotations of the 
“superstitious” or the “enthusiastic”; the illicitly religious and strangely spiritual 
happening of an affectively intense experience at the crossroads of autonomy and 
attunement.  Applicants for whiteness, the operating license of racism, would label such 
occurrences disreputable, confined solely to the province of blackness.  At the same time, 
as the widespread interest in the “occult” at the turn of the twentieth century suggests, 
they also desired to claim them as their own. 
 Double-consciousness is both generated and occulted by the fact that while the 
“impartial spectator” placed at the center of sympathetic sentimentality’s moralism is 
advertised as setting aside particularities, it in fact acts as a container in which a select 
few are smuggled in to provide the unsounded metric by which the standards of civil 
intercourse are measured.  Those who assume the poss ssion of such privileged 
particulars are exempted from the requirement of behaving “impartially.”  Those who 
must prove their ability to be “impartial” are those who are considered unable to do so, 
excluded from normative “sympathy” by definition.  Double-consciousness is the by-
product of this tortured logic/logic of torture.  It speaks to unattended difficulties with the 
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project of using “impartial spectatorship” as a plan for manufacturing self-critical agency 
on an empirical plane.  This unforeseen onus of traditional moralism is unequally 
parceled out, along lines drawn according to that most overconventionalized of 
“sentiments”: racism.  Double-consciousness is that process undergone by people 
compelled to behave as if they were “impartial spectators,” under real (new) world 
conditions.  It is the “curse” that hangs over the head of those coerced into bearing the 
burden of an impossible task. 
 But once one becomes conscious of this affliction, it becomes a “gift.”  Double-
consciousness becomes something altogether other than “impartial spectatorship” when it 
is embraced purposefully as a means of giving rise to an emergent third.  What was 
supposed to be a regulative ideal turns out to be a “p culiar sensation,” what was taken to 
be a norm is revealed to be a limit case.  This eventuality demands “a loftier respect for 
the sovereign human soul that seeks to know itself and the world about it; that seeks a 
freedom for expansion and self-development; that will love and hate and labor in its own 
way, untrammeled alike by old and new.”  The itinerary of double-consciousness 
broaches autonomous affect/affect of autonomy and opens a reactivation of the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity.  And insofar as the capacity for affectively intense 
experience has been racialized, liberation in general means that “the longings of black 
men must have respect.”  Not only is double-consciousness the revealing upshot of the 
attempt to institute the “impartial spectator,” theexamples of those who enact it could 
very well be instructive for all those who would go beyond the moralism of sympathetic 
sentimentalism.  As Du Bois writes, “the rich and bitter depth of their experience, the 
unknown treasures of their inner life, the strange rendings of nature they have seen, may 
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give the world new points of view and make their loving, living, and doing precious to all 
human hearts.”21  This pursuit of universality through the appreciation of raciality takes 
place through improvisational lyricism.  The emergence of a streaming thirdness of 
sonicity through the playing out of supplemental seeing registers as a writing infused 
with the musicality of the “sorrow songs.”  Du Bois’s treatment of the spirituals is the 
epitome of his overall strategy.  Double-consciousnes  and its second-sight not only 
constitute a parody of the “impartial spectator,” they also trace a metafigure of the 
parodic in general, manifest the cognitive and visual analog of the musical and otherwise 
sonic phenomena at its heart. 
 As literary theorist Linda Hutcheon notes, the English “parody” derives from the 
Greek parodia, which loosely translates as “counter-song.”  It is not enough to merely 
draw this etymological connection and leave it at th t.  One must also unfold the implicit 
multivalence involved in this derivation.  The qualifying prefix para can mean either 
“against” or “beside.”  When defining parody it makes as much sense to speak of a 
singing that facilitates an encounter with as much as one that simply counters pre-
established conventions.  If in one of its aspects the parodic acts as a means of 
“opposition or contrast,” in another—one that is interdependent with the first—it 
performs “a suggestion of accord or intimacy.”  Consequently, its “final meaning”—one 
that hovers “between complicity and distance”—“rests on the recognition of the 
superimposition of these levels.”  Through parody issues a thirdness that emerges through 
the overlap of two terms that seem contradictory but are in fact complementary, although 
irreducible to one another.  It thus avoids functioning merely as “ridiculing imitation” and 
thereby “marks the intersection of creation and re-creation, of invention and critique.”  It 
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involves not discarding but rather recycling, is “endowed with the power to renew” and 
“revitalize.”  While parody, since its antique inception, has gone beyond “song” to 
become a multimedia modality, in all its manifestations in retains an echo of its 
indigenous musicality, which surfaces as a distinct i tonation.  It is irreducibly “double-
voiced.”  “Its two voices,” Hutcheon writes, “neither merge nor cancel each other out; 
they work together, while remaining distinct in their defining difference.”  While it may 
be initially perceived as “aggressive,” it is ultimately “conciliatory,” “building upon more 
than attacking its other, while still retaining its critical distance.”22  Parody sounds a 
mode of engagement in which difference is accommodated s a spur to fuller 
understanding.  Rhetorician Eric King Watts has located the sort of dual voicing 
Hutcheon draws attention to in the work of Du Bois, taking his parody of “My Country 
’Tis of Thee” as an example.  Du Bois effects what e calls “little changes” in the song’s 
phrasing (for example, altering the second line of its opening couplet from “Sweet land of 
liberty” to “Late land of slavery”) in order to sound a revamped and more fully nuanced 
patriotism.23 
 Du Bois presents this parodic maneuver not only as a survival tactic utilized to 
weather ocularcentrism (which is, ironically, so vigilantly focused on the visual as to 
miss the “little changes” of intonation proposed) but also as a surreptitious and good-
humored affront that enacts a sonicity making way for a (re)cognition of fully embodied 
responsivity.  He describes “the dilemma” faced by black people when attending a public 
occasion in which the conventional declaration of love for one’s country is called for.  It 
is not just that white people stand there, ready to judge whether adherence to the 
standardized cant is whole-hearted.  What impinges on a more fundamental stratum is the 
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mere fact that “they look at you.”  As Watts writes, “Du Bois understands this moment of 
transfixion by the white gaze as an event that prohibits mutual understanding between the 
races.”  Through such surveillance any embodiment of blackness “is held actionless and 
is muted; it, thus, does not constitute a being to which one must answer.”  Du Bois’s 
parody of “My Country” shakes up this restricting situation, mobilizing “double-
consciousness” to enact a dual voicing—the sonic analog of supplementary seeing—that 
“is constitutive of ethical and emotional dimensions that make it an answerable 
phenomenon.”  By foregrounding “the sound of specific experiential encounters in civic 
life,” Du Bois thus disturbs the ocularcentric eviscerations of “sympathetic” moralism, 
liberating autonomous affect/affect of autonomy andthereby casting seeds of a 
modernized ethics of attunement.  Du Bois’s parodic sounding thus makes inroads on the 
imperative that “the longing of black men must have respect.”  It takes the first step of 
making these yearnings communicable, modeling a “mutual understanding” that allows 
the emergence of that eloquence that is the fruit of ambivalence, the thirdness promised 
by double-consciousness.  After Du Bois’s intervention, “two moods and motivations 
interpenetrate one another in the singing of ‘America’ and, thus, they coax a closer 
affiliation among diverse interests.”  By performing alterations that nevertheless rhyme 
with the original, his parody “mediates the incoherence among black feelings”—makes 
them coherent in a nonreductive manner—“by proposing both resistance and 
atonement.”24 
 In retooling “My Country,” Du Bois is following the example set by the “sorrow 
songs.”  In Souls he draws on this inspiration for a similarly parodic maneuver: the 
intonation that surfaces in the climactic passage in “Of the Training of Black Men.”  And 
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his target, once again, is the tradition of normative sentimentality.  While in “My 
Country” he is concerned with how it compromises a performance of patriotism ripe for 
reconstruction, here he aims to renegotiate its role in the composition of the population 
that manifests contemporary American nationality.  He calls out the way “sympathy” 
clandestinely cultivates racism, breaking moralistic conventions by making them 
answerable to a “sovereign human soul” previously he d captive on trumped up charges.  
He lobbies for the accommodation of such a singularity’s “freedom for expansion and 
self-development.”  The passage in question comes imediately after Du Bois’s 
resounding of the “dangerously clear logic of the Negro’s position.”  After working to 
amplify these reverberations caught up in the tortuous chain of reasoning forged through 
the hidden confluence of “anomalies of affect” and “moral crookedness,” he insists upon 
the fact that even without his assistance those caught up in this intricate enmeshment 
persevere in the face of “strong indictments against them,” leveled through the 
institutional force of “decent domesticity.”  “Negroes” become “black men,” strive 
towards their liberation, by issuing “counter-cries” (my emphasis) that run 
“beside/against” the refracted clarity of twisted logic, emitting a sonicity that cuts 
through ocularcentrism and voices a demand for fully embodied responsivity that—Du 
Bois warns pointedly—“you may not wholly ignore, O Southern Gentlemen!”25 
 In what follows this declaration of interdependenc, Du Bois makes explicit what this 
breaching of ignorance implies.  The sampling of apostrophic convention with which it is 
rung in—as well as the foregrounded particularity of the readers Du Bois addresses—
marks it as a parody of sentimentality.  “If you deplore their presence here,” Du Bois 
writes, 
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They ask, Who brought us? . . . And finally, when you fasten crime upon 
this race as its peculiar trait, they answer that slavery was the arch-crime, 
and lynching and lawlessness its twin abortion: that color and race are not 
crimes, and yet they it is which in this land receives most condemnation, 
North, East, South, and West.26 
 
Du Bois opens the passage by redirecting the trajecory of “the Negro problem” away 
from its supposed and explicitly named subjects towards those who brought it into being 
in the first place: slave-traders and -holders.  In doing so, he does not so much shift blame 
as make it moot.  Just as white America depended upon the labor of those whom it would 
come to “deplore,” normative sentimentality—particularly the “whiteness” that is its so-
called “virtue”—implicates blackness not only as public nuisance but also as illicit 
inspiration.  This leads into the note on which he ends: a debunking of the criminalization 
of “color” perpetrated by instituted patterns of racialization.  The true culprits are not 
“misguided” individuals but rather the agents of a sh dow governmentality that would 
make any move towards emancipation a crime.  Du Bois proposes a divergent circularity 
of renewed responsibility and mutual recognition.  At the heart of this effort is a 
reclaiming of partiality as an instrument for a fuller orchestration of cross-cultural 
interaction, of raciality as a vehicle for universality. 
 While he is willing to grant that the “counter-cries” he champions are something 
other than “wholly justified,” he insists that they “daily present themselves in the guise of 
terrible truth” because the hailings that they parodically respond to fall short of holism as 
well.  Poised at the juxtaposition of these partialities—exercising double-consciousness—
Du Bois enacts an emergent thirdness “gifted/cursed” with a unique grasp on “the 
question of the future.”  In the wake of Reconstruction’s betrayal, the most pressing 
concern regarding America’s black population “is how best to keep these millions from 
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brooding over the wrongs of the past and the difficulties of the present, so that all their 
energies may be bent toward a cheerful striving and co-operation with their white 
neighbors toward a larger, juster, and fuller future.”  The complaints of “black men” must 
be heard so their longings can be respected, their strivings (foremost, it is implied, “the 
pursuit of happiness”) facilitated.  This involves securing for them basic material 
necessities and granting them access to the possibilities of “higher education.”  The 
prospects for an always already self-wounded “Union” depend in a fundamental way on 
“gaining the right of black folk to love and enjoy” so that they can partake of “the 
Freedom of Art that is the Beauty of Life.”  Only such measures will address how such a 
sizable and significant portion of the nation is “cut off from the main effort by the lesions 
of race.”  Standing in the way of this updating of existing patterns of racialization are not 
only the enemies of “the Negro”—who would deny such “Truth” calling for recognition 
“above the Veil”—but also those who are nominally “s mpathetic” with the cause of 
blackness but nevertheless have a difficulty perceiving what it entails in full.27 
 Thus, “knightly America,” both “North” and “South,” seems to hold a “grudge” 
against the fact that “loosing the possibilities of mankind for the development of a higher 
and broader and more varied human culture” necessarily involves “the opening of 
opportunity to the disinherited to contribute to civilization and the happiness of men.”  
This affliction is caused by a failure to question normative moralism.  Sentimentality and 
the “impartial spectator” who is its agent have epistemological as well as ethical 
shortcomings.  This double fault is a consequence of disciplining the life of 
feeling/feeling of life to an excessive extent and is remedied through an aesthetics of 
illegitimacy that sketches the outlines for a politics of dispossession.  By striving to bring 
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into play a modernized ethics of attunement, Du Bois seeks to encourage not only the 
enjoyment of “the right of the so-called unfathered child to be.”  Further, as philosopher 
Thomas Slaughter explicates, he proposes that “a state of ‘indebtedness’” can be 
empowering, that a certain freedom comes from the nec ssity to “borrow things” and the 
promise to “own nothing.”28  Both these propositions were crucial to making Du Bois’s 
own existence bearable.  In undertaking this program, Du Bois was up against not only 
those “Southern Gentlemen” who would take moralistic norms to unforeseen extremes—
such as Dixon, who in The Leopard’s Spots (published a year before Souls) draws on 
them to rally for a “Redemption” orchestrated through the “knightly” efforts of the Ku 
Klux Klan.  His parodic maneuvers reached all the way down to the founding document 
of sentimental sympathy drawn up by Smith. 
 
A Stigma(tism) 
The nineteenth was the first century of human sympathy,—the age when 
half wonderingly we began to descry in others that ransfigured spark of 
divinity which we call Myself; when clodhoppers and peasants, and 
tramps and thieves, and millionaires and—sometimes—Negroes, became 
throbbing souls whose warm pulsing life touched us so nearly that we half 
gasped with surprise, crying, ‘Thou, too!  Hast Thou seen Sorrow and the 
dull waters of Hopelessness?  Hast Thou known Life?’  And then all 
helplessly we peered into those Other-worlds, and wailed, ‘O World of 
Worlds, how shall man make you one?’ . . . And herein li s the tragedy of 
the age: not that men are poor,—all men know something of poverty; not 
that men are wicked,—who is good? not that men are ignorant,—what is 
Truth?  Nay, but that men know so little of men. 
 
 W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of Alexander 
Crummell” 
 
 The last four chapters of Souls reweave its thematic fabric, flipping the texture of the 
piece so that where before the reader felt warp she or  now feels weft.  They turn what 
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has come before inside-out, being the consequence of th author having “stepped within 
the Veil, raising it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses.”  Having limned the 
barrier to affective resonance racism institutes, h now defies it, bringing to light a 
previously unknown interiority that, while it can just be barely seen, issues an effulgent 
sounding.  Du Bois meant for these four essays to be read together.  Though parsing them 
piece-by-piece is unavoidable, it is best to avoid doing so in strict sequence.  I will jump 
directly into the thick of things, wrestling with te “tale twice told but seldom written” 
that Du Bois brings to attention in “Of Alexander Crummell” and “Of the Coming of 
John” before moving on to the unique responses to this cautionary story that Du Bois 
bookends it with, in “Of the Passing of the First-Born” and “The Sorrow Songs.”29  It will 
come in handy to keep in the back of our minds the loss that Du Bois suggests has taken 
place in the passage from orality to literacy (“twice told but seldom written”).  Doing so 
will prepare us for the treatment at the end of this chapter of the ways in which Du Bois 
goes beyond the strictly literate.  Through improvisational lyricism Du Bois nudges 
writing to its very limits, enacting a use of langua e infused with and functioning as 
music that comes fully into its own with the advent of sound recording technologies and 
is exemplified by how these found materials are utilized by hiphop artists. 
 In doing so, he performs the re-engagement with the existential problematic of 
expressing singularity his “tale told twice” has called for all along.  Du Bois presents both 
the promise and the danger of this undertaking in “Of Alexander Crummell” and “Of the 
Coming of John,” allowing their insistent story to echo throughout his work, to become 
the narrative of its own making.  If there is a “moral” here, it is that traditional moralism 
needs to make way for a modernized ethics.  Du Boisth roughly diagnoses and dissects 
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the “sympathy” that resides at the intersection of sentimentality and racism.  His most 
concise statement of this critique—that sympathetic sentimentality had become, by the 
turn of the 20th century, as much a force for misunderstanding as fellowship—comes in 
“Of Alexander Crummell,” but it is only accessible to those who hear past the many 
sleights-of-hand through which Du Bois encrypts it.  The titular figure of this chapter is 
only nominally its subject, and in two related senses.  First, if Du Bois was, around the 
turn of the twentieth century, interested in the recently deceased Crummell, he was so 
insofar as the latter emblematizes his own unfinished story: the career of a “would-be 
black savant.”  Duplicity, here, almost automatically doubles-up on itself—is 
quadrupled—as the “knowledge” that is to be the product of this “tale told twice” is itself 
“a twice-told tale.”  Those things of value Crummell, Du Bois, and others like them are 
thrilled to discover are taken to be mere tacit assumptions by their “white neighbors.”  
That the same thing can, depending on one’s point of view, be either novel or customary, 
however, seems to suggest that it deserves a different audition.  This is what the example 
of Crummell suggests.  Playing off slight variations of phrasing like that between “twice-
told tale” and “tale twice told,” Du Bois comes at what motivates the telling from an 
acute angle.  Only thus can he “know the world and know himself.”30 
 Which brings us to the second subterfuge in “Of Alexander Crummell.”  An argument 
that is paradoxically both covert and explicit is secreted between the lines of this “history 
of a human heart.”  It is the rationale behind Du Bois’s parody of sentimental moralism, 
and I have managed to piece it together in the epigra h with which this section opens.  
Du Bois is well aware that the concept of “sympathy” was first brought to the fore in the 
1700s, but his implication is that it was not until the following century that it would bear 
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fruit and in the process reveal certain unintended consequences.  The parodic bent of Du 
Bois’s argumentation can be gleaned from its first, long phrase.  That those who embody 
blackness are endowed with “a human heart,” Du Boisimplies, remains a questionable 
proposition.  This anomaly exists not because “Negro s” are thought to lack feeling, but 
rather because they elicit a degree of affective intensity that can thoroughly short-circuit 
the regime of overconventionalized “sentiment.”  That Du Bois is not just paying tribute 
to the tradition of “human sympathy” but also leveling a critique that seeks to reclaim its 
unfulfilled promise, however, does not become undeniable until the second sentence of 
this passage—and only then when juxtaposed with what follows, its displaced 
complement.  What comes before the ellipsis is from the beginning of “Of Alexander 
Crummell.”  What comes after is from the end.  Sympathetic sentimentality seems at first 
to have effected a recognition and welcoming of singularity.  Those practicing it, 
however, seem to become quickly overwhelmed by the incalculable differentiations 
broached by the potential for attunement across certain lines assumed to be unbreachable.  
What results is an imperial vision that seeks to contain the singularity’s endogenous.  
And it is this disciplinary regulation that constitu es “the tragedy of the age,” establishes 
a supposed “collaborative” effort in which, especially insofar as it is founded upon an 
implicit racialization that institutes a wide range of injustices and inequalities, “men 
know so little of men.”  Normative sentimentality and its constricted sympathy eventuate 
not only in an ethical dilemma but also an epistemological knot that the parodic 
maneuvers of Du Bois are meant to untangle. 
 For, as Susan Mizruchi has shown, around the turn of the twentieth century American 
social theorists increasingly showed an “interest in the function of sympathy as a means 
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of differentiation and exclusion” as much as in its role in securing unity and cohesion.  
This intellectual orientation created a situation in which “sympathetic actions have 
themselves become the pathway of estrangement.”  “Where we expect to find instinctive 
recognition of another’s feeling,” Mizruchi writes, “we now find race hatred.”  Such an 
outcome “implies that the act of sympathy may require not only the exclusion but the 
disappearance of certain groups.”  This pernicious combination of consolidation and 
elimination surfaces in Jefferson and is implicit in he work of Smith.  Through its 
operation, racism is shown to be the constitutive limit of sentimental sympathy.  In the 
face of this, an aesthetics of illegitimacy that reop ns the existential problematic of 
expressing singularity is the most pressing need.  In “Of the Coming of John,” Du Bois 
seeks to enact this artistic endeavor by narrating the predicament it seeks to remedy, 
thereby making patently obvious hidden assumptions.  This piece performs a fictional 
extrapolation of the argument made in “Of Alexander Crummell.”  The closing of the 
latter essay, which immediately precedes the opening of “Of the Coming of John,” 
illustrates “the tragedy of the age”—“that men know so little of men”—by taking its 
titular figure as a key example.  Although Crummell “brought within his wide influence 
all that was best of those who walk within the Veil,” “he worked alone, with so little 
human sympathy.”  Because he champions the longings a d strivings of “black men,” he 
dies unknown.  “They who live without knew not nor dreamed of that full power within,” 
Du Bois writes, “that mighty inspiration which the dull gauze of caste decreed that most 
men should not know.”31  It becomes apparent that sympathy not only limits knowledge, 
but has limits of its own that are isomorphic to that of the field of knowledge it allows 
access to.  Sympathy itself is knowledge put into power, the refracted clarity of vision 
 249 
enforced by new world governmentality.  Marking thelimits of this regime is “the Veil”: 
a concatenated figuration comprised both of “the dull gauze” and that which it 
obscures—that which, in fact, it invents in the first place. 
 “Of the Coming of John” offers a graphic illustration of the way that sentimental 
moralism can act to violently eliminate those who br ach its signature limitations.  Even 
aside from its content, there are a number a featurs that mark this story as illegitimate.  
The genre of the piece is a strange mixture of allegory and social realism.  The point of 
view is equally off-putting, beginning as an odd first-person plural (the “we” and “us” 
that introduce the protagonist) that evaporates into a stunning, visceral omniscience (the 
enactive eliciting of affective resonance with the protagonist’s most intimate experiences 
of interiority—which are, somewhat paradoxically, occasioned by the sudden impact of 
exteriority upon his life).  While the former conveys the conventional window-dressing 
of the narrative, the latter puts it into motion, immersing the reader in the moments of 
affective intensity that pace the action.  Thus, the voicing of the “twice-told tale”/“tale 
twice told” is endowed with parodic duality.  The figure of the double pops up, as well, as 
a structuring device for the story’s plot.  The action is structured around the comings and 
goings of two Johns: the black protagonist (John Jones) and his white counterpart (John 
Henderson).  Both come from “the far-away Southern village” of Altamaha, Georgia, and 
are sent north for college.  The Jones and Henderson families are deeply intertwined.  
The latter owned the former before emancipation and in the postbellum period during 
which the narrative takes place continued to employ them.  Jones was named after 
Henderson, who was a year or two older than his “dark boyhood playmate,” a de facto 
and somewhat illicit foster-brother—a “darker namesake.”  The Hendersons’ informal 
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adoption of the young Jones was underwritten by the fact that his ancestors were the 
property of theirs.  They may have felt an additional degree of responsibility for his well-
being given that he grew up for the most part withou  his father, who died before his time 
because of the undue stress of excessive physical labor.  But that the relationship between 
the two Johns was nevertheless “off-color” is attested to by the imperative of their going 
separate ways once they came of age.  Only through s c  explication of a segregation 
that had thus far remained implicit could Henderson imultaneously fondly remember 
Jones as his “closest playfellow in boyhood” and scorn him at present as “the darky that 
tried to force himself into a seat beside the lady I was escorting.”32 
 Henderson’s slur is a consequence of him and Jones cros ing paths again prior to their 
coordinated returns to Altamaha.  This chance meeting offers the reader a brief but 
evocative accounting of the degree to which they have been given distinctly different 
training during their early adulthood.  Both have changed, in ways that make going back 
to where they came from problematic, but to different degrees.  While Henderson has 
witnessed preexisting assumptions take on a different cast given his exposure to life 
beyond the provincial, Jones has experienced his previous understanding being 
completely overturned.  He finds that what made him such “a good boy” among the 
“white folk of Altamaha”—being “a fine-plough hand, good in the rice fields, handy 
everywhere, and always good-natured and respectful”—does not make the grade insofar 
as the tasks he is asked to undertake as a college stud nt are concerned.  He finds it 
necessary to reconceive his inborn capacities not as a naturalized “social” role that 
remains static over time but as an ongoing process of human naturing that opens up room 
for role-play.  The extent to which he is “behind” is indicative not of incapability but 
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rather of untapped potential.  His intellectual growth is all the more impressive given that 
it did not come easily.  It is by virtue of “pausing perplexed where others skipped 
merrily” that Jones is capable of “walking steadily through difficulties where the rest 
stopped and surrendered.”33 
 His ability to do the latter is put to the test when he begins to contemplate reentering 
“society.”  As Jones’s knowledge has broadened, so ha  his affective life been enriched.  
Bringing his “queer thought-world” gradually into cntact with “a world of motion and 
men” leads him “slowly to feel almost for the first time the Veil that lay between him and 
the white world.”  Having heard whispers of singularity and the new attunements it 
makes available, Jones becomes privy to the sort of unvoiced assumptions someone like 
Henderson knew all along and took for granted.  Coming at these reservations from a 
different angle, he experiences them as the limits they are rather than the entitlements 
they purport to be.  As Du Bois puts it, “he first noticed now the oppression that had not 
seemed oppression before, differences that erstwhile seemed natural, restraints and slights 
that in his boyhood days had gone unnoticed or beengr eted with a laugh.”  In 
consequence of this new knowingness—in essence, an intensification of affect—Jones 
“found himself shrinking from the choked and narrow life of his native town,” even 
though he fully intends to return.34  He wrestles with the suspicion that neither half of his 
segregated home may be receptive to what he has to teach them.  He therefore jumps at 
the opportunity to join his school’s vocal quartet and tour the North singing spirituals the 
summer after his graduation, a brief reprieve before undertaking demanding work.  Even 
during this vacation, however, Jones is reminded that the interwoven pursuits of 
knowledge and pleasure are, for “a would-be black savant” like him, darkened by the 
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constant threat of danger.  The past still hangs over the new world he yearns to freely 
explore as long as the edification of blackness is assumed to cause only suffering—that 
is, as long as the joy it entails is banned by an obsolete yet intransigent “social” order. 
 On “a bright September afternoon” near the end of his pilgrimage, Jones finds himself 
with a free afternoon to explore New York City, hisgroup’s current stop.  He gets caught 
up in the dazzling crowd he meets upon entering public space.  Whimsically following “a 
tall, light-haired young man and a little talkative lady,” he unintentionally finds himself at 
a ticket office and buys a ticket, entering a theater to witness what turns out to be a 
performance of Wagner’s Lohengrin.  In his somewhat dazzled condition, Jones ends up 
in front of the couple he had followed as they make their way to their seats, his slow pace 
holding up their progress.  The male member of the couple is irritated by the hold-up, and 
simultaneously “flushed at the roots of his hair” and “grew pale with anger” (undergoing 
a coloring that both asserts and hides itself) when he discovers that “there directly beside 
his reserved orchestra chairs sat the Negro he had stumbled over on the hallway.”  He 
complains to the management, and petulantly takes his eat, as the woman who 
accompanies him “deftly changed the subject.”  Earlier she had cautioned him “to not 
lynch the colored gentleman simply because he’s in your way,” to which her “fair-haired 
escort” had, with “a shade of annoyance” and “half impatiently,” responded that 
Northerners like her misunderstood Southerners like h mself, that “despite all your 
professions, one never sees in the North so cordial and intimate relations between white 
and black as are everyday occurrences with us.”  He is led to reminisce about his 
childhood friendship with “a little Negro named after me” but abruptly stops short 
(“‘surely no two,—well!’”) when he almost commits the impropriety of owning up to the 
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sincerity involved in this always already compromised intimacy.  Consequently, he fails 
to connect the “little Negro named after me” who populates his past with “the Negro he 
had stumbled over” who haunts his present.  Jones, for his own part, is too absorbed in 
the immersive “dreamland” surrounding him to notice this small drama of manners.35  
The woman at the sidelines of this opening act is soon placed right in the middle, sitting 
between the two estranged but unknowingly connected m n. 
 The lights fall.  The curtain rises.  Nevertheless, Jones is still taken unawares “when, 
after a hush, rose high and clear the music,” which “l ngered and swept through every 
muscle of his frame, and put it all a-tune.”  (Du Bois here is both moving his narrative 
along and modeling the sort of response he expects of hi  readers, insofar as he seeks to 
emulate in writing the effects of musicality.)  Swept up in sound, Jones “closed his eyes 
and grasped the elbows of the chair, touching unwittingly the lady’s arm,” who in turn 
“drew away.”  Her date for the afternoon also notices this illicit contact.  In part, the 
tension here has to do with what Sandra Gunning has identified as the “translation of the 
freedman’s impulse toward democracy”—here the longing for the freedom to enjoy 
operatic virtuosity—“into ultimately a threat against the most personal, most sacred 
aspect of white life”: its, riffing off Ann Du Cille, “coupling conventions.”  Involved as 
well, however, is the fact that the sort of embodied r sponsivity elicited by an enactive art 
and exercised by Jones in this scene does indeed violate norms of sentimentality, and 
thereby threatens to compromise the “virtue” that such moralism endows whiteness with, 
especially in its feminized forms.  The touch is made “unwittingly,” but there is no 
denying that it occurs.  Aesthetic engagement is illegitimate, a fact underlined when the 
narrator has Jones wonder why his fellow audience members seem so “listless and idle.”  
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They have been ingrained with the discipline of “impartial” spectatordom, while he alone 
remains open to being immersed in the music.  This not only marks him as deviant, but 
leaves him unprepared when the intermission comes and with it an usher sent to escort 
Jones out of the theater, in response to the complaint by the man sitting two seats away 
from him.  Jones complies without a fuss.  As he ris s from his seat the two men lock 
eyes for the first time and recognize each other.  Our protagonist is shaken and hurries 
out, forgetting to collect the proffered refund of the price of admission or register the 
manager’s assurance that he “indeed felt the matter keenly.”  Jones leaves convinced that 
his belief that he could freely enjoy the wonders of urban modernity makes him “a 
natural-born fool” and immediately writes a letter to his mother and sister announcing his 
imminent return home.36 
 His afternoon at the opera, however, proves to be but a euphemistic foreshadowing of 
what is to come, sexual transgression a red herring to draw attention away from the real 
worry: the edification of blackness and the possibility of having to learn from it.  The 
question is not so much whether you want your sister to go “black,” but rather how far 
“society” “dare let the Negro”—and, consequently, his “white” neighbor as well—“be a 
modern man.”  Met with confusion, incomprehension, a d finally “scorn and scathing 
denunciation” from the elders among the darker half of his people, Jones is initially 
crestfallen.  Buoyed by the understanding, admiration, and desire for emulation evinced 
by his younger sister, Jennie, he gathers the courage to petition “the Judge”—
Henderson’s father, Jones’s sibling’s employer, and pparently the foremost authority in 
Altamaha—“for the privilege of teaching the Negro school.”  He is met with 
quintessential ambivalence.  After putting Jones in his place by turning him away from 
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the front door and making him use the servant’s entrance, “the Judge”—after some 
delay—hails him and “plunged squarely into the busine s”: 
“You’ve come for the school, I suppose.  Well, John, I want to speak to 
you plainly.  You know I’m a friend to your people.  I’ve helped you and 
your family, and would have done more if you had n’t got the notion of 
going off.  Now I like the colored people, and sympathize with all their 
reasonable aspirations; but you and I both know, John, that in this country 
the Negro must remain subordinate, and can never expect to be the equal 
of white men.”37 
 
Plainness reveals itself to be crooked, as sympathy is shown to be regulated by a 
“reasonableness” that “white men” have only to nominally abide by insofar as they are 
assumed to be endowed with it from the outset, and that “the Negro” can apparently 
never attain because they actually have to submit themselves to it in order to ensure their 
survival.  The “aspirations” of would-be “black men” have to be limited not only to 
ensure their continued subordination but to prevent the eventuality that “white men” will 
learn something from them.  At the intersection of racism and sentimentality, to hinder is 
to “help” and what “white men” and “the Negro” are supposed to “both know” is a 
positive fact only insofar as normative moralism is as umed to be in force.  “Knowledge” 
is restricted to that which follows from preconceived notions. 
 Only by trying to wrap our minds around this torturo s logic/logic of torture can we 
make sense of what “the Judge” next says to Jones: 
In their place, your people can be honest and respectful; and God knows, 
I’ll do what I can to help them.  But when they want to reverse nature, and 
rule white men, and marry white women, and sit in my parlor, then, by 
God! we’ll hold them under if we have to lynch every Nigger in the land. 
 
Any alteration in interpersonal relations is understood as a complete overturning of the 
dominant “social” order.  The emancipation of blackness is consequently understood to 
“reverse nature” rather than constitute the latest phase in an ongoing process of naturing.  
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A non-negotiable attachment to whiteness as “virtue” and the entitlements it “naturalizes” 
leads inexorably to the proposal of genocide.  The exposition of “reasonableness” so 
easily transitioning into an outburst of extreme “passion,” revitalized sociality is reduced 
to degraded sexuality.  The broaching of the erotic—broadly understood as the realm of 
affect—is met with the threat of violence because it promises to shake up “society.”  And 
in this circumstance, “reasonableness” and “passion” are in effect the same thing: an 
indication of the short-circuiting of “sentiment,” he exhaustion of “sympathy.”  The 
resistance to the potential of affective resonance is so strong as to turn assistance into 
murder in the blink of an eye.  It is under this strain that “the Judge” demands that Jones 
“accept the situation and teach the darkies to be faithful servants and laborers.”  He 
attempts to use Jones’s manufactured illegitimacy as leverage, appealing to him to follow 
in the footsteps of a denigrated paternity: “I knew your father, John, he belonged to my 
brother, and he was a good Nigger.”  This is the first and only time Jones’s father is 
mentioned.  He otherwise fails to register as a significant presence, an indication of how 
much of himself Du Bois puts into this character, his own father having absented himself 
before his son turned two.  “The Judge” seems to overestimate the influence this paternal 
example will have over Jones, and thus his appeal to illegitimacy backfires.  Jones does 
indeed agree “to accept the situation,” but this is an instance of insistence rather than 
repetition.  The “situation” as he voices it is different from that which comes out of the 
mouth of “the Judge.”  Jones cannot help but be parodic even when making a sincere 
effort to follow the rules because he has cultivated singularity and thus outgrown the 
“mutual understanding” his interrogator assumes is still in effect.  In spite of his best 
intentions Jones “found it so hard and strange to fit his old surroundings again, to find his 
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place in the world about him.”38  And it is only in a world in which this illegitimacy can 
be embraced as a distinctive aesthetic stance with ethical and political upshots that Jones 
can survive.  This is the world that Du Bois seeks to realize for himself and other real-
world black artists and intellectuals, if not for this particular fictional exemplar. 
 By virtue of what turns out to be a misunderstanding, Jones is allowed to teach.  His 
example would have proved instructive for “the Judge” as well as his pupils, if Altamaha 
allowed itself to actually hear what he had to say.  For, in the meantime, Henderson has 
returned to town and is feeling similarly “misplaced.”  Upon his son’s homecoming, “the 
Judge” is “proud” of Henderson’s cultivation of instilled privilege, believing that his son 
has come back to follow in his footsteps.  But “the younger man could not and did not 
veil his contempt for the little town and plainly had his heart set on New York.”  
Henderson needs a broader stage, a higher vantage from which it is easier to overlook 
those “black men” who he believes can only be “stumbled over” and as such call to be 
removed.  Just like his father, Henderson attempts to face the challenges of modernity by 
(mis)figuring it according to the dictates of the archaic.  He is merely attempting to do so 
on a larger scale.  Where “the Judge” seeks to pump new blood into a regional 
slaveocracy, his son aspires to enforce a nationwide hite supremacy with its sights set 
on a new, American imperialism.  (This is, of course, what Du Bois’s enaction of 
antiracist globality is meant to derail.)  The expectations of his father stand in his way as 
much as the ambitions of a “would-be black savant” like Jones.  Thus, as the two rapidly 
become reacquainted, “the argument often waxed hot between them.”39 
 The conflict comes to a head in the following exchange: 
“Good heavens, father,’ the younger man would say after dinner, as he 
lighted a cigar and stood by the fireplace, “you surely don’t expect a 
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young fellow like me to settle down permanently in this—this God 
forgotten town with nothing but mud and Negroes?”  “ I did,” the Judge 
would answer laconically; and on this particular day it seemed from the 
gathering scowl that he was about to add something more emphatic, but 
neighbors had already begun to drop in to admire his son, and the 
conversation drifted. 
 
The Judge is prevented from voicing his disappointme t about his son refusing his 
example.  “Society” intrudes upon the “decent domesticity” it is supposed to protect.  
Polite discourse gets in the way of resolving the clash of “sentiment” and “passion,” as 
one neighbor interjects a particularly juicy piece of gossip: that Jones “is livenin’ things 
up at the darky school” with “his almighty air and upish ways.”  “The Judge” inquires 
whether his guest has “heard him say anything out of the way” and is met with the reply: 
“‘I don’t need to heah: a Nigger what won’t say ‘sir’ to a white man, or—’”  Oddly, then, 
conventions of Southern manners serve to silence both Jones and “the Judge.”  The 
neighbor breaks off his complaint because Henderson jumps in to inquire exactly who 
this “dangerous Nigger” is, and he “flushed angrily” upon finding out that it is the self-
same “darky that tried to force himself into a seat beside the lady I was escorting.”  By 
this point, however, his father “waited to hear no m re.”  “He had been nettled all day, 
and now at this he rose with a half-smothered oath, took his hat and cane, and walked 
straight to the schoolhouse.”  The transgressions of the two Johns are conflated in the 
mind of “the Judge,” and Jones is about to become accountable not only for the fear he 
provoked but also for the indignity that Henderson has inflicted.  Thus, after “a long, hard 
pull to get things started in the rickety old shanty that sheltered his school”—just when he 
“seemed to see at last some glimmering of dawn”—our protagonist has his lesson 
interrupted by “the red, angry face of the Judge.”  The latter declares the school closed 
and orders the children to “go home and get to work,” declaring that the town’s elite “are 
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not spending their money”—that is, the child labor they could otherwise be extracting—
“on black folks to have their heads crammed with impudence and lies,” the existence of 
which remain unsubstantiated and indeterminate—and just that much more frightening.40 
 Meanwhile, Henderson “wandered aimlessly about after his father’s abrupt 
departure,” by chance coming across an opportunity to ease his boredom and exact 
vengeance for his discontent.  In the woods that border his father’s property he comes 
across Jennie and forces himself on her.  Jones, making his own way home through the 
same woodland, absorbed in his own worries and discouragement, is brought back to his 
surroundings by a “frightened cry” and is met with the vision of “his dark sister 
struggling in the arms of a tall and fair-haired man.”  He does what any “sentimental” and 
“sympathetic” brother would do at the mere threat of his sister being sexually assaulted: 
grabbing what is at hand (in this case “a fallen limb”) and defending her.  Given the 
“pent-up hatred of his great black arm,” he inadvertently kills Henderson.  One is left 
wondering if he would have done so had his broader hopes not been so cruelly dashed.  
One is left wondering, as well, if Henderson would have put himself in such a 
compromising position had not his own ambitions been inhibited as well.  These 
questions, though, are mooted by the torturous logic/l ic of torture constituting the 
governmentality of the slave South.  “The Judge” rounds up a posse and lynches Jones, 
who is waiting for them at the scene of the “crime.”  Thus, Du Bois graphically illustrates 
how, as Mizruchi writes, “the ritual sacrifice of strangers” serves as the “monstrous 
fulfillment of the sympathy crisis: a frenzied unification of White sentiment, a 
segregated, incestuous sympathy gone wild.”41 
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 He also shows that whiteness pays as big a price for perpetuating this regime of 
sympathetic sentimentality as blackness does.  Confronted with “that haggard white-
haired man” that “the Judge” has been reduced to, Jones does not rage, does not run, but 
in a demonstration of affective resonance despite his dire situation “pitied him.”  This act 
of earth-bound grace is made possible by a final exercise of the aesthetic illegitimacy.  In 
response to the call of “the noise of horses galloping, galloping on,” Jones finds himself 
“softly humming” along with a “strange melody”: the bridal chorus from Lohengrin.42  
This citation is illegitimate in multiple ways.  First of all, this part of the opera comes 
from the beginning of the third act, which most like y would have been performed after 
Jones had been forced to leave the theater.  More importantly, he effects a slight change 
in the lyric he riffs on.  Jones sings, “Joyfully guided, draw near.”  In the original, 
however, the first word is “Faithfully.”  In the ultimate expression of singularity, Jones 
denies the injunction to “teach the darkies to be faith ul servants and laborers” and 
demands that the longings of “black men” be respected by being emulated.  If his 
fictional murderers do not hear him, those who read his tale do.  Du Bois’s story leaves 
us with the question of exactly how “sympathy” led to this state of affairs.  The answer 
has to do both with the historical conditions shaping postbellum America and with some 
of the most fundamental assumptions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
 
Teutonic Plague 
The discovery of personal whiteness among the world’s peoples is a very 
modern thing,—a nineteenth and twentieth century matter, indeed.  The 
ancient world would have laughed at such a distinctio .  The Middle Age 
regarded skin color with mild curiosity; and even up into the eighteenth 
century we were hammering our national manikins into one great, 
Universal Man, with fine frenzy which ignored color and race even more 
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than birth.  Today we have changed all that, and the world in a sudden, 
emotional conversion has discovered that it is white and by that token, 
wonderful! 
 
 W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Souls of 
White Folk” 
 
 In a rather infamous passage from Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson argues 
that “Negroes” are static and opaque entities.  He complains of “that eternal monotony, 
which reigns in their countenances, that immovable black veil which covers all the 
emotions of the other race.”  Here, as in Page, blackness is disfigured as the simultaneous 
absence (irreducibility to overconventionalized “sentiment”) and presence (ultimately 
undeniable embodiment of autonomous affect/affect of autonomy) of feeling.  In the 
opening pages of Souls, Du Bois takes up this Jeffersonian disfiguration  cast doubt 
upon the provenance of the “veil,” implying that in the end it is actually a projection of 
whiteness, always already in motion.  He makes plain that what are taken to be deep 
differences are in fact merely superficial.  This makes their positing, however, more 
rather than less harmful.  “I remember well when the s adow swept across me,” he 
writes.  As a prepubescent initiation into courtship rituals, the children at the public 
school Du Bois attended played a game in which theyexchanged visiting cards.  “The 
exchange was merry,” Du Bois notes, “till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my card,—
refused it peremptorily, with a glance.  Then it dawned upon me with a certain 
suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and 
longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil.” 43 
 That a “newcomer” can so easily push a long-time resident out of the “society” he 
had up until then felt to securely belong to and the unexpected quickness with which her 
gaze effects rejection underscores the degree to which t e presumption of being 
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“impartial” is a refraction of partiality rather than its inverse.  Through the intrusion of 
“polite society,” Du Bois is made the object of an ocularcentric spectatordom that 
simultaneously alienates and lays claim to him.  According to Victor Wolfenstein, this 
“situation of insult and injury both personal and racial” forms the “affective and 
aesthetic core” both of Souls.  It gives rise to a condition “where the freedom f self-
expression can be enjoyed” only after “the renunciation of the desire to be at home in the 
world of ordinary human intercourse and sympathy.”  The intertwining of alienation and 
“property” claims that Du Bois’s parody of sentimentality would dismantle, liberating 
estrangement as a positive potential for illegitimacy nd dispossession, is apparent in 
Jefferson’s Notes.  Shortly after positing the “immovable veil of black,” he seems to 
imply that it “covers all the emotions of the other race” only through a concerted 
demobilization undertaken by the “impartial spectator.”  Under the influence of 
emancipated blackness “the imagination is wild and extravagant, escapes incessantly 
from every restraint of reason and taste.”  But the imposition of “reasonableness” that 
Jefferson would prescribe as an antidote to this imag native unruliness is nothing other 
than “a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous pas ions”44  The stress of an illicit 
recognition of the singularity of blackness compromises a regime that seeks to preserve 
the “virtue” of whiteness.  The effort to ward off the incipient resonance blackness’s 
affective intensity elicits enlists the assistance of an ocularcentric occlusion.  The barrier 
erected here is a contrivance of the “impartial spectator” rather than an inherent 
“property” of those rendered a “spectacle.”  This “veil of blackness,” made “immovable,” 
is consequently invested with more significance and indelibility than a superficial and 
contingent feature warrants, framed as indicative of “deeper” differences that are 
 263 
assumed to necessitate inequalities.  This investment is able to be made only by 
overlooking the movement that instituted its beneficiary in the first place. 
 The “veil” that figures so significantly in both Jefferson and Du Bois is foreshadowed 
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  Smith argues that those labeled “savage”—of which 
he takes “a negro from the coast of Africa” to be ex mplary—are, from the vantage of an 
“impartial spectator,” “impenetrable” and therefore in ligible for admission into a 
“civilization” held together by orthodox moralism, a “society” that trades in “sentiment” 
to ensure “sympathy.”  This ineligibility is of their own making because they willfully 
“conceal the truth.”  But it is the prior assumption f overconventionalization on the part 
of the observer rather than a concerted effort on the part of the observed that leads to the 
belief that the latter not only “never express thems lves by any outward emotion” but are 
also “possessed” by “concealed” “passions” that are “mounted to the highest pitch of 
fury.”  The status of the “truth” Smith posits remains highly uncertain.  We can hear here 
the same sort of simultaneous projection and obscuration that we heard in Jefferson. The 
exclusion and exploitation of blackness and the ignora ce and insensitivity of whiteness 
are unforeseen yet inevitable consequences of certain overreachings and shortcomings 
that form the very foundation of sympathetic sentimentality.  For Smith sympathy is the 
glue that holds “society” together only insofar as it provides the means for evaluating the 
“propriety” of the actions undertaken by one’s neighbors and—with an additional degree 
of effort that requires a program of discipline—oneself.  By tracing the intricate workings 
of this spectatorial “impartiality” we can observe exactly how it is that Smith is able to 
take it for granted that “the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by 
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bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer” 
(my emphasis).45 
 Brought to the surface here are the fundamental role of imagination in the institution 
of sympathy and the normative ambitions of overconventionalized “sentiment.”  In 
making this maneuver Smith smuggles in his own unexamined assumptions; for, as 
David Marshall argues, in his account “sympathy depends upon a theatrical relation 
between a spectator and a spectacle.”  And this “theater of sympathy” is fundamentally 
structured by an ocularcentrism that deproblematizes th  doings of the “impartial 
spectator” at the cost of inhibiting the imagination from realizing its broadest potential as 
fully embodied responsivity.  Smith believes that “virtue” is achieved through submission 
to the protocols of overconventionalized “sentiments.”  They are in the end what enables 
us “to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast” (my 
emphasis).  This totalizing agreement is what motivates and rewards the sacrifices one 
has to make to assume the role of an “impartial spectator.”  It also demonizes and 
discards difference for the sake of securing a uniform positioning that wards off the 
flexibility that can be realized through a more mobile positionality.  Cramped by 
assuming a static pose, an actor in Smith’s ocularcent ic “theater of sympathy” enters the 
scene suffering, and thus “longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the 
entire concord of the affections of the spectator with his own” (my emphasis).  Laboring 
under this imperative of absolutism, however, “he can only hope to obtain this by 
lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spctators are capable of going along with 
him.”  “He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so,” Smith writes, “the sharpness of its 
natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concert with the emotions of those who 
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are about him.”  In the ocularcentric “society” that Smith is modeling actors can be 
sympathized with only to the extent that they gain “possession”—through “self-
mastery”—of “emotions” that are not actually their own.  The open-ended variety of the 
life of feeling/feeling of life is reduced to a closed set of overconventionalized sentiments 
that enforce the compulsory muting of affectively intense experience and thus cause pain 
where there could otherwise be joy.  Only thus is the so-called “harmony and concert” 
promised by sympathetic sentimentality secured.  Only thus does Smith feel “allowed to 
say so.”46 
 On Smith’s account, one gauges the propriety of other’s actions by imagining (more 
accurately, imaging, ocularcentrically) their life of feeling/feeling of life and judging 
whether one sympathizes with them—that is, whether they are what they “should be”: 
reducible to overconventionalized “sentiments.”  One gauges the propriety of one’s own 
actions by imaging the imagination of an average member of one’s society, 
superimposing it upon one’s own awareness of the situation, and judging whether that 
internalized other would sympathize with one’s motives.  As D.D. Raphael writes, an 
actor in Smith’s ocularcentric theater “has to imagine that he is an uninvolved spectator 
who in turn imagines himself to be in the position of the involved agent” and “ask 
himself whether the feelings that he imagines he would then experience do or do not 
correspond to the feelings that he actually experiences now.”  Thus is the “impartial 
spectator” instituted, installed as “the great inmate of the breast.”  Such a “feat of 
imagination doubling back on its tracks,” Raphael opines, “is not impossible but it seems 
too complicated to be a common experience.”  Or, rathe , the possibility that the 
mechanism of the “impartial spectator” aims for ultimately necessitates its undoing, 
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insofar as Smith’s desire for secure unity gets in the way of the duplicitous complications 
that are inevitable in the undertaking he proposes.  Smith wishes to forget that 
“impartiality” is always already partial, and thus inadvertently suggests that those 
assumed to be within the bounds of sympathetic sentim ality are relieved of the need to 
demonstrate their qualifications for inclusion, while those of the margins of this “society” 
have to make the case for their continued presence a d thereby cannot be embraced—
indeed, may need to be removed.  By parodying what Smi h would play straight, Du Bois 
not only brings these difficulties to the surface but rehabilitates spectatorial “impartiality” 
as “double-consciousness,” thus refiguring critical engagement as entailing alienation and 
intimacy rather than detachment and possession.  This is, indeed, “a strange experience.”  
But this does not imply that everyone could not potentially partake of it.  One endowed 
with double-consciousness embodies “a problem” insofar as he is immersed in “a world 
which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the 
revelation of the other world.”47  One must keep in mind the dual-voicedness of Du 
Bois’s parody to hear how this familiarity with estrangement opens out into singularity’s 
endogenous plurality.  Doubling leads to a tripling, that gives rise to a quadrupling . . . 
and so on—exactly through the disruption of so-called “self-consciousness.”  Involved 
here is not the denial of truth, but rather its reclamation and reactivation. 
 Resistance to this vast undertaking is registered by the fact that, as Du Bois plots it in 
the epigraph heading this section, a widespread “discovery of personal whiteness” 
followed immediately upon the fruition of “human sympathy.”  If we read Du Bois 
parodically, he can be heard to suggest that the finely frenzied ignorance that was 
practiced in eighteenth century Europe and came into maturity in nineteenth century 
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America involved not keeping an open mind when it came to matters of “color and race” 
but rather making tacit assumptions about this issue, prejudices couched like explosives 
at the base of a building set to be demolished, eventuating in what Du Bois calls “a 
sudden, emotional conversion.”  This eruption of whiteness—which is also a 
disfiguration of blackness—was predestined by normative sentimentality.  By the time he 
was finishing Souls—drafting “The Sorrow Songs,” its last chapter—the extent to which 
“white” Americans still clung to “impartial” spectatordom and were therefore resistant to 
“double-consciousness” left him with no other option than to bluntly confront “a 
headstrong, careless people” with the pointedly rhetorical question:  “Your country?  
How came it yours?”48  The phantom answer: “white” people have the United States 
because, to a large extent, “black” people made it for them.  Everyone is borrowing, 
especially those who deny it the most. 
 Emancipated blackness is “the most beautiful expression of human experience born 
this side the seas,” but those who pale in comparison stubbornly refuse to hear.  “It has 
been neglected, it has been, and is, half despised, and above all it has been persistently 
mistaken and misunderstood.”  “The Passing of the First-Born,” when audited in this 
context, sounds not only personal grief but political anguish, as the death of Du Bois’s 
infant son becomes emblematic of this broader fatality.  Du Bois narrates the funeral 
procession through the streets of Atlanta, registers the disrespect and disregard of the 
longings and strivings of “black men” that reigns esp cially in circumstances that seem to 
call for overwhelming sympathy.  “The busy city dinned about us,” Du Bois writes, “they 
did not say much, those pale-faced hurrying men and women; they did not say much,—
they only glanced and said, ‘Niggers!’”49  These “white” people want to alienate 
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blackness, keep it in its place and at a distance, ocularcentrically.  But, at the same time, 
they want to lay claim to it audibly, so much so that their epithet of choice saturates th  
atmosphere.  They want to profit by it and assume an insulting familiarity with it that 
forever threatens to pass over into fully embodied responsivity and thereby overturn 
itself.  In Du Bois, this sort of, to riff on Eric Lott, “love and theft” is evident most 
plainly in the Anglo-American reception of the “sorr w songs.”  It is on the ground of the 
spirituals that he stakes his strongest case for emancipated blackness, as well as for the 
aesthetics of illegitimacy and politics of dispossession it opens up. 
 
Sounding Joy 
It was the Supreme Adventure, in the last Great Battle of the West, for that 
of human freedom which would release the human spirit from lower lust 
for mere meat, and set it free to dream and sing. . . . And then some unjust 
God leaned, laughing, over the ramparts of heaven and dropped a black 
man in the midst. . . . It transformed the world.  It turned democracy back 
to Roman Imperialism and Fascism; it restored caste nd oligarchy; it 
replaced freedom with slavery and withdrew the name of humanity from 
the vast majority of human beings. . . . But not without struggle.  Not 
without writhing and rending of spirit and pitiable wail of lost souls. . . . A 
great song arose, the loveliest thing born this side of the seas. . . . It was a 
new song and its deep and plaintive beauty, its great cadences and wild 
appeal wailed, throbbed and thundered on the world’s ears with a message 
seldom voiced by man.  It swelled and blossomed like incense, improvised 
and born anew out of an age long past, and weaving into its texture the old 
and new melodies in word and in thought. 
 
 W.E.B. Du Bois, Black 
Reconstruction in America, 
1860-1880 
 
I have seen and known several persons who have been ex rcised with 
falling down, jumping up, clapping of hands, and screaming, all in a 
manner to disturb the whole congregation, who could habitually when at 
home, live careless and sometimes trifling lives.  They appeared to make 
religion a business of passion and emotion, and studied most to acquire 
occasional frames and feelings. . . . We have too, a growing evil, in the 
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practice of singing in our places of public and society worship, merry airs, 
adapted from old songs, to hymns of our composing: often miserable as 
poetry, and senseless as matter, and most frequently composed and first 
sung by the illiterate blacks of the society.  Thus instead of inculcating 
sober christianity in them who have least wisdom to govern themselves; 
lifting them into spiritual pride and to an undue estimation of their 
usefulness[.]  Here ought to be considered too, a more exceptionable error, 
which has the tolerance at least of the rulers of our camp meetings.  In the 
blacks’ quarter, the coloured people get together, and sig for hours 
together, short scraps of disjoined affirmations, pledges, or prayers, 
lengthened out with long repetition choruses. 
 
 John Fanning Watson, Methodist 
Error 
 
 Shortly after Du Bois composed the journal entry that heads this chapter he 
experienced firsthand what he renders in a third-person narrative forty years later in the 
passage from Black Reconstruction that opens this section.  In “The Shadow of Years,” 
the first essay in Darkwater, he builds up to the earlier occurrence by way of conveying 
the atmosphere within which he discovered and cultivated the hopes propelling the 
celebratory dedication to what would become his life’s work.  Du Bois’s twenty-fifth 
birthday occurred while he was pursuing graduate studies in Europe.  During this 
transatlantic sojourn, the world opened up for him: hints of an antiracist globality 
flickered on his horizon: 
 On mountain and valley, in home and school, I met n and women as 
I had never met them before.  Slowly they became, not white folks, but 
folks.  The unity beneath all life clutched me.  I was not less fanatically a 
Negro, but “Negro” meant a greater, broader sense of humanity and 
world-fellowship.  I felt myself standing, not against the world, but simply 
against American narrowness and color prejudice, with the greater, finer 
world at my back urging me on. 
 
But when the fellowship that was financing his European education ran out, he was 
forced to return home to “Days of Disillusion”:  “I dreamed and loved and wandered and 
sang; then, after two long years, I dropped suddenly back into ‘nigger’-hating 
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America.”50  In our considerations of double-consciousness, we usually think of it as 
something momentary: a flash of insight, a flinch against surroundings that have 
suddenly become predatory.  The juxtaposition of these two passages, however, 
illustrates a case in which double-consciousness is a matter of facing an insistent situation 
that recurs irregularly over the course of a lifetime.  It is only through bridging the 
temporal expanse, superimposing the end of the passage from Darkwater and the 
beginning of that from Black Reconstruction, that the dual phrasing of Du Bois’s parody 
sounds to its fullest.  By making this connection, we observe how the gesture towards 
universality made by a counter-racist raciality is too easily assimilated and consequently 
defused by “the Universal.”  It is also made plain, however, that the problem at hand is 
not so much the presence of an enthusiastic blackness upon the American scene, but 
rather the way it is disfigured by a racist “society.”  These overconventionalizations get 
in the way of “Negroes” transforming themselves into “black men,” but at the same time 
they offer a point of friction against which the moentum for making this very move can 
be generated.  This is the work that the “sorrow song ” do: registering, with spirit, the 
pain inflicted by “the Universal”; joyously mending a rent universality; sounding a 
counter-racist raciality through the cracks of a calcified white supremacy. 
 Just as the career of double-consciousness is often truncated, so too is that of the 
music that it gives rise to and is inspired by.  The spirituals are for the most part 
considered solely via their modified concert renditions and the transcriptions on which 
they were based.  Consequently, as Albert Raboteau argues, the “sorrow songs” are often 
reduced to merely “words and notes printed on a page.”  When Du Bois implies, in the 
passage from Black Reconstruction cited above, that the spirituals mark the inception of 
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African American agency, he suggests that they sound strains deeper than those 
foregrounded around the time he was writing Souls.  In order to pick up the Ellisonian 
“lower frequencies” of the “sorrow songs,” attentive listeners need to, as Raboteau 
writes, “imagine them as performed” in contexts other than the formal concert setting 
instituted by the Western classical tradition.  One of these would obviously be the black 
church, which Du Bois got a taste of while he was teaching in rural Tennessee.  Further, 
in sampling this music within the context of African American worship, Du Bois 
subliminally picked up on certain intangible traces of earlier settings that shaped the 
black spirituality of his time.  These faint echoes take us back to the turn of the 19th 
century to revisit the massive, miscegenated happenings orchestrated by heterodox 
evangelical sects—particularly the Methodists—on the margins of the South: “camp 
meetings.”  In a move that prefigures the way James paradoxically secularizes religion by 
defining it in terms of cultivating “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men” 
rather than instituting churches or adhering to dogma, these multi-day outdoor festivals 
were enacted in order to open an ever-widening circle of individuals to certain affectively 
intense experiences.51  “Camp meetings” provided an escape—all the more precious and 
powerful for being transitory and interstitial—from the overconventions of slave 
“society.”  African Americans not only participated in these gatherings but were among 
their leaders.  Through a motley ensemble of syncretic artistic practices—singing, 
dancing, exhortation, enthusiasm, ecstasy—that fall under the figure of the “ring shout,” 
emancipated blackness was embodied as an enjoyment of freedom/freedom to enjoy (all 
the more poignant for being achieved under conditions f enslavement), offering 
participants of European descent a model for reaching towards the altered states that were 
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the raison d’être of “camp meetings.”  Here we can witness an early instance of people 
conventionally labeled “white” willingly, self-consciously, jubilantly learning from 
African Americans.  We can also hear how blackness sounds itself out not as the property 
of a group of people conventionally labeled “black” but rather through ongoing processes 
of interaction and borrowing among multiple groups from a variety of backgrounds.  
Thus, an aesthetics of illegitimacy sows the seeds of a politics of dispossession.  Most 
telling for our purposes, however, it was through the immersive enaction of the “ring 
shout” at “camp meetings” that the spirituals were first cobbled together and began to be 
broadcast.  Within this context, not only singing but listening involved the mobilization 
of fully embodied responsivity. 
 When Du Bois cites the spirituals, it is this performative ambiance that he seeks to 
draw his readers into.  A couple of barriers, however, stood in his way.  First, by the time 
Du Bois was writing, the particular pocket of liminality opened at the intersection of 
“camp meetings” and “ring shout” had long been closed.  By the 1820s, as presaged by 
the passage from Watson above, published in the last ye r of the ’teens, evangelicals—
especially Methodists, who would soon be practicing the most popular form of 
Protestantism in America—were making the move from sect to denomination, 
abandoning dissent and seeking “respectability.”  In part, this meant making 
compromises with the regime of overconvention that governed the slave South.  The 
focus of their practice shifted from affect and exprience to institution and orthodox 
doctrine, and they began distancing themselves fromthe things that previously went on at 
“camp meetings.”  This meant, in particular, disappearing the “ring shout” from the stage.  
As we can hear in the words of Watson, a concerted effort was made to alienate the 
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blackness that not so long ago had been at the heart of Methodist vernacular.  Those 
qualities associated with it—spirited embodiment, a enactive approach to expression, 
improvised musicality, mobilizations of language in which the written or printed word 
was peripheral—were made taboo.  What is more, Watson put his finger forcefully upon 
what he believed to be the most “exceptionable” Methodist error: allowing African 
Americans a venue in which to cooperatively work out techniques of expressive 
autonomy.  By Du Bois’s own postbellum moment, the singing of spirituals had found a 
way to work its way through this dense cloud of censorship but it had in large part done 
so by downplaying the wildness of its appeal.  This dulled voicing was exactly what its 
predominantly “white” audience craved.  It was such attempts to simultaneously alienate 
and lay claim to blackness that triggered Du Bois’s double-consciousness, set it vibrating 
at such a pitch that his own attempt to properly modulate what he had to say was shaken 
up by his consternation at the insolubility of his “strange experience” of “being a 
problem.”52 
 In “Of Beauty and Death,” the last essay in Darkwater, Du Bois responds to the 
accusation of at least one “pale friend” that he ovrreacts to this stubborn conundrum, 
that he is “too sensitive.”  “I admit,” he writes, “I am—sensitive.  I am artificial.”  The 
hyphen here serves both to insist upon Du Bois’s exi t nce as a problem that cannot be 
neatly swept away and to imply that “sensitivity” is not quite the right word for what it 
feels like to labor under these constraints.  It will do, for now.  But only by being 
immediately qualified as being “artificial.”  The artificiality of Du Bois’s cultivated 
sensitivity is a consequence of its departure from the naturalization of 
overconventionalized sentiment.  It is an assertion of the ongoing naturing that is 
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autonomous affect/affect of autonomy.  Artificial sen itivity is singularity living under 
the stress and strain of everyday racism.  Du Bois attempts to give his interlocutor a sense 
of what this is like by providing a catalog of insult  and injuries in the form of “a day in 
the life,” only to be faced with the charge of once again exaggerating.  In his own 
defense, Du Bois tries to key his audience into the fact that insofar as these acts of 
violence are racialized, their reality is virtual as well as actual.  And the very real impact 
of their virtuality, encoded in the cadence of the passage below, should not be 
underestimated: 
They do happen.  Not all each day,—surely not.  Butnow and then—now 
seldom, now, sudden; now after a week, now in a chain of awful minutes; 
not everywhere, but anywhere—in Boston, in Atlanta.  That’s the hell of 
it.  Imagine spending your life looking for insults or for hiding places from 
them—shrinking (instinctively and despite desperate bolsterings of 
courage) from blows that are not always but ever; not each day, but each 
week, each month, each year. 
 
Du Bois responds to this dilemma by making the virtual reality generated through 
racialization his own.  Artificial sensitivity opens out into counter-racist raciality.  The 
emancipated blackness that Du Bois works with is a repertoire of affective techniques, a 
matter of both inborn capacity and cultivated aptitude.  According to his account in Dusk 
of Dawn, he was raised like any other child growing up in New England.  Thus, “racial 
feeling was then purely a matter of my own later lea ning and reaction.”  Because this 
artificial sensitivity tapped autonomous affect/affect of autonomy, however, “it was 
nonetheless real and a large determinant of my life and character.”  The virtual reality of 
this raciality made it something Du Bois could “feel better than explain.”  Being a 
“Negro”—especially one who is attempting to become a “black man”—involves “an 
intensity of feeling” that is “difficult, strangely difficult, to translate . . . into words.”  
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“Nevertheless,” Du Bois insists, “as the feeling is deep the greater the impelling force to 
seek to express it.”53   
 The spirituals were a key component in the education that set the stage for his 
program of counter-racist raciality.  It was by infusing their music into his writing that he 
was able to begin articulating this project, engaging the existential problematic of 
expressing singularity in order to trigger the staggered enaction of affective resonance.  
Through this means Du Bois sought not only to persuade his “white” audience to learn 
from blackness, but also to make themselves open to the possibility of embodying it 
themselves.  He sought to broadcast his aesthetics of llegitimacy and politics of 
dispossession by eliciting ethical attunement.  Du Bois’s “later learning” of the affective 
techniques of blackness can be considered to have begun when, while he was in high 
school, a concert was given in the provincial Massachusetts town where he grew up by a 
group of spiritual singers.  “I was thrilled and moved to tears and seemed to recognize 
something inherently and deeply my own,” he writes.  At the same time, he was aware 
that this initial exposure to “Negro folksong” was “second hand.”  After moving on to 
Fisk, he was able to make more intimate contact with the “sorrow songs” during “a 
Southern Negro revival” he attended in rural Tennesse , experiencing an “intense 
excitement.”54  Du Bois attempted to trigger a reenactment of such an immersive 
experience on the part of his readers by evoking the a mosphere at the intersection of 
“camp meetings” and “ring shout,” understood not so much as historical locations and 
occurrences as an imaginative spacetime, one suffused with fully embodied responsivity.  
The tactic he used to thus emulate the effects of music in writing was to render the 
artifacts taken to be most representative of the spirituals fragmentary.  By providing only 
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a few bars from transcriptions, without the words, at the heading of each essay, Du Bois 
was prompting his readers to supply what was missing, initiating an enactive literature 
that would elicit bodily responses through which the ambiance of “camp meetings” and 
the “ring shout” could be imaginatively invoked.  According to Weheliye, Du Bois was 
able to enact blackness and elicit attunement by using compositional operations similar to 
those utilized by contemporary DJs.  An unstated corollary to this argument is that the 
experience Du Bois’s contemporaries had with the emrgent technology of the 
phonograph enabled them to interact with his writing in a way that facilitated his desired 
result.  As my own portrait of Du Bois as a hiphop producer before the letter suggests, 
our own experiences today with a gamut of sound technologies—from multitrack 
recorders to digital samplers, Walkmen to iPods—grants us an even greater facility for 
catching on to his model of literature as the staggered enaction of affective resonance.  In 
this sense, listening to and enjoying hiphop—as well as taking the time to understand the 
way in which it is made—prepares one to read Du Bois in the immersive, embodied, 
affectively intense manner he sought to stimulate and, by extension, can also provide 
novel approaches to the respective works of Stein and J mes. 
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 My project is counterhistorical in two related ways.  It seeks to tell a story that cuts 
against the grain of the “official” record and it does so by undertaking an engagement 
with that past motivated by concerns grounded in the present.  Listening through the filter 
of my ethnographic fieldwork in Detroit, I heard James as a hiphop lyricist before the 
letter, enacting a sound-drenched performance art th t is instrumental, in multiple senses, 
rather than merely incidental to the effort of conveying his distinctive brand of feelingful 
thinking.  Pragmatism, that is, was as much an art as i was a philosophy.  Sounding it as 
improvisational lyricism foregrounds how fundamental an engagement with the aesthetic
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 dimension is to its interdependent communicative and speculative ambitions.  This 
comes most prominently to the fore in Varieties, where James sought to infuse language 
with the musicality—that is, the affective intensity—of experience in order to confront 
the existential problematic of singularity.  The central problem that James and his 
students struggled with was that what one finds most eaningful is also that which is 
most difficult to communicate, that one sounds the de pest strains of one’s interiority 
only by coming in the closest possible touch with exteriority.  Hiphop picks up where 
they left off, utilizing newly developed resources to address this ultimately insoluble 
conundrum. 
 The upshot of all this is an appreciation for the way in which James, responsive to the 
novel contingencies of the modern world and the needs of its inhabitants, paradoxically 
secularized religion, taking it beyond what it would be if restricted to existing institutions 
and dogma.  This same move is evident in the work of contemporary hiphop artists.  A 
case in point is Erykah Badu’s “The Healer,” produced by the inestimable Madlib.  
Constructed as a call-and-response pattern between th  titular figure and a singularly 
plural voicing designated “The Children” (both vocalized by Badu), this song functions 
both as a psalm for hiphop and a eulogy for one of its foremost sacred technicians: the 
late great J Dilla (Madlib’s kindred spirit).  Much of what the “The Children” have to say 
boils down to the insistent chant “hiphop” (the italics here indicating that these syllables 
are sung).  They seem to know what they are but seek guidance for their efforts to realize 
their multifarious potentiality, and “The Healer” attempts to steer them in the right 
direction.  Replying to their signature chanting, he informs them that “it’s bigger than 
religion” and consequently also “bigger than the government.”  By constituting itself as 
 281 
an enactive art that elicits fully embodied responsivity, hiphop surfaces a sociality before 
and beyond any instituted “society,” sounds an ethics of attunement—an ongoing process 
of working through and with the partialities of affective resonance to redefine 
communion, communication, and community—that, if realized, would work to  overturn 
existing political regimes.  According to the terms of this postreligious spirituality, the 
superstitious is demystified, shown to be an emergent property of cutting-edge 
technology.  This is evidenced both in the lines from Pharoahe Monch that serve as the 
epigram for this Conclusion and in Badu’s song.  In addition to their “hiphop” chant, as a 
direct corollary, “The Children” also insist on their continued vitality: 
we ain’t 
dead said the children 
don’t believe it 
we just made ourselves invisible 
. . .  
I told you 
we ain’t dead yet 
we’ve been living through you internet 
 
The exemplars of hiphop are “invisible,” but neverth less exist as an assemblage of 
affective techniques coursing through a global sound system of iPods and MP3s.  “The 
Children” are both the senders and receivers in this recursive network.  Every 
pronouncement they make is followed by an equally insistent refrain: a sampled “hungry 
hungry hungry hungry.”  This music is the source of its own sustenance, both its 
nourishment and that which builds up its appetite again.  The Jamesian paradox, as spun 
by hiphop, issues in an immersive spacetime for innovative performances of 
embodiment. 
 As I intimated at the end of the previous chapter, this zone at the crossroads of affect 
and experience was broached already at the turn of the nineteenth century by 
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experimental evangelists operating on the fringes of the antebellum South.  As Richard 
Rabinowitz shows, it is also tapped in the “devotionalist” exercises through which a 
strain of New England Congregationalism was enacted, which remained vibrant up to the 
brink of the twentieth century.  “Devotionalism offered an escape,” Rabinowitz writes, “a 
way to attenuate the social pressures of playing one’s assigned role with great 
scrupulosity without leaving the religious sphere.”  It was able to make this departure 
from convention by “making religious feelings into g als worthy in themselves” and 
“finding the best technical means for producing such feelings.”  Devotionalists, in effect, 
enacted religion as the capacity for and cultivation of affectively intense experience.  This 
is how they foregrounded and asserted their singularity,  singularity that was 
endogenously plural insofar as it constituted “a kind of internal ‘society’”—a sociality 
before and beyond any institutionalization of the “social”—through “projecting one’s 
inner feelings as an extreme otherness,” infusing interiority into exteriority.  In short, as 
Rabinowitz writes, “devotionalists felt that the inte sity of their personal experience set 
them apart from those Christians whose claims resided only in proper behavior.”  By 
calling on the “powerful penetration of intense affections . . . to replace the dull 
obligations of one’s role in moralist organizations,” devotionalists practiced an ethic 
according to which “the right thing was more often done in opposition to what others 
were supposed to think.”  In doing so, they made “a step toward empowering the mind to 
create its own world” that entailed “the newly developed sense of the history of one’s life 
as a work of art.”1  They forecasted a radically constructivist epistemology made 
operational through artistic enaction.  In doing so, they provided not only the immediate 
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background against which James wrote Varieties, but instantiated a model that both Stein 
and Du Bois would seek to emulate and update throug their own efforts and careers. 
 By picking up and expanding on the way James sought to infuse the printed version 
of his lectures with traces of the oratorical situation through which they were originally 
delivered, Stein and Du Bois developed a model of literature as the staggered enaction of 
affective resonance.  Engaging the existential problematic of expressing singularity, Stein 
developed a prototype for a media technology through which affective intensity could be 
always incompletely restaged across spatial distances and temporal gaps, which Du Bois 
refined and wheeled out for use by the multitude.  In doing so, they choreographed an 
interaction of self and environment that went beyond the devotionalists.  For, as it turns 
out, the latter remained attached to certain scraps of dogma that prevented them from 
living up to the examples they set.  For them, “a number of dangers lurked in identifying 
deeply moving experiences with the life of faith.”  In particular, and most acutely, by 
clinging to “the inner self as the only safe refuge from the disappointments of social life,” 
“the alarming discovery was made that no self was there.”  But, as Stein and Du Bois 
discovered, danger became promising when faith ceased being a matter of allegiance to a 
celestial power placed at an infinite distance and became instead participation in the 
worldly ambiance of immersive creativity.  Through this unleashing of fully embodied 
responsivity, the self becomes less a static entity than a dynamic process.  And thereby an 
“alarming discovery” becomes an exciting possibility.  For, if allowed to play itself out to 
its fullest, affectively intense experience shows, as Abraham Maslow argues, “that 
precisely those persons who have the clearest and strongest identity are exactly the ones 
who are most able to transcend the ego or the self and to become selfless.”  This is not the 
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nihilation of self but rather its expansion.  It does not disappear so much as become 
diaphanous.  As Mihaly Csikzentmihaly illustrates, a person who immerses herself in the 
embodiment of an enactive art “no longer feels likea separate individual, yet her self 
becomes stronger.”  She “grows beyond the limits of her individuality by investing 
psychic energy in a system in which she is included.”   By engaging the existential 
problematic of expressing singularity, coupling interiority with exteriority in order to 
communicate what is most intricately meaningful andthus least simply communicable, 
“the self emerges at a higher level of complexity.”2  These are things Stein and Du Bois 
realized as they repurposed a paradoxically secularized eligion into a postreligious 
spirituality that would be most fully realized by those who would follow in their 
footsteps.  In making this move, they each made themselves emblematic of a stream of 
experimental endeavor feeding into hiphop and thereby facilitating its channeling of a 
Jamesian aesthetics of constructive dissonance, or illegitimacy: mixed-media poetics and 
the art of blackness. 
 It is only after this long review that I realize tha  I have been concerned with the 
existential problematic of expressing singularity, affectively intense experience, the 
staggered enaction of affective resonance, and the ethics of attunement from the very 
beginning.  This constellation came together through my aesthetic engagement with 
hiphop.  My consideration of James, Stein, and Du Bois came later and served as a means 
of unfolding this knot of thematic density, developing an improvisationally lyrical 
phraseology of my own, enabling a more nuanced account of “the interaction between 
personal development and artistic achievement” withhich I began.  Of particular 
importance in making this move from music to literau e, from the methods of musicians 
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to the way I myself went about doing scholarship, were my interactions with my 
ethnographic consultants around the issue of freestylin, hiphop’s take on improvisational 
lyricism.  Pertinent here are not only face-to-face encounters like the interview I 
conducted with the Breakfast Club, but—perhaps even more so—my listening to the 
sound recording of this interview and my efforts to satisfactorily transcribe it.  Let me 
immerse you in the moment: I unplug my headphones from the sampler that sits on my 
desk next to my laptop.  I plug them into my portable tape recorder and begin listening to 
the recording of our talking, thumb on the speed-control dial to slow down the tape at 
crucial moments, to open up the words and stretch out their sounds.  My concern is not 
merely to understand (or remember, since it all made perfect sense to me at the time) 
what Lacks, Tone, El, and I were saying.  More to the point, I am trying to develop a way 
to visually echo the sounds of these words and in do g so be true to the experience of the 
interview, retain the sense of that time.  Throughout this recomposition I am guided by 
“yaknowwhati’msayin,” and in the process I become aware that this phrase is the sound I 
am trying to resound in concentrated form, stretching out and winding its way through all 
the words.  Somehow the visual fixity of my writing has to reverberate with the 
movement of this sound, capture it without reducing it to simply a straight line. 
 As the linguist Dwight Bolinger notes, the “stream of sound that issues from the 
human voice box can be cut up into many kinds of segments, some of which everyone 
knows or thinks he knows.”  He cites sentences, clauses, and syllables as examples.  “But 
running through this fabric of organized sound,” he writes, “is a master thread that holds 
it all together and by its weavings up and down and in and out shows the design as a 
whole.”3  This is particularly true, I would argue, of hiphop lyricism, especially as it is 
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composed through freestylin.  For the most part hiphop lyrics have been analyzed in 
terms of their literal or figurative word content.  Some attention has been paid to the 
rhythmic and percussive flow of the words.  In short, in approaching lyrics scholars have 
started with words and only afterwards, if at all, considered sound.  To a large extent this 
orientation is the result of assessing meaning on the basis of hasty transcriptions and 
therefore overlooking the processes through which lyrics are made.  Through my 
ethnographic research I found that MCs often, especially when they are improvising, start 
with sounds rather than words.  Or, better, they trat words like sounds from the 
beginning, infusing music into language and thereby r organizing its standard patterns.  
This discovery has led me to insist that rather than content or flow, what I call style is the 
most meaningful element of hiphop lyricism.  Style, in short, is a way of working through 
a mix of tune and timbre to make use of, coordinate, nd transform the resources of 
content and flow.  Content and flow are important, but without style they lose that aspect 
of meaning that is most fundamental to the art of hiphop lyricism. 
 Thus, I would say that hiphop lyricism renews langua e by emphasizing sound, 
thereby making language an element in a broader musical composition.  To a 
considerable degree, this stylin consists of weaving o e’s voice through a track’s collage 
of sampled and layered tones and timbres in a way that is fresh, dope, wild, chill.  In the 
process of doing so, however, the MC creates distinctive patterns of accentuation that 
make the style his or her own—make it seem as if the music was made precisely to 
channel his or her voice—that are often the most noticeable elements of stylin.  As 
Bolinger writes, such “points of emphasis” are made “naturally by the human voice.”  
But the freestylin MC has developed an unusual awareness for this ordinary occurrence, 
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has a sense for how to coordinate his or her voice w th music, recreate it through music’s 
influence to keep innovating new styles, in effect remaking (or at the very least actively 
working through) nature.  Bolinger suggests that stylin “can only be suggested in 
writing,” but I would argue that this is true only if we assume writing itself cannot be 
remade.4  In hiphop lyricism, all stylin is freestylin, in the sense that the emphasis on 
sound that MCs develop through improvisational performance without exception informs 
the craft of writing lyrics.  This is not to say that the influence is not mutual, that the 
experience of writing does not in turn inspire unprecedented performances.  But I would 
say that writing plays a role in an MC’s continuing musical development only insofar as 
it has itself been reshaped through a unique sense for ound. 
 Saying that all stylin is freestylin is not meant to imply that freestylin is simply a
style.  Rather, it is an approach to style in general, a way of using different styles during 
the course of ongoing stylin, an openness to whatever styles—and therefore whatever 
contents and flows—suit the continuing musical development of an MC.  Or as Tone and 
Lacks explained it to me: 
T: Freestylin is whatever you feel by the time you dne picked the mic up 
or the beat drops, yaknowwhati’msayin. 
L : Freestylin is the expression of your heart. 
T: Word up. 
L : Without havin to confine yourself to content.  Any sorta content.  It’s 
gonna expose what your style is.  What your personality is.  Or it’s an 
expression of your heart, what your personality is. 
T: Yaknowwhati’msayin.  Just some clever rhymes, man, on the stage. 
L : Yeah. 
T: Take the stage any beat, rock it, look at the crowd you see your 
peoples.  Yaknowwhati’msayin, it’s just whatwhats’up, man, get right up 
here, yaknowwhati’msayin. 
L : The reciprocation.  I feel you, man.  The reciprocation.  Your 
consciousness. 
R: Flip it upside down? 
L : But you get it back.5 
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Freestylin is working through your sense for sound in the heat of the moment and being 
able to rock any beat.  It is maintaining style—and therefore personality—as an ongoing 
process rather than a static accomplishment, a stylin that remains open to the unexpected 
and new.  To express heart means to confront potentially dissonant elements—an odd 
beat and one’s all too limited voice—and mix them constructively, not necessarily 
resolving the tension but making it sound good, making something listeners can feel. 
Freestylin is both a means of divergence and a thred of coherence running throughout 
hiphop culture.  As such, it is one of the interwoven streams of hiphop style’s way of 
shaping a complex aesthetic system, and thereby making  dynamic way of life. 
 As the end of this last exchange suggests, during the course of our interviews—as 
well as through their examples as artists—Hodge and L cks were teaching me how to 
freestyle.  Some dissonance occurs around the word “reciprocation.”  I take it in the sense 
of “reciprocal”—inverting a fraction—whereas Lacks takes it in the more active sense of 
“reciprocate”—giving back what you receive.  But rather than brushing my meaning off, 
he manages to combine it with his to make a more complex yet coherent sense out of our 
initially divergent elements—flipping something in a way that gives it back.  Since words 
here are sounds, vibrations rather than static images, dissonance can be treated 
constructively rather than avoided or taken to mean an incoherent wavering between 
extremes.  Through experiences like these I came to r alize the degree to which art 
shapes life through hiphop style.  Learning this, I began to develop a way of studying 
hiphop that approaches art not merely as a topic, but also as an example, a way of 
studying aesthetics that aspires to be a form of hiphop itself.  I became aware of this 
possibility and of my ability to pursue its development through my experience of 
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“yaknowwhati’msayin”—hearing it live and on record, thinking through it, and working 
to resound it.  Quite simply, “yaknowwhati’msayin” was the most persistent theme 
running through my interactions with the Breakfast Club.  A line like 
“Yaknowwhati’msayin, it’s just whatwhats’up, man, get right up here, 
yaknowwhati’msayin” may seem somewhat meaningless ju t written down like this, but 
it is in fact overflowing with meaning for me, both as I first heard it and as I transcribed 
and read it and reread it again and tried to craft an even better transcription.  And this 
excessive meaning comes from more than just the line’s context within a longer course of 
discussion.  More than anything this meaningful surplus results from the weight of 
“yaknowwhati’msayin.”  Rather than mere hesitation, pause, or elongation—something 
like “um”—“yaknowwhati’msayin” is a nodal point of style composed through the weave 
of hiphop’s sound sensibility. 
 It never occurred to me to transcribe it as “you know what I’m saying.”  I did try at 
first to write it as “ya know what i’m sayin,” but this felt too much like breaking a chord 
into its component notes.  All the overtones and voicings were lost, which in this case 
were most of the meaning.  It comes as one chunk, heavily but evenly percussive.  Not: 
“yaknowwhati’msayin,” “yaknowwhati’msayin,” or any other such variation.  Just: 
“yaknowwhati’msayin.”  There is variation, but this occurs within the even percussive 
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basic form sounds like a statement, the first variation sounds like a question and the latter 
sounds like a gentle command, a reminder to pay attention to what is being said.  Most of 
the meaning of the phrase works through the simultanei y of this percussive evenness and 
tonal variance, insofar as it can take on a rich variety of subtly divergent senses while at 
the same time maintaining a loose but steady coherenc .  Through the filter of this sound 
mixing, its word elements carry a persistent yet uniq e content, slightly different from 
what they mean if they were first taken as separate words and only afterwards considered 
as a combined stream of sound.  Content-wise “yaknowwhati’msayin” means less “you 
understand what I’m talking about” and more “I’m talking in a particular way that you 
and I share.”  It means “you understand my talking because you know what it feels like to 
talk this way” or “you know what I’m talking about because you know how it feels.”  
“We’ve had similar experiences and we know what they m an because we have a sense 
for that kind of thing.”  In short, it is a way of emphasizing and thereby sharing affect 
through words by treating them like sounds. 
 By sharing “yaknowwhati’msayin” with me—teaching it to me through their 
examples and in doing so making me aware that it was something I felt and did before I 
learned to purposefully think through it—Lacks and Hodge led me to consider the 
possibility that hiphop could be not only an art bualso a way of studying aesthetics.  
“Hiphop, man,” Hodge warned me, “I mean a lot of peo l  go to real lengths to put a 
label on it.  It ain’t music.  It’s not necessarily culture, either.  It’s vaster, 
yaknowwhati’msayin.  It goes deeper than just the culture.”  For him, it began as “a 
curiosity,” then it became “a game.”  “But,” Hodge added, 
beyond that, yaknowwhati’msayin, it’s like it’s like a family member 
almost, yaknowwhati’msayin.  You take it for granted a lot.  But at all 
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points of time it’s a part of you, yaknowwhati’msayin.  You don’t even 
think about it anymore.  You’re at that point, yaknowwhati’msayin. 
 
As Lacks went on to explain, “hiphop is a state of being, yaknowwhati’msayin.”  It is that 
aesthetic existence that makes you curious, and you start playing around with it.  Before 
long it becomes less like a game and more like a mission, something you stick with and 
that you are stuck with even though, as Hodge puts it, “you ain’t into it sometimes.”  In 
that sense, “it’s like a family member.”  Or better, “it’s a part of you.”  It is a clue to a 
continuously new you, which for Lacks makes it “like an escape from oppression.”  To 
evade constriction, however, is not to avoid coherence, but rather to redefine what 
coherence means.  When talking about hiphop, Lacks told me, “there’s only one way to 
understand what’s being said and that’s to live it, yaknowwhati’msayin.  If you don’t live 
it, you won’t ever get it.  You’ll be a fake and anyo e can tell if you bein fake or not and 
they won’t feel it.  And that’s the whole thing.”  To be a fake is not to feel or be felt, not 
to put your heart into it.  To live it means to actively organize your experience through 
hiphop’s aesthetic, and therefore make it meaningful. 
 Hiphop, Lacks insisted is “who you are.  It’s who you are.  It’s who you are and it 
screws us up if you ain’t bein real with it, then it ain’t.  It’s like two left feet if it ain’t 
real.”  Note, however, that as far as hiphop goes not being real is not just awkwardness.  
It is awkwardness that results from trying too much to be in control, to “put a label” on 
hiphop, to keep treating it like a game even after “you’re at that point, 
yaknowwhati’msayin,” to lose your curiosity.  To bereal, to be true to the style of 
hiphop, means improvisational lyricism as a way of life, participating in the composition 
of art through the process of self-creation.  Having learned this from Lacks and Hodge, I 
developed a sense for studying hiphop as a way of working to form a new element, a new 
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stream of hiphop activity.  To study hiphop means to challenge the degree to which we 
“take it for granted.”  Particularly, it means to question the assumption that once hiphop 
becomes “a part of you” you “don’t even think about it anymore.”  But this renewed 
emphasis on curiosity does not necessarily mean gettin  hiphop out of your system.  
Rather, it means taking hiphop to be a way of studying as well as a topic of study, both “a 
state of being” and a way of thinking though that st e of being.  Hiphop’s sound 
sensibility becomes not merely a way of feeling, but a way of feelingful thinking, a way 
of thinking through feeling, and feeling as a way of thinking.  It is this affective 
exploration that I heard echoed in James and studens, a d that I have mobilized to put a 
new spin on their work. 
 
Listening Transcription: A Methodological Coda 
 “Yaknowwhat’msayin” is a manifestation of hiphop lyricism in casual conversation.  
My experiments in transcribing it not only attempt to simulate its sound in writing but in 
doing so constitute a new application of the enactive model of literature James, Stein, and 
Du Bois pursued.  In this coda, I would like to briefly illustrate how this “listening 
transcription” can be used to work with not only occasional phrases but exemplary 
verses.  Once again, immerse yourself in the moment:  Press play and the first sound 
Boogie Down Productions’ “Poetry” makes is a syncopated and looped triplet, a bass line 
that is either synthetic or heavily filtered.  A percussive collage of sampled drums in 
between drum machine hits backs and follows the bass.  A James Brown scream, framed 
and flickering like a snapshot caught in the act, is followed by DJ Scott La Rock 
scratching in an anonymous “get down.”  A strummed guitar riff simultaneously 
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completes the sonic landscape and marks its perpetual incompletion, ushering in a 
chopping-up and flipping-around of the cobbled drum pattern.  This jagged and shifty 









ten to the 










in  if  this is a 
tape










 not a dem
o in fact  call 
it
 
a lecture a visual 
picture  sort of a po
etic and rhythm like mixture listen 
 I’m not dissin but there’s somethin that you’re miss
in  maybe you 
should 
touch
 reality stop wish
in for 
beats with plenty bass  and 
lyr ics in haste 
if 
its
 meaning doesn’t 
manifest  
PUT IT  to rest  
I am 
a














vation  that is to see without 
SPEAKING   
take off your coat 
take notes I am 





 I am not a king or 
queen
 I’m  not rul





try   a small dedication to those that 
might know of me 
 
 294 
The sound of KRS-One’s rhymes here—inseparable fromthe musical track through 
which it is woven—vibrates through word processing, leaving as its echo an unusual yet 
compelling transcription.  Without this attention to how sounds perturb sights it becomes 
all too easy to forget what type’s standard display misses.  Nevertheless, what we have 
here initially comes across perhaps as a handful of words, syllables, and letters thrown on 
the page to form a chaotic mist.  Like such a random istribution, however, these 
transcribed lyrics manifest an intricate and complex order when attended to closely.  This 
weird way of writing reaches for and echoes the music of hiphop lyricism.  Listening 
transcription poses the same question Fred Moten suggests can be heard through the 
poetry of Amiri Baraka—“what if we let the music (no reduction to the aural, no mere 
addition of the visual but a radical nonexclusion of the ensemble of the senses such that 
music becomes a mode of organization in which principles dawn) take us?”6  The 
soundscape of “Poetry” suggests a possible destination. 
 Following hiphop’s musically organized movements, listening transcription can 
distinguish three interwoven currents of lyricism’s angular stream: content, percussion, 
and style.  Content comes through simply as the literal and figurative meanings of words 
as processed through the visual media of script, print, and type.  Meaning is not confined 
to content, but the recording, mixing, and broadcasting of its other frequencies is 
primarily accomplished through nonvisual means—sound technologies such as samplers, 
turntables, and microphones, for example.  Listening transcription resonates with this 
broader bandwidth by echoing the percussion and style of sound, thereby perturbing the 
serially linear pattern of writing and registering the divergent circularity of musical 
motion.  First, two varieties of percussion are marked: upbeat and downbeat, accent and 
 295 
emphasis, bold face and small caps.  Second, style—h  more complicated issue of tonal 
and microtonal (or timbral) variation—is traced in a way that seeks to present the 
paradoxically broken flowing of hiphop.  Each syllab e is lifted above or pushed below 
the central axis of a standard line, depending on whether its timbre is “high” or “low.”  
While granting a wave-like continuity, this vertical spacing also marks the breaks—
words flying apart, unruly syllables launching flights between lines, strange trajectories 
tracing the outlines of a conspicuous and irregularly shaped emptiness—that make for 
lyricism’s disjointed articulation, the angular fluency it shares with wildstyle graffiti, 
breakdancing, turntable technique, and sample-based production.  The limitations of the 
page, however, present a further difficulty.  In a perfect world, lyrics could be visually 
and graphically experienced—that is, simultaneously seen and touched, as well as 
heard—as twisted fibers of enormous length, entangling each other in a wavy fabric that 
enfolds the globe.  But given the relatively small wingspan necessary to make script, 
print, and type workable as means of recording, mixing, and broadcasting, the 
transcription of a musical world system runs up against limits that make horizontal 
spacing as much of a problem as vertical spacing is a solution.  That spacing would 
constitute such a central issue for the aesthetic criss- rossing listening transcription seeks 
to accomplish—its mixing of media through the juxtaposition of senses—should come as 
no surprise.  Spacing is after all, as Jacques Derrida in particular has brought to our 
attention, the fundamental characteristic of writing—and therefore that which most 
radically distinguishes it from other arts, such as music.7 
 The diversification of vertical spacing itself begins to loosen up the rigidity of 
writing’s horizontal spacing.  I utilized two additional means of limbering the line and 
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getting around page limits: a lack of punctuation and unjustified margins.  Together these 
two aspects reinforce a sense of broken flowing, the continuity of unpunctuated lines 
interrupted by boundaries displaced inside the body of the page, the interruptions in turn 
jumped by the off-beat push of the lyrics’ syncopation.  Presented between page and eye 
is a twisting, folding, entangled corpus infused with the sound of hiphop.  It is a sight that 
breathes, hears, and touches.  Emerging through this mixed-media experimentation is a 
network of overlapping embodiments laying the groundwork for the consensus of 
autonomous and potentially dissonant positions.  Navigating this tricky and tense domain 
calls for continually sustaining a perpetually off-kilter balance of structure and 
spontaneity, singularity and convention, by combining what happens to come within 
reach into a coherent shape that maintains the independence of juxtaposed elements.  
Listening transcription, then, is an aesthetic system of simultaneously composing, 
performing, and interpreting enactions that clear a sp ce for, house, and motivate 
embodiments of consensual autonomy (of affect).  By marking margins via two “Tab” 
key hits, breaks become internal to lines and vary in length depending upon their exact 
location on Microsoft Word’s virtual page.  Horizontal spacing achieves a degree of 
variability enabling precise scoring of silent voices, broken flow echoed through a 
collage of shattered rigidity’s shards, interanimated and reanimating fragmentation.  
Through this means I hope to both simulate the effects hiphop lyricism has upon listeners 
and emulate the way James, Stein, and Du Bois sound American literary modernism. 
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